Palm Beach Post agreed motion in Epstein records suit, July 2022

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA¶

CA FLORIDA HOLDINGS, LLC, Publisher of THE PALM BEACH POST,¶

Plaintiff,¶

v.¶

DAVE ARONBERG, as State Attorney of Palm Beach County, Florida; SHARON R. BOCK, as Clerk and Comptroller of Palm Beach County, Florida,¶

Defendants.¶

CASE NO.: 50-2019-CA-014681-AG¶

AGREED MOTION OF PLAINTIFF C PUBLISHER OF THE PALM BEACH JUDGE DONALD J. HAFELE TO R PENDING STATE ATTORNEY’S HIS ASSIGNMENT T E HOLDINGS, LLC THE HON. CIRCUIT JURISDICTION OVER THE NS MOTION [DE S0I AFTER VENILE DIVISION¶

O¶

Plaintiff, CA FLORIDA HOLDI the Publisher of The Palm Beach Post (“The Palm Beach Post”), moves for an o ting that Hon. Circuit Judge Donald J. Hafele retain jurisdiction over the State Atto ‘s Amended Motion for Sanctions under Florida Statutes § 57.105 [DE 50] a r his ssignment to the Juvenile Division, and in support states:¶

I. s c has a long history. As this Court is well aware, The Palm Beach Post brought t t seeking public disclosure of the State of Florida grand jury materials relating to the trim I prosecution of Jeffrey Epstein against both the Palm Beach County State Attorney’s Office and the Clerk and Comptroller. The sole issue remaining before the Court is the State Attorney’s November 9, 2020 Amended Motion for Sanctions under Florida Statutes § 57.105 [DE 50].¶

2. Initially both defendants, the Office of the State Attorney for Palm Beach County, Florida, and the Clerk and Comptroller of Palm Beach County, Florida, opposed public disclosure of the Epstein grand jury materials.

3. After the Office of the State Attorney ended its opposition to disclosure of the Epstein grand jury materials and adopted a neutral position, The Palm Beach Post cjropped the Office of the State Attorney from the case.

4. Nevertheless, the Office of the State Attorney moved for against The Palm Beach Post pursuant to Florida Statutes § 57.105, and filed its tion for Sanctions on November 9, 2020 [DE 50].

5. The Palm Beach Post opposes the Office o c Attorney’s Amended Motion for Sanctions, the motion has been fully briefed , ‘S S, evidentiary hearing on the Court’s non-jury k forr September 6, 2022 as the #4 back-up case. The Amended Motion had been two or dockets but was not reached. atter has been set for a two-hour

6. During the penden o dice of the State Attorney’s sanctions motion, The Palm Beach Post moved for su a j dgment before the Hon. Donald J. Hafele.

7. On Octo 21, this Court heard arguments for over 2 hours from counsel for The Palm Beach t and e Clerk and Comptroller as to the merits of The Palm Beach Post’s motion for s judgment. At the end of that hearing, the Court complimented counsel as to their and professionalism and acknowledged that the issues were complex and novel and required significant research and analysis.

8. On December 20, 2021, this Court issued a lengthy Opinion and Final Judgment that denied The Palm Beach Post’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed the action. A copy of the Final Judgment is attached as Exhibit A.

9. The Palm Beach Post filed a notice of appeal that remains pending.

10. In light of this Court’s intimate knowledge and experience with this case, as well as the Office of the State Attorney’s pending motion for sanctions, which addresses the complex and novel constitutional, statutory and common law issues that have been analyzed in this Court’s Final Judgment, this Court’s retention of jurisdiction solely to adjudicate the Office 9f the State Attorney’s motion for sanctions is warranted.

II. This Court’s familiarity with the case and its intricacies will i ial resources and will be far more efficient for the court system and the parties w judge who is unfamiliar with the case get up to speed.¶

12. The sanctions motion [DE 50] is the only pfetention by this Court, as the Final Judgment is on appeal, and there are no othera ding before the Circuit Court.

13. Retention for the sanctions mo c• NfrjNitiary i hearing, which is set for two hours, should not create an undue burden fort • ourt uvenile Division docket.

