Court filing, 2021-04-22

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT TN AND FOR PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA¶

CA FLORIDA HOLDINGS, LLC, CASE NO.: 50-2019-CA-014681-XXXX-MB Publisher of THE PALM BEACH POST,¶

DIVISION: AG¶

v.¶

DAVE ARONBERG, as State Attorney of Palm Beach County, Florida; SHARON R. BOCK, as Clerk and Comptroller of Palm Beach County, Florida,¶

APPENDIX TO MOTION OF PLAINTIFF CA FLORIDA HOLDINGS, LLC FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND INCORPORATED MEMORANDUM OF LAW¶

• 1. Excerpts from the March 19, 2010 deposition of Detective Recarey (Volume I and In
• 2. Excerpts from the April 27, WO [lion of Detective Recarey (Volume III and
  • IV)
• 3. November 2020 artme of Justice Office of Professional Responsibility Report
• 4. Excerpts frgat the vember 23, 2009 video-taped deposition of Michael Reiter (Volume I and
• 5. 6 Michael S. Reiter, Chief of Police, letter to Barry E. Krischer, State Attorney
• 6. Indictment
• 7. Non-Prosecution Agreement and Addendum to the Non-Prosecution Agreement
• 8. Plea Deal
• 9. July 8, 2019 Geoffrey S. Berman, United States Attorney, letter to The Honorable Henry Pitman re: United States v. Jeffrey Epstein; Case No. 19 CR 490 (RMB)

• (RMB)

• 12. Palm Beach Post articles
• 13. June 3, 2020 Hearing Transcript on the Motion to Dismiss in
• 10. July 8, 2019 Department of Justice U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York Press Release “Jeffrey Epstein Charged in Manhattan Federal Court With Sex Trafficking Of Minors”
• 11. August 27, 2019 Hearing Transcript from United States District Court of the Southern District of New York, United Sates of America v. Jeffrey Epstein; Case No. 19 CR 490 4,Aski kedrt of Palm Beach County, CA Florida Holdings LLC Publisher of the Pa c)eac ost v. Dave Aronberg, Sharon R. Bock; Case No. 50-2019-A-014681 “s milted,

Dated: April 22, 2021¶

+6s¶

ERG TRAURIG, P.A.¶

s for CA Florida Holdings, LLC, lisher of The Palm Beach Post¶

tephen A. Mendelsohn, Esq. 401 East Las Olas Blvd., Ste. 2000 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Telephone: (954) 768-8225 Facsimile: (561) 338-7099¶

By: /s/ Stephen A. Mendelsohn¶

STEPHEN A. MENDELSOHN Florida Bar No. 849324 mendelsohns@gtlaw.com smithl@gtlaw.com FLServiceQgtlaw.com¶

By: /s/ Michael./ Grpgiel¶

MICHAEL J. GRYGIEL (Admitted Pro Hac Vice) 54 State St., 6th Floor Albany, New York 12207 Telephone: (518) 689-1400 Facsimile: (518) 689-1499 grvgielmegtlaw.com¶

By: /s/ Nina D. Boyajian¶

NINA D. BOYAJIAN¶

(Admitted Pro Hac Vice)¶

1840 Century Park East, Ste. 1900¶

Los Angeles, California 90067¶

Telephone: (310) 586-7700¶

Facsimile: (310) 586-7800¶

boyajiann@gtlaw.com¶

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE¶

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 22od day of April, 2021, a true foregoing has been filed with the Clerk of the Court using the Stab which will send a notice of electronic service for all parties ofhen t copy of the e-filing system,¶

St 4 erdelsohn )¶

. MENDELSOHN¶

Appendix 1¶

sic¶

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA¶

CASE NO. 08-CIV-80119-MARRA/¶

-vs- VOLUME I OF¶

JEFFREY EPSTEIN, AS ’¶

P¶

08-80232, 08-08380, 08-80381 - 994 ,S 100¶

08-80993, 08-80811, 08-808 , 0469¶

09-80591, 09-80656, 09-8 , -81092¶

OSITION OF IVE RECAREY

¶

I III9v¶

Friday, March 19, 2010¶

9:37 - 5:12 p.m.¶

250 Australian Avenue South Suite 1500 West Palm Beach, Florida 33401¶

Reported B :¶

Cynthia , RPR, FPR Notary Public, State of Florida Prose Court Reporting Job No.: 1509¶

