IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA¶
CIRCUIT CIVIL DIVISION: AG CASE NO.: 50-2019-CA-014681-XXXX-MB¶
CA FLORIDA HOLDINGS LLC PUBLISHER OF THE PALM BEACH POST,¶
Plaintiff/Petitioner¶
vs.¶
DAVE ARONBERG, SHARON R BOCK,¶
Defendant/Respondents.¶
FINAL JUDGMENT¶
THIS CAUSE came before the court on the motion Florida Holdings, LLC, publisher of The Palm Bea complaint in this action. (TIE # 58.) The ASks 9IC<( ea mg, defendant, Abruzzo, in his Bb judgment of plaintiff CA e Newspaper”), on Count I of its capacity as the Clerk and Comptroller of Im Be h.County (“die clerk”), filed a response to the k==,, motion on October 1, 2021. (D.E. # TheNewspaper filed a reply on October 13, 2021. (D.E # 77.) The motion was heard urt on October 22, 2021. The court has considered the submissions of the partiewohe arguments of counsel, the record in the case, and is otherwise advised of the pre es. Because Count II of the Newspaper’s complaint, which is the only other count, has b .spo of by Order filed June 7, 2020 (D. E. # 33), this is a final judgment in the case.t¶
Parry JOINT¶
ID0 J30 EV#73O DATEADMITTECE 2ZI¶
Joint Exhibit J30¶
I The court is aware that in an October 22, 2021, article published by the Newspaper it suggested that the court indicated at the hearing that it was inclined to release the records. The Newspaper may have misheard the court’s remarks during the hearing, which lasted nearly two hours. The court is not criticizing the Newspaper and has a great deal of respect for the reporter but must clarify that the court stated that it had not made a decision whether it wouldlorder that the grand jury records would be produced. (Hrg. Tr. at 19:11-1.6.)_The court reiterated, “So, I just wanted¶
SUMMARY OF THE CASE AND ITS CURRENT STATUS¶
The Newspaper filed its complaint on November 14, 2019, seeking disclosure and production of documents, exhibits, testimony transcripts, audio and visual materials, and all other things (“the Materials”) presented to the 2006 grand jury in proceedings instituted by the State Attorney for the 15{sup}th Judicial Circuit in and for Palm Beach County, Florida (“the State Attorney”) which resulted in an indictment of Jeffrey Epstein for one count of Felony Solicitation of Prostitution, No. 50-2006-CF-009454-AXXX-MB, and a subsequent charge of Procuring Person Under Age 18 for Prostitution, 50-2008-CF-009381-AXXX-MB. In both cases, on June 30, 2008, Mr. Epstein pleaded guilty to the charge of Procuring Person under Age 18 for Prostitution. He was sentenced to 12 months of community control in the custody of the Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office. (2008-CF-009381, D.E. # 11, 12; 2006-CF-009454, D.E. # 89.)¶
Count I of the Newspaper’s complaint seeks a declaratory judgment that section 905.27(1)(c), Florida Statutes, should be interpreted to permit disclosure of the Materials to the Newspaper so that it may then report on their content as part of its continued investigation and reporting of matters relating to Mr. Epstein. That count also seeks a declaration ordering disclosure of the Materials “pursuant to [the court’s] inherent authority over grand jury proceedings because of the exceptional public interest in this case and the compelling circumstances supporting transparency.” (Amended Complaint, ¶ 71.)¶
PRELIMINARY PROCEDURAL ISSUE¶
The court notes that the only other defendant in this case, the State Attorney, has been dismissed, and there have been no attempts to intervene in this case to take a position against¶
to make that clear from the outset, that there will be no wholesale turning over of any records if — and, again, that is a significant word — if the production is ordered.” (Hrg. Tr. at 20:9-13, emphasis added.)¶
disclosure, Thecleres position is that he is merely the custodian of the Materials, and as such he has no real interest in the issues beforethe court as identified. The clerk only needs direction from the court on whether or not he should produce and disclose the Materials. Nonetheless, the clerk has zealously advocated the position against disclosure based upon grand jury secrecy and confidentiality because finder Rule 2.420(d)(1)(3)(1,1i) of the.Florida Rules of Gene Practice and )tididial Administration, the clerk ivrequired to maintain the confidentiality > d jury IS records.¶