WHEREFORE, The Palm Bea t ectfully requests that this agreed motion be granted, that this Court retain jurisdicti ov the Office of the State Attorney’s Amended Motion for Sanctions under Florida § 57.105 [DE 50], and schedule a two-hour evidentiary hearing at the Court’s co ence, and grant such other relief as the Court deems just and proper.¶

CERTIFICATE OF CONFERRAL¶

2022, Lauren Whetstone, counsel for Plaintiff, CA Florida Holdings, LLC, the Publisher of The Palm Beach Post, conferred with Doug Wyler, counsel for Defendant, Dave Aronberg, as State Attorney of Palm Beach County, to seek his consent with regard to the relief sought in this Motion. Mr. Wyler, counsel for Dave Aronberg, agrees to the relief sought herein.¶

Respectfully submitted,¶

/s/ Mark Bideau¶

LAUREN WHETSTONE¶

Florida Bar No. 45192¶

MARK F. BIDEAU¶

Florida Bar No. 564044¶

777 South Flagler Drive, Suite 300 East¶

West Palm Beach, FL 33401¶

Tel.: 561.650.7900¶

whetstonel@gtlaw.com¶

bideaum tlaw.co¶

sandra.famadas¶

STEP ENDELSOHN¶

Flo . 849324¶

TRAURIG, P.A.¶

0 atlas Olas Boulevard, Suite 2000¶

” S\ rn rt auderdale, FL 33301¶

.: 954.768.8225¶

endelsohnsAgtlaw.com¶

* if smithlegtlaw.com¶

MICHAEL J. GRYGIEL¶

(Admitted Pro Hac Vice)¶

54 State Street, 6th Floor¶

Albany, NY 12207¶

Tel.: 518.689.1400¶

grvaielmeiztlaw.com¶

NINA D. BOYAJIAN¶

(Admitted Pro Hac Vice)¶

1840 Century Park East, Suite 1900¶

Los Angeles, CA 90067¶

Tel.: 310.586.7700¶

bovaiianna,etlaw.com¶

riveraal@gtlaw.com¶

Counsel for Plaintiff CA Florida Holdings, LW, Publisher of The Palm Beach Post¶

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE¶

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and accurate copy of the foregoing has been electronically filed with the Florida E-File Portal for e-service on all parties of record herein on July 22, 2022.¶

/s/ Mark Bideau¶

CoSA Mark Bideau¶

EXHIBIT “A”¶

NOT A CERTIFIED COPY¶

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA¶

CIRCUIT CIVIL DIVISION: AG CASE NO.: 50-2019-CA-014681 -XXXX-MB¶

CA FLORIDA HOLDINGS LLC PUBLISHER OF THE PALM BEACH POST,¶

Plaintiff/Petitioner¶

vs. DAVE ARONBERG, SHARON R BOCK, Defendant/Respondents.¶

FINAL JUDGMENT¶

THIS CAUSE came before the court on the mono Florida Holdings, LLC, publisher of The Palm complaint in this action. (D.E. # 58.) Th e ralhaining defendant, Abruzzo, in his capacity as the Clerk and Comptrolle each County (“the clerk”), filed a response to the motion on October I, 2021. (D. e Newspaper filed a reply on October 13, 2021. (D.E. # 77.) The motion was heard b e court on October 22, 2021. The court has considered the submissions of the c arueth arguments of counsel, the record in the case, and is otherwise advised of the i Because Count II of the Newspaper’s complaint, which is the only other count, h I” • sed of by Order filed June 7, 2020 (D.E. # 33), this is a final judgment in the mmary judgment of plaintiff CA case.’ os (“the Newspaper”), on Count I of its¶

Cos¶

{sup}&#x27; The court is aware that in an October 22, 2021, article published by the Newspaper it suggested that the court indicated at the hearing that it was inclined to release the records. The Newspaper may have misheard the court’s remarks during the hearing, which lasted nearly two hours. The court is not criticizing the Newspaper and has a great deal of respect for the reporter but must clarify that the court stated that it had not made a decision whether it would order that the grand jury records would be produced. (Hrg. Tr. at 19:11-16.) The court reiterated, “So, I just wanted¶