1 IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA 2 CASE No.502008CA037319XXXXMB AB¶

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B.B.¶

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• VS-

JEFFREY EPSTEIN AND¶

VOLUME I OF II A.¶

O ‘S¶

DEPOS DETECTIV RECAREY¶

arch 19, 2010¶

• 5:12 p.m.

stralian Avenue South Suite 1500 Palm Beach, Florida 33401¶

Reported By: Cynthia , RPR, FPR Notary Public, State of Florida Prose Court Reporting Job No.: 1509¶

1 Q. I understand. Now, it’s obviously not 2 public at that point. You’re keeping the 3 investigation private?¶

4 A. Correct.¶

5 Q. But nonetheless all those 6 you would have reviewed from Ms. 7 been business records of the police 8 the time? documents that Pagan would depart¶

9 A. Correct.¶

10 Q. 11 12 13 I understand. Now, w information from Detective P l’iiA\o, sr through exactly what ilik plained occurred to her? u reviewed this ould you walk us¶

14 MR. PIKE.¶

(1 5) (THE W (She was taken to)¶

(1 9) (20 21 22 23 THE WITNESS: (Once she got there, she was! taken upstairs to the bedroom area.) (At that; (time what my understanding was is they were) (taken to the bedroom area through the stairwell) (where Mr. Epstein was awaiting to do a massage.’¶

24 (MR. KUVIN:) (Okay¶

(3) THE WITNESS:’, (The massage began.) (At some)¶

(:.5::)¶

IMr. Epst house for the purpose of making) (money viding a massage.)¶

. KUVIN:) (Okay¶

Q (point during the massage Mr. Epstein — this is’ (all off recollection by the wayj¶

CD MR. KUVIN: (If you want to use the) (incident report, what we’re referring to would (be on Pages 11 through roughly 15 of the; (incident report —)¶

0 MR. PIKE: (Just¶

10 (11) (7) MR. PIKE: (Just so th (we’re still on the one t rd is clear,) There is a (form objection on t m answer.)¶

0 14 (7 (THE WITNESS It as — I haven’t found) (exactly where oes into the story, however) I know -2,¶

17 18 19 — where there was some¶

20¶

21 (A vibrator?)¶

22 ) Correct.¶

23 24 25 0 mcaxi (Was she asked to take her clothes) (off according to what she told the police) (dpartment?)¶

16 (MR. UV NO (I think it’s at Page 14.)¶

(MR. KUVIN:) if you need i (refresh your recollection.)¶

(1) (MR. PIKE:) Form.¶

(2) (THE WITNESS:) Yes.¶

(3) (BY MR. KUVIN:)¶

(4) (Q.) (And how old was she at the time?)¶

(5) (MR. PIKE:) Form.¶

(6) (THE WITNESS:) Fourteen.¶

(7) (BY MR. KUVIN:)¶

(8) (Q.) (Was there an investigation as to how [REDACTED])¶

(9) (actually was taken to the home?) (In other words did)¶

(10) (you determine who took her there?)¶

(11) (A.) (Correct.)¶

(12) (Q.) (Who was that?)¶

(13) (A.) (Haley Robson.)¶

(14) (MR. PIKE:) Form.¶

(15) (BY MR. KUVIN:)¶

(16) (Q.) (Did Ms. Pagan interview Ms. Robson?)¶

(17) (A.) (No, she did not.)¶

(18) (Q.) (Not at this point?)¶

(19) (A.) (No.)¶

(20) (Q.) (Did you ultimately interview Ms. Robson?)¶

(21) (A.) (Yes, I did.)¶

(22) (Q.) (With respect to what [REDACTED] explained, I)¶

(23) (would like to walk through this if I could for a)¶

(24) (minute.)¶

(25) (MR. PIKE:) (What page are you on?)¶

OD MR. KUVIN: Fourteen.¶

CD 0.3Y MR. KUVIN:)¶

10¶

11 MR. PIKE:¶

12 (BY MR. KTJVIN:)¶

CD CD D Was there another woman that she described; (in the home at Epstein’s house?)¶