The clerk is correct that his role as custodian of the Materials i 0 low the court’s. direction once confidentiality is. determined, The cleric’s role ‘in t ocegling has been complicated, or expanded, because the Newspaper filed this .civil declaratory judgment action and .has moved for summary judgment and le of Ghia Procedure 1.510. However; the proper procedure for obtaining dj5, \_ of confidential court records is set forth in. Florida Rule of General Practice and Judi it istration 2.420(j), which only requires the filing of a “motion’ seeking diselo . Gen. Prac. & Jud..Admin Rule 2.4’20(j)(1).¶
Accordingly, the cou the Newspaper’s complaint and, motion for summary judgifient as a motion for ditclo nder Rule 2.420(j).2 As a result, the court need not deterititie, as a matter of law ve e clerk’of the court:is a proper party defendant to a declaratory judgment act release of grand jury -records. Although the clerk of court is the proper¶
{sup}2 Rule 2.4200X3) requires a party seeking disclosure to serve the motion “on all parties and, reasonably affected non-parties[.]” Of Course, that. did not occur here and would have been impossible to carry out, as “reasonably affected non-parties” cannot be determined without actually seeing the Materials. Because the court is denying the relief sought, however, this issue academic,¶
subject of any order directing the release of protected grand.jury records issued pursuant to Rule 2.420(j); under the rule ii is not a “defendant” or “party” in relation to the rruested itself.¶
The court’s determination to treat the Newspaper’s claim as a Rule 2.420(j) motion resolves another issue as well; The Newspaper devotes significant argument baits standing to prosecute this action, arguing that section 905.2ThestS it With a private right of action. (Motion, 81401. First, the argument of whether section 905,27 creates a priva e right: on was already substantively addressed by this court’s Order dismissing Coun Amended Complaint. (DIE. # 33). Second, the court sees ho reason to question er’s standing to bring a Rule 2.420(j) motion, which is available. to any member th is seeking access to records of the judicial branch. SoaFla. R. Gen. Prac. & lud¶
Lastly, even in treating the complaint and mo ary judgment as a motion under Rule 2.4200i there are no disputed fact issuesk4. ues before the court are issues of laws Accordingly, this is a final judgment.¶
TED FACTS¶
The facts germane to s n gment are not in dispute and arc recounted here. The 2006 gland jury. was convened oceedings instituted by.the State Attorney: regarding alleged criminal misconti of ual nature by Jeffrey Epstein, now deceaSed. Materials were presented to ury. The United States Department of Justice, by and throu-gh the office of the Uni Attorney for the Southern District of Florida, obtained the Materials.1 The¶
{sup}3 This fact is established by Exhibit 3 to. the Newspaper’s motion, which is the United States Department of Justice, Office of.Professional..Responsibility Report, “Investigation into the U.S.. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District ofFlorida’s Resolution °fits :20.06-2008 lederal ‘Criminal Investigation. of Jeffrey Epstein and Its Interactions with. Victims during the Investigation,” Nov. -2020 (‘•the Reportr)., The Report makes references to the fact that the federal government obtained and reviewed thelqaterials• See the Reptirtata 9, 23, 264 38.n, 67, 271 .n: 425 and 283.¶
Newspaper operates and does business in Palm Beach County, Florida. The clerk is a duly elected governmental official, and he and his office have custody of the Materials.¶
ANALYSIS¶
The Newspaper appears to have presented questions of first impression regarding both the interpretation of section 905.27 and the “inherent authority” of the court. Those questions also implicate issues of constitutional import regarding the historic tension between grand jury secrecy and the First Amendment. Additionally, the Newspaper presents these questions in the context of genuine subjects of public interest and concern regarding the prosecutorial process of Mr. Epstein. Mr. Epstein was a person of great wealth and influence accused of being a sex predator who engaged in criminal sex trafficking of minors, among other crimes.¶
The public record establishes{sup}4 that Mr. Epstein entered into a federal non-prosecution agreement with the United States Attorney for the Southern District of Florida in exchange for a guilty plea in the then pending state court case to one count of procuring a minor for prostitution, for which he served less than a year in work-release incarceration at the Palm Beach County Jail.{sup}5 Mr. Epstein was federally indicted in 2019 by the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York for the same type of conduct during the 2002-2005 time-span preceding the 2006 state indictment and the 2008 no-prosecution agreement negotiated with the federal prosecutor. Mr. Epstein was never brought to trial on those 2019 charges, having committed suicide in his New York jail cell.¶