SUMMARY OF THE CASE AND ITS CURRENT STATUS¶

The Newspaper filed its complaint on November 14, 2019, seeking disclosure and production of documents, exhibits, testimony transcripts, audio and visual materials, and all other things (“the Materials”) presented to the 2006 grand jury in proceedings instituted by the State Attorney for the I5`” Judicial Circuit in and for Palm Beach County, Florida (“the State Attorney”) which resulted in an indictment of Jeffrey Epstein for one count of Felon itation of Prostitution, No. 50-2006-CF-009454-AXXX-MB, and a subsequent char g4 wring 5I Person Under Age 18 for Prostitution, 50-2008-CF-009381-AXXX-MB. In c : on June 30, 2008, Mr. Epstein pleaded guilty to the charge of Procuring Person 8 for Prostitution. He was sentenced to 12 months of community control in t uts of the Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office. (2008-CF-009381, D.E. # 11, 12; 9454, D.E. # 89.)¶

Count I of the Newspaper’s comp c in i’ oed a declaratory judgment that section 905.27(1)(c), Florida Statutes, should b - erp to permit disclosure of the Materials to the Newspaper so that it may then re r content as part of its continued investigation and reporting of matters relating to n. That count also seeks a declaration ordering disclosure of the Materials “pursuan re court’s] inherent authority over grand jury proceedings because of the exception ublic nterest in this case and the compelling circumstances supporting transparency ended Complaint, 1 71.)¶

PRELIMINARY PROCEDURAL ISSUE¶

The court notes that the only other defendant in this case, the State Attorney, has been dismissed, and there have been no attempts to intervene in this case to take a position against¶

to make that clear from the outset, that there will be no wholesale turning over of any records if and, again, that is a significant word — if the production is ordered.” (Hrg. Tr. at 20:9-13, emphasis added.)¶

disclosure. The clerk’s position is that he is merely the custodian of the Materials, and as such he has no real interest in the issues before the court as identified. The clerk only needs direction from the court on whether or not he should produce and disclose the Materials. Nonetheless, the clerk has zealously advocated the position against disclosure based upon grand jury secrecy and confidentiality because under Rule 2.420(d)(1XB)(xvi) of the Florida Rules of General Practice and Judicial Administration, the clerk is required to maintain the confidentialit4iand jury records.¶

The clerk is correct that his role as custodian of the Materials ’ direction once confidentiality is determined. The clerk’ complicated, or expanded, because the Newspaper and filed • ti a civil declaratory judgment clerk’s :11 proceeding has been action has moved for summary judgment u Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510. tt However, the proper procedure for obtaining • i f confidential court records is set forth in ci iss” Florida Rule of General Practice and J ial inistration 2.420(j), which only requires the filing of a “motion” seeking disclo . Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin Rule 2.420(jX2). 0ollow the court’s¶

Accordingly, the court ill t the Newspaper’s complaint and motion for summary judgment as a motion for under Rule 2.420(j).2 As a result, the court need not determine, as a matter of la hethef the clerk of the court is a proper party defendant to a declaratory judgment ac the release of grand jury records. Although the clerk of court is the proper¶

{sup}2 Rule 2.420(j)(3) requires a party seeking disclosure to serve the motion “on all parties and reasonably affected non-parties[.j” Of course, that did not occur here and would have been impossible to carry out, as “reasonably affected non-parties” cannot be determined without actually seeing the Materials. Because the court is denying the relief sought, however, this issue is academic.¶

subject of any order directing the release of protected grand jury records issued pursuant to Rule 2.420(j), under the rule it is not a “defendant” or “party” in relation to the requested itself.¶

The court’s determination to treat the Newspaper’s claim as a Rule 2.420(j) motion resolves another issue as well. The Newspaper devotes significant argument to its standing to prosecute this action, arguing that section 905.27 vests it with a private right of action. (Motion, 11 81-90.). First, the argument of whether section 905.27 creates a private ri ction was already substantively addressed by this court’s Order dismissing Cou e Amended Complaint. (D.E. # 33). Second, the court sees no reason to question e per’s standing to bring a Rule 2.420(j) motion, which is available to any mem th blic seeking access to records of the judicial branch. See Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & J . 2.420(a).¶

Lastly, even in treating the complaint and m ary judgment as a motion under Rule 2.420(j), there are no disputed fact issuer ssues before the court are issues of law. Accordingly, this is a final judgment.¶