{sup}4 See the Report, referenced in n. 1, supra.¶
{sup}5 Id.¶
1/1this Wet the Court rules agaitist the’Newspaper because the established and binding maxims of Florida law constrain itto do so. As noted below, federal courts have departed from the limited prescriptions of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) in granting access to grand jury records in “special circumstances:” 4g, In re Petition ofCraigi 131 F:3d 99; [02 (2c1Cir, 1997) (recognizing “that.there are certain “special circumstances”’ ‘which release of d, jury records is appropriate even.otitside of the boundaries of (Ride 607’). Yforida,law gr, has yet to recognize such flexibility under either section 903.27 orRule2.420(j)¶
(A) Section 90517 and the phrase “‘furthering ju c¶
The court first addresses the issue whether the Newspaper’ chit, within “the purpose of . furthering justice” under section 905.27(1Xc). TheJttll sections 905.27(1) and (2) provide.context:¶
- (l) .A. grand juror, state attorney; assist interpreter; or any other person ap the testimony of a witness exam receivedbyitexcept when r purpose of: norney, reporter; stenographer, the grand jury shall not disclose the grand. jury or other evidence court to diselose the testimony for the
- (a) Ascertaining W.h. sistent with the testimony given by the witness before the court; (I?) Determining (c)Furt Figju the witness is guilty of perjury; or
(2) wful for any person knowin0y to publith, broadcast, disclose, communicate to any other person, or knowingly to cause, or permit to !shed, broadcast, disclosed, divulged, or communicated to any other person, any manner whatsoever, any testimony of a witness examined before the g and jury; or the content, gist, Or import thereof, except when such testimony is of has been disclosed in a court proceeding. When a court orders the disclosure of such testimony, pursuant t9 subsection (1)for use in a criminal case, it may be disclosed to the prosecuting attorney o1’ the court. in which such criminal case, is pending, and by the prosecuting attorney to his orlher assistants, legal associates, and employees, and to the defendant and’the defendants attorney, and by the latter to his or her legal associates and eniployeel. When such¶
disclosure is ordered by a court pursuant to subsection (I) for use 0.• a civil case34/1t may be disclosed to all parties to the case and to their attorneys and by the latter to their legal associates and employees. However, the grand Airy testimony afforded such persons by the court can only be used in the defense or prosecution of the civil or criminal caseanil for no otherpurpose.vhatsoever.¶
(Emphasis added.)¶
Reading SubSettion (C) (“furthering justice”) iri tanderit With Stibtection,(2), it js evident. that the phrase afinthering justice” is to be interpreted in.the context of seekingdiscld$Rllfgrand jury materials .for use in a pending criminal or-civil case. The NewsPaPer riot seeking disclosure, of the Materials for such a purpoSe. (Amended 114.) Instead, the Newspaper advocates a more expansive int jliSti eV’ and also posits thatbe.causeit is:not seeking diSClOs or civil case,, it seeks an additional declaration that es that it is ¶ 70; Motion the term “furthering terialtforuSeina criminal use ofihe: Materials Is not so limited” by section 905:27(2) (iet) The Ne’s s the ability to publiSh the Materials and reference them in its reporting.and also torn Complaint, prayer $ 21; Motion, I. % aterials available “to the public.” (Amended¶
. The Newspaper:mak n vgtments, to advance its more expansive construction of section,905.27 as Mitt Of “fiirthe justice.” Unquestionably, the established Matters surrounding: Mr, Epstein’s con mstances of his resolution of the 2006 state charges and potential federal char: • s .2008 guilty plea and incarceration are matters of public interest,. and disclos aterials: may arguably fall-within the concept of “furthering justice” in the broade social sens.e of the phrase Yet; the court’s interpretation of the scope of section 905.27¶