SPUTED FACT¶

The facts germane tot fin I judgment are not in dispute and are recounted here. The 2006 grand jury was con n proceedings instituted by the State Attorney regarding alleged criminal miscon of a sexual nature by Jeffrey Epstein, now deceased. Materials were presented to d jury. The United States Department of Justice, by and through the office of the Ur1I tes Attorney for the Southern District of Florida, obtained the Materials.3 The¶

{sup}3 This fact is established by Exhibit 3 to the Newspaper’s motion, which is the United States Department of Justice, Office of Professional Responsibility Report, “Investigation into the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida’s Resolution of Its 2006-2008 Federal Criminal Investigation of Jeffrey Epstein and Its Interactions with Victims during the Investigation,” Nov. 2020 (“the Report”). The Report makes references to the fact that the federal government obtained and reviewed the Materials. See the Report at 20, n. 23, 26, 38 n. 67, 271 n. 425 and 283.¶

Newspaper operates and does business in Palm Beach County, Florida. The clerk is a duly elected governmental official, and he and his office have custody of the Materials.¶

ANALYSIS¶

The Newspaper appears to have presented questions of first impression regarding both the interpretation of section 905.27 and the “inherent authority” of the court. Those questions also implicate issues of constitutional import regarding the historic tension between secrecy and the First Amendment. Additionally, the Newspaper presents these que he context of genuine subjects of public interest and concern regarding the prosecu ss of Mr. Epstein. Mr. Epstein was a person of great wealth and influence acc A5of g a sex predator who engaged in criminal sex trafficking of minors, among oth tc ‘m¶

The public record establishes° that Mr. E Si t into a federal non-prosecution agreement with the United States Attorney foye l o ern District of Florida in exchange for a guilty plea in the then pending state cou e t ne count of procuring a minor for prostitution, for which he served less than a ye lease incarceration at the Palm Beach County Jail? Mr. Epstein was federally indi in 19 by the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York for the s of conduct during the 2002-2005 time-span preceding the 2006 state indictment the 2 8 no-prosecution agreement negotiated with the federal prosecutor. Mr. Epstein ver brought to trial on those 2019 charges, having committed suicide in his New Y 1.¶

{sup}° See the Report, referenced inn. 1, supra.¶

{sup}51d¶

In this Order, the court rules against the Newspaper because the established and binding maxims of Florida law constrain it to do so. As noted below, federal courts have departed from the limited prescriptions of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) in granting access to grand jury records in “special circumstances.” E.g., In re Petition of Craig, 131 F.3d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1997) (recognizing “that there are certain “special circumstances” in which release of grand jury records is appropriate even outside of the boundaries of [Rule 6(e)]”). Florida la ever, has yet to recognize such flexibility under either section 905.27 or Rule 2.420 • .)q¶

(A) Section 905.27 and the phrase “furthering j e.¶

The court first addresses the issue whether the Newspa c’ cla its within “the purpose of … furthering justice” under section 905.27(1)(c). ThAct 1 i of sections 905.27(1) and (2) provide context:¶

• (1) A grand juror, state attorney, assi to attorney, reporter, stenographer, interpreter, or any other person ap be re the grand jury shall not disclose the testimony of a witness exa • ed b ore the grand jury or other evidence received by it except when repo a court to disclose the testimony for the purpose of:
• (a) Ascertaining wheth it is consistent with the testimony given by the witness before the court;
• (b) Determ th r the witness is guilty of perjury; or
• (c) Fu ustice.

(2)“S(7►Itdlawful for any person knowingly to publish, broadcast, disclose, or communicate to any other person, or knowingly to cause or permit to be lished, broadcast, disclosed, divulged, or communicated to any other person, in any manner whatsoever, any testimony of a witness examined before the grand jury, or the content, gist, or import thereof, except when such testimony is or has been disclosed in a court proceeding. When a court orders the disclosure of such testimony pursuant to subsection (1) for use in a criminal case, it may be disclosed to the prosecuting attorney of the court in which such criminal case is pending, and by the prosecuting attorney to his or her assistants, legal associates, and employees, and to the defendant and the defendant’s attorney, and by the latter to his or her legal associates and employees. When such¶

disclosure is ordered by a court pursuant to subsection (1) for use in a civil case, it may be disclosed to all parties to the case and to their attorneys and by the latter to their legal associates and employees. However, the grand jury testimony afforded such persons by the court can only be used in the defense or prosecution of the civil or criminal case and for no other purpose whatsoever.¶

(Emphasis added.)¶

Reading subsection 1(c) (“furthering justice”) in tandem with subsection (2), it is evident that the phrase “furthering justice” is to be interpreted in the context of seeking disc of grand jury materials for use in a pending criminal or civil case. The Newspaper C edges that it is not seeking disclosure of the Materials for such a purpose. (Amend 114.) Instead, the Newspaper advocates a more expansive int Aca tan of the term “furthering or civil case, it seeks an additional declaration tha e ed use of the Materials “is not so justice” and also posits that because it is not seeking disclo it h) o aterials for use in a criminal \ limited” by section 905.27(2). (Id.) The New ts the ability to publish the Materials and i reference them in its reporting and also t ke t Materials available “to the public.” (Amended s tir Complaint, prayer at 21; Motion, t, ¶ 70; Motion ¶¶

The Newspaper makes tron guments to advance its more expansive construction of section 905.27 as part of ’ *ng justice.” Unquestionably, the established matters surrounding Mr. Epstein’s co t, the ircumstances of his resolution of the 2006 state charges and potential federal char his 2008 guilty plea and incarceration are matters of public interest, and disclo e Materials may arguably fall within the concept of “furthering justice” in the broadest, social sense of the phrase. Yet, the court’s interpretation of the scope of section 905.27¶

{sup}6 The Newspaper concedes in its submissions that the court could first conduct an in camera review of the Materials and redact any information the court deems sensitive, such as identities of “innocent parties.” (Amended Complaint, ¶ 9; Motion, ¶y 80 n.3, 110 n. 7.)¶

and of the phrase “furthering justice” is governed and constrained by the established rules of statutory construction.¶

In interpreting a statute, the court must respect the role of the legislature, the legislative process, and the language of the statute. “‘A court’s function is to interpret statutes as they are written and give effect to each word in the statute.” State v. Sampaio, 291 So. 3d 120, 125 (Fla. 4’h DCA 2020) (quoting Ha. Dept. of Revenue v. Fla. Mun. Power Agency, 789 (Fla. 2001). “[W]hen legislation is clear ‘our task is to apply the text, Kaplan v. Epstein, 219 So. 3d 932, 933 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (quoting Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120, 126 (1989). “It is our [c 320, 324 ove upon it.” eFlore v. Marvel to interpret the law as given us by the people in the Constitution or by the Legis t re not permitted to substitute judicial cerebration for law or that which we thin \e w ould be and command that it be l . i n enforced.” hr re Investigation of Circuit ,htd 11.4c th Judicial Circuit of Florida, 93 So. 2d 601, 608 (Fla. 1957). “As courts, we sh nev orget that in construing acts of the legislature, we are concerned only with the po r legislature to enact the law. Our peculiar social and economic views have no plac a consideration.” Tyson v. Lanier, 156 So. 2d 833, 838 (Fla. 1963).¶

Turning t lion 5.27, the term “furthering justice” as used in subsection (l)(c) cannot be read in a v without regard to the entire text of the statute, and particularly subsection (2). “Eve must [also] be read as a whole with meaning ascribed to every portion and due regard given to the semantic and contextual interrelationship between its parts.” Indian River County v. Ocean Concrete, Inc., 308 So. 3d 1010, 1014 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020) (quoting Ha. Dept! of Emit Prot. v. ContraciPoint LL(’, 986 So. 2d 1260, 1265 (Fla. 2008) (quoting Forsythe v. Longboat Key Reach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So. 2d 452, 455 (Fla. 1992)).¶

Subsection (2) clearly limits section 925.27’s scope to those instances in which grand jury testimony or materials need to be disclosed for use in a criminal or civil case. Subsection (2) provides that once grand jury testimony is disclosed in the course of a court proceeding, it is then open to unlimited dissemination. But before that occurs, the court must determine that one of the three needs prescribed in subsection (1) is present in a criminal or civil case that requires disclosure. There is nothing in section 905.27 that gives a court cane blanche aut to release grand jury materials in any situation that might bear some relationship to “fpMl g justtiice” in its broadest sense.¶