{sup}6TheNewspaper concedes in its submissions that the court could first conduct an in camera review of the Materials and redact any information the court deems sensitive; such as identities of “innocent parties,” (Amended Complaint; ¶ 9.;M0tion, ¶¶ 84 n.3; 110 0, 7.)¶
and of the phrase “furthering justice” is governed and constrained by the established rules of statutory construction.¶
In interpreting a statute, the court must respect the role of the legislature, the legislative process, and the language of the statute. “A court’s function is to interpret statutes as they are written and give effect to each word in the statute.” State v. Sampaio, 291 So. 3d 120, 125 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020) (quoting Fla. Dept. of Revenue v. Fla. Mun. Power Agency, 789 So. 2d 320, 324 (Fla. 2001). “[W]hen legislation is clear ‘our task is to apply the text, not improve upon it.’” Kaplan v. Epstein, 219 So. 3d 932, 933 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (quoting Pavelic & LeFloré v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120, 126 (1989). “It is our [courts’] duty to interpret the law as given us by the people in the Constitution or by the Legislature. We are not permitted to substitute judicial cerebration for law or that which we think the law should be and command that it be enforced.” In re Investigation of Circuit Judge of Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida, 93 So. 2d 601, 608 (Fla. 1957). “As courts, we should never forget that in construing acts of the legislature, we are concerned only with the power of the legislature to enact the law. Our peculiar social and economic views have no place in such a consideration.” Tyson v. Lanier, 156 So. 2d 833, 838 (Fla. 1963).¶
Turning to section 905.27, the term “furthering justice” as used in subsection (1)(c) cannot be read in a vacuum, without regard to the entire text of the statute, and particularly subsection (2). “Every statute must [also] be read as a whole with meaning ascribed to every portion and due regard given to the semantic and contextual interrelationship between its parts.” Indian River County v. Ocean Concrete, Inc., 308 So. 3d 1010, 1014 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020) (quoting Fla. Dept’ of Envlt. Prot. v. ContractPoint Fla: [REDACTED], LLC, 986 So. 2d 1260, 1265 (Fla. 2008) (quoting Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So. 2d 452, 455 (Fla. 1992)).¶
Subsection (2) clearly limits section 925.27’s scope to those instances in which grand jury testimony or materials need to be disclosed for use in a criminal or civil case. Subsection (2) provides that once grand jury testimony is disclosed in the course of a court proceeding, it is then open to unlimited dissemination. But before that occurs, the court must determine that one of the three needs prescribed in subsection (1) is present in a criminal or civil case that requires disclosure. There is nothing in section 905.27 that gives a court carte blanche authority to release grand jury materials in any situation that might bear some relationship to “furthering justice” in its broadest sense.¶
Accordingly, the Newspaper’s argument that section 905.27 and the term “furthering justice” permits disclosure of grand jury materials in the situation must be denied here, where there is no criminal or civil case in which it is to be used.¶
(B) The court’s “inherent authority.”¶
Alternatively, the Newspaper argues that the court has “inherent authority” to order the release of the Materials. At several places in its submissions, the Newspaper asserts its “right” or “entitlement” to disclosure of the Materials under both section 905.27 and the court’s “inherent authority and supervisory powers.” (Amended Complaint ¶ 70, Motion, ¶¶ 86, 113, 114) There is, however, no First Amendment right to the disclosure of grand jury materials. “A settled proposition, one that the press does not contest, is this: there is no First Amendment right of access to grand jury proceedings.” In re Motions of Dow [REDACTED] & Co., 142 F.3d 496, 499 (D.C. Cir. 1998), cert. denied sub nom. Dow [REDACTED] & Co., Inc. v. Clinton, 525 U.S. 820 (1998); accord, In re Sealed Case, 199 F.3d 522, 523 (D.C. Cir. 2000).¶
The Newspaper provides several passages from state and federal cases generally recognizing a court’s “inherent authority.” (Motion, ¶ 95.) The Newspaper also cites several¶