Accordingly, the Newspaper’s argument that section 2 the term “furthering justice” permits disclosure of grand jury materials in the si t .0 ;) st be denied here, where there is no criminal or civil case in which it is to be used.S \r¶

(B) The court’s “inherent S ” .”¶

Alternatively, the Newspaper ar tha e court has “inherent authority” to order the release of the Materials. At severe its submissions, the Newspaper asserts its “right” or “entitlement” to disclosure of rials under both section 905.27 and the court’s “inherent authority and supervisors.” (Amended Complaint ¶ 70, Motion, ¶¶ 86, 113, 114) There is, however, no proposition to gra Amendment right to the disclosure of grand jury materials. “A settled the press does not contest, is this: there is no First Amendment right of access eedings.” In re Motions of Dow & Co., 142 F.3d 496, 499 (D.C. Cir. 1998), cert. denied sub nom. Dow & Co., Inc. v. Clinton, 525 U.S. 820 (1998); accord, In re Sealed Case, 199 F.3d 522, 523 (D.C. Cir. 2000).¶

The Newspaper provides several passages from state and federal cases generally recognizing a court’s “inherent authority.” (Motion, ¶ 95.) The Newspaper also cites several¶

federal cases in which grand jury materials were disclosed, yet those cases substantially turn on Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e), which governs disclosure of grand jury materials and contains provisions not present in Florida statutes and rules. (Motion,1 96.) The Newspaper also references the recent example of a Kentucky state court releasing portions of grand jury testimony in the Breonna Taylor case under Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure 5.24, which gives Kentucky courts broad, unrestricted authority to “at any time … direct otherwlt regarding disclosure of grand jury materials. (Motion, ¶¶ 97-100.) Finally, the r cites In re Petition of Craig, 131 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 1997), in which the court there o umber of factors to consider in determining whether, under federal law and rule er ourt may release grand jury AO for reasons other than those enumerated in F e of Criminal Procedure 6(e). The Newspaper argues that this court should ap S tactors in exercising its “inherent ( \K authority” to release the Materials.¶

A court’s “inherent authority” h • s S bo daries. “[1]f a specific statute or rule applies, the trial court should rely on the rule or statute rather than on inherent authority.” Moakley v. Smallwood, 826 So d 2 1, 227 (Fla. 2002) (addressing inherent authority to sanction attorney misconduct); accl ntini v. Cleveland Clinic Florida, 65 So. 3d 22, 38 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (fmding th erred in relying on inherent authority instead of sanctions statute). “In a contes a clear, valid, unchallenged statute and a trial court’s general “inherent author atute must prevail.” Swearingen v. Pretzer, 310 So. 3d 1084, 1089 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) (Kelsey, J. dissenting).¶

The Newspaper has provided no Florida authority holding that a trial court may use its “inherent authority” to order disclosure of grand jury materials in the face of section 905.27, which governs and enumerates the circumstances under which grand jury materials may be disclosed. Again, the court acknowledges the Newspaper’s vibrant and sincere arguments for seeking disclosure as a matter of public interest and in “furthering justice” in the broader sense of the term. Nonetheless, “(u)nder fundamental principles of separation of powers, courts cannot judicially alter the wording of statutes where the Legislature clearly has not done so.” Fla. Dept of Revenue, 789 So. 2d at 324.¶

Even if “furthering justice as stated in section 905.27 could be exten diA yond the specific situations prescribed by that statute, still the court cannot do so, he court notes the Order issued by this court (The Honorable Krista Marx) in State of Fl i a ,grey Epstein, No. 50-5006-CF-009454-AXXX (Order, Jan. 4, 2020), in whhi a rt denied the Florida Department of Law Enforcement’s motion for disclosure 4 e grand jury materials at issue here:¶

Although the term “furthering exception in both common law and is actually quite narrow — it do justice,” but rather requires which outweighs any inte another manner. Brook! that “a party seeking d showing of a particulari (citing United St added))). Su speculatio trial c dete 66 t ” ms quite broad, the history of the m c se law establishes that the exception mpass any reason that could “further of a particularized and compelling need ntaining secrecy and cannot be satisfied in 495 So. 2d 135, 137-38 (Fla. 1986) (holding [of grand jury proceedings] must make a strong in order to outweigh the public interest in secrecy” Sells Enig, Inc.. 463 U.S. 418, 443 (1983) (emphasis a s owing must be comprised of “more than a mere surmise or Minto , 113 So. 2d at 365. If a party makes this a showing, then the examine the grand jury testimony in camera and make a of its materiality. Id. Disclosure should then be permitted only if the attainment of justice.” Brookings, 495 So. 2d at 138; Minton, 113 365.¶

This court reiterates that the term “furthering justice”, as recognized in the foregoing quote, still requires the showing of a particularized and compelling need which outweighs any interest in maintaining secrecy and cannot be satisfied in another manner. The court also finds that such a showing has not been made here.¶

It is true that “furthering justice” is an amorphous term which can be read to support a broad range of justifications for disclosure. Black’s Law Dictionary offers several contexts in which the term “justice” has been defined. Id. (11th Ed. 2019). It may well be that the disclosure of Jeffery Epstein’s grand jury records could reveal that fair treatment did not occur and that Mr. Epstein might have escaped appropriate punishment through some failing of our justice system. However, the public’s generalized interest in investigating that potential inj considered and weighed against the specific policies in favor of grand jury, preserve the safety of grand jurors and witnesses and encourage testimony in all cases submitted to grand jury. See Grand V J a Petersburg, Fla. 624 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (citi 41 “)i v. State, 113 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1959)). Here, the justification for disclosure is den as, y from the notoriety of the accused tone were enough to compel disclosure of ling effect on witnesses and jurors considering and the public’s suspicion of unfair treatment grand jury records, it could have an unin %., ed c must be —policies that and unhampered nn, A.D. v. City of St. the indictment of powerful indiv’ future grand jury proceedings. In any event, the Newspaper in the present case to establish a particularized and compelling need which outweighs any interest in ’ wing grand jury secrecy.¶

Finally, t court’ “inherent power” does not give it carte blanche to ignore legal mandate simply because it finds the underlying cause particularly worthy. umstances presented above will induce the Legislature to amend section 905.27 to precedent or Perha grant the courts additional authority or leeway in ruling on unique cases such as this one. Alternatively, an appeal of this order might persuade a higher court to establish a less restrictive interpretation of the “furthering justice” exception, the limitations of section 905.27, and the limits of a court’s “inherent authority.” Until that time, this court is bound by the fundamental doctrines of statutory construction, separation of powers and stare decisis to rule according to the law as it exists today.¶

CONCLUSION¶

Based upon the constraints imposed upon this court by section 905.27, the court has limited authority to order the release of grand jury records. No matter how palatable and persuasive the Newspaper’s arguments may be, the court cannot exercise that limited authority Nor does the court’s “inherent authority” permit it to broaden the statute’s limits. Th mends both parties’ attorneys for their exceptional oral and written presentations.¶

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDG a al judgment is hereby entered dismissing this action in its entirety. Defendant J e o, in his capacity as Clerk of the Circuit Court & Comptroller for Palm Bea 1 go hence without day. The court reserves jurisdiction to entertain any motio ur der Rule 1.525, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. This is a final, appealable judgment.¶

DONE and ENTERED in Palm Beach County, Florida.¶

+o¶

	Name	Address	Email
		n/a
CYNTHIA M GUERRA	n/a		Clerk_e-service@mypalmbeachclerk.com

	54 E fiti STAR T-6TH FLOOR
	ALB Y i Y
Name	Address	Email
DOUGLAS A. WYLER	201-I FERNANDINA BEACH, FL	doug.wyler@comcast.net
JAMES CULLEN MOONEY	n/a
KENNETH G. TURKEL	n/a
LAUREN R. WHETSTONE	777 S FLAGLER DR STE 300 E
MARK F. BIDEAU	n/a
NINA D. BOYAJIAN	UITE 1900 LOS ANGELES, CA
NINA D. B Y	n/a
SHANE B. T
		jnmcdonald@mY achcferk.com
		lisa.meri eta jocuva.com,
		teri.dele baidcuva.com
	5100 TOWN CENTER CIR SUITE	mendelsohns@gtlaw.com,
STEPHEN A. MENDELSOHN, ESQ		smithl@gtlaw.com,
	400 BOCA RATON, FL 33486	flservice@gtlaw.com