federal cases in which grand jury materials were: disclosed, yet.those cases- substantially turn on. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e), which governs disclosure of grand jury materials’ nd .contains.provisions notpresent in ‘Florida statutes and rules. (Motion, 1.96.) The Newspaper also. references the recent example of aKentucky state court-releasing portions of grand jury testimony in. the Bretnin-a Taylor case under KentuCky Rule of Criminal ProadOtt 5.24, *rich gives Kentucky courts broad, unrestricted authority to ‘at any time . . , direct’ °therm rding disclosure. of grand. jury materials. (Motion, 11 97-100). Finally, the N. - L4 r cites. In. re Petition of Craig, 131 F:3d 99(2d Cir. 1007), in which the court there: . c mber of factors. to.contiderin determining whether; under federal law anct wie, a . rt may release:grand juryintietiril fa-treasons other than those enumerated iii F of Criminal:Procedure 6(e). The Newspaper argues that this court should appappl ay 1E ors in. exercising. its “inherent authority” to release theMaterials.¶
A court’s “inherent:authotity” h the trial court should rely on the Moakleyvi Spialhvoocl, 826 2 7 (Fla. 2002) (addressing inherent authority tosanction attorney misc:Orlduct);aceord, i y •Cleveitnad CliniaTIOtidd; 65 So..3d 22, 18 (Fla. 4th DCA nd aGies. “[I]f a specific statute or rule applies, le or statute rather than on inherent authority.” 201.1) (finding th trial r tirt’etred 10 relying on inherent authority instead of•aanctionsstagne), “In a mint a. dear, -valid, unchallenged statute and .a trial courts’ general. “inherent authoti to must prevail.” Swearingen v. Pretzer,110 So. 3d .1.084, 1089 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) elsey”.1 dissenting).¶
The Newspaper has provided no ‘Florida authority bolding that a Onto:sun slay use its “inherent authority” to order disclosure of grand jury material; inthe face asection905.27, which governs and enumerates the circumstances under which grand. jury’ materials maybe disclosed.¶
Again, the court acknowledges the Newspaper’s vibrant and sincere arguments for seeking disclosure as a matter of public interest and in “furthering justice” in the broader sense of the term. Nonetheless, “(u)nder fundamental principles of separation of powers, courts cannot judicially alter the wording of statutes where the Legislature clearly has not done so.” Fla. Dept. of Revenue, 789 So. 2d at 324.¶
Even if “furthering justice” as stated in section 905.27 could be extended beyond the specific situations prescribed by that statute, still the court cannot do so, here. The court notes the Order issued by this court (The Honorable Krista Márx) in State of Florida v. Jeffrey Epstein, No. 50-5006-CF-009454-AXXX (Order, Jan. 4, 2020), in which the court denied the Florida Department of Law Enforcement’s motion for disclosure of the same grand jury materials at issue here:¶
Although the term “furthering justice” seems quite broad, the history of the exception in both common law and modern case law establishes that the exception is actually quite narrow – it does not encompass any reason that could “further justice,” but rather requires the showing of a particularized and compelling need which outweighs any interest in maintaining secrecy and cannot be satisfied in another manner. Brookings v. State, 495 So. 2d 135, 137-38 (Fla. 1986) (holding that “a party seeking disclosure [of grand jury proceedings] must make a strong showing of a particularized need in order to outweigh the public interest in secrecy” (citing United States v. Setts Eng’g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 443 (1983) (emphasis added))). Such a showing must be comprised of “more than a mere surmise or speculation” Minton, 113 So. 2d at 365. If a party makes this a showing, then the trial court may examine the grand jury testimony in camera and make a determination of its materiality. Id. Disclosure should then be permitted only if “essential to the attainment of justice.” Brookings, 495 So. 2d at 138; Minton, 113 So. 2d at 365.¶
This court reiterates that the term “furthering justice”, as recognized in the foregoing quote, still requires the showing of a particularized and compelling need which outweighs any interest in maintaining secrecy and cannot be satisfied in another manner. The court also finds that such a showing has not been made here.¶
It is true that “furthering justice” is an amorphous term which can be read to support a broad range of justifications for disclosure. Black’s Law Dictionary offers several contexts in which the term “justice” has been defined. Id. (11th Ed. 2019). It may well be that the disclosure of Jeffery Epstein’s grand jury records could reveal that fair treatment did not occur and that Mr. Epstein might have escaped appropriate punishment through some failing of our justice system. However, the public’s generalized interest in investigating that potential injustice must be considered and weighed against the specific policies in favor of grand jury secrecy—policies that preserve the safety of grand jurors and witnesses and encourage their frank and unhampered testimony in all cases submitted to grand jury. See Grand Jury Fall Term, A.D. v. City of St. Petersburg, Fla. 624 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (citing Minton v. State, 113 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1959)). Here, the justification for disclosure is derived primarily from the notoriety of the accused and the public’s suspicion of unfair treatment. If that alone were enough to compel disclosure of grand jury records, it could have an unintended chilling effect on witnesses and jurors considering the indictment of powerful individuals in future grand jury proceedings. In any event, the Newspaper in the present case has failed to establish a particularized and compelling need which outweighs any interest in maintaining [REDACTED] jury secrecy.¶
Finally, this court’s “inherent power” does not give it carte blanche to ignore legal precedent or statutory mandate, simply because it finds the underlying cause particularly worthy. Perhaps the circumstances presented above will induce the Legislature to amend section 905.27 to grant the courts additional authority or leeway in ruling on unique cases such as this one. Alternatively, an appeal of this order might persuade a higher court to establish a less restrictive interpretation of the “furthering justice” exception, the limitations of section 905.27, and the limits of a court’s “inherent authority.” Until that time, this court is bound by the fundamental doctrines¶
of statutory construction, separation of powers and stare decisis to rule according to the law as it exists today.¶
CONCLUSION¶
Based upon the constraints imposed upon this court by section 905.27, the court has limited authority to order the release of grand jury records. No matter how palatable and persuasive the Newspaper’s arguments may be, the court cannot exercise that limited authority here. Nor does the court’s “inherent authority” permit it to broaden the statute’s limits. The court commends both parties’ attorneys for their exceptional oral and written presentations.¶
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED that final judgment is hereby entered dismissing this action in its entirety. Defendant Joseph Abruzzo, in his capacity as Clerk of the Circuit Court & Comptroller for Palm Beach County, shall go hence without day. The court reserves jurisdiction to entertain any motion filed under Rule 1,525, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. This is a final, appealable judgment.¶
DONE and ENTERED in Palm Beach County, Florida.¶
| Name | Address | |
|---|---|---|
| n/a | ||
| CYNTHIA M GUERRA | n/a | Clerk_e- |
| service@mypalmbeachclerk.com |
| Name | Address | |
|---|---|---|
| DOÜGLÁS A. WYLER | 961687 GATEWAY BLVD SUITE | |
| 201-I FERNANDINA BEACH, FL | ||
| 32034 | doug.wyler@comcast.net | |
| JAMES CULLEN MOONEY | n/a | jmooney@bajocuva.com, |
| lheckman@bajocuva.com | ||
| JESSICA NEER MCDONALD | POST OFFICE BOX 229 WEST | |
| PALM BEACH, FL 33401 | CLERK_E- | |
| SERVICE@MYPALMBEACHCLERK.COM, | ||
| jnmcdonald@mypalmbeachclerk.com | ||
| KENNETH G. TURKEL | n/a | kturkel@bajocuva.com, |
| lisa.meriwether@bajocuva.com, | ||
| teri.deleo@bajocuva.com | ||
| LAUREN R. WHETSTONE | 777 S FLAGLER DR STE 300 E | |
| WEST PALM BEACH, FL 33401 | WHETSTONEL@GTLAW.COM, | |
| flservice@gtlaw.com, | ||
| sandra.famadas@gtlaw.com | ||
| MÄRK F. BIDEAU | n/a | bideaum@gtlaw.com, |
| thomasd@gtlaw.com, | ||
| FLService@gtlaw.com | ||
| MICHÄEL GRYGIEL | 54 STATE STREET 6TH FLOOR | |
| ALBANY, NY 12207 | GRYGIELM@GTLAW.COM | |
| MICHAEL J. GRYGIEL | n/a | grygielm@gtlaw.com |
| NINA D. BOYAJIAN | 1840 CENTURY PARK EAST | |
| SUITE 1900 LOS ANGELES, CA | ||
| 90067 | ||
| NINA D. BOYAJIAN | n/a | boyajiann@gtlaw.com, |
| riveraal@gtlaw.com | ||
| SHANE B. VOGT | n/a | shane.vogt@bajocuva.com, |
| garnold@bajocuva.com | ||
| STEPHEN A. MENDELSÖHN, ESQ | 5100 TOWN CENTER CIR SUITE | |
| 400 BOCA RATON, FL 33486 | mendelsohns@gtlaw.com, | |
| smithl@gtlaw.com, | ||
| flservice@gtlaw.com |