(T) THE WITNESS: (Yes.) (She described (blonde female which I believe was Nad ilglp,¶

CD¶

(T¶

14¶

15 (If I can just — I am going)¶

(7 to —¶

17 Yeah, take a look.¶

(7) (Nadia was the one who took)¶

(7 upstairs, I believe.)¶

20 MR. PIKE: (Form.)¶

(7¶

22 LUpstairs in Mr. Epstein’s house?)¶

CED (MR. PIKE:, (Same objection.)¶

gD THE WITNESS: (Yes.)¶

25¶

MR. PIKE: (Form.¶

BY MR. KUVIN: )¶

0 (7) (The same home that we described before on,¶

CD MR. PIKE: (Form.)¶

CD (this .) (When she gets upstairs, the womip es the¶

(1 MR. PIKE: (Form.)¶

11 AC.;) THE WITNESS: Corr -c¶

(I (BY MR. KUVIN : )¶

13 (okay] At t 4Srnt does she tell you)¶

14 (that Mr. Epstein c¶

(: MR. P¶

16 THE T ESS:) (This is what she’s informing)¶

17 Of fic gan.¶

18 BY UVI :¶

(7 Pagan, yes?)¶

21 MR. PIKE: (Same objection.)¶

22 (BY MR. KUVIN:)¶

23 (51 (All right.) (And what does Mr. Epstein do)¶

24 (at that point according to what) explained?,¶

25 MR. PIKE: (Form.)¶

20 A. (Yes.)¶

BY MR. KUVIN:¶

(El Brillo Way?)¶

THE WITNESS: (Yes.)¶

(BY MR. KUVIN:)¶

(room?)¶

ED (All right.) (Let’s walk through {sup}s¶

U¶

0 off her clothes.)¶

CD (:) (Okayi (And she’s 14 at this point?)¶

10 (take off her clothes?)¶

11 (MR. PIKE:) (Form.)¶

CD (What did) explain was hi em nor,¶

(I Jli a he was stern when) THE WITNESS:¶

13 (he instructed he move her clothing¶

(L¶

17 ITNESS:) In a towel:¶

18 (BY MR UV(Illr)ia¶

19 a (Could you explain to us exactly what)¶

20 Epstein supposedly instructed her to do —)¶

21 MR. PIKE: (Form.)¶

22 BY MR. KUVIN:¶

23 (Q.) (— and then what he did?)¶

24 MR. PIKE: (Same objection.)¶

25 THE WITNESS:’ (He instructed her to provide)¶

16 (Form.)¶

THE WITNESS: He told her to remove, take¶

(BY MR. KUVIN::¶

MR. PIKE: (Form.¶

THE WITNESS: Correct.¶

(BY MR. KUVIN:¶

(Mr. Epstein’s demeanor with respect t a ing her to)¶

AC.;)¶

(a massage pointing to the specific lotion for) (her to use.) (He laid on the table face down.) C (As she was providing the massage, he asked her) (to get onto his back.) (She straddled herself (along his back and advised that her exposed) (buttocks was touching his bare buttocks.¶

12¶

13¶

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25¶

was Q. Okay. Did describe what her reaction to what was occurring at this point?¶

MR. PIKE: (Form, move to strike.¶

(BY MR. KUVIN:)¶

(fl (What happened next?)¶

MR. PIKE:) (Form.)¶

THE WITNESS: (He tAr ver onto his back) ss,¶

(and was masturbatin¶

BY MR. KUVIN:¶

Q. Okay. according to he asturbate to conclusion¶

MR. Form.¶

WITNESS: It doesn’t state in the 44;;ft.¶

KUVIN:¶

MR. KUVIN: Form.¶

THE WITNESS: She was disgusted by his actions but didn’t say anything.¶

Q. Okay. And what does she describe occurs 3 between her, Mr. Epstein, if anything?¶

5 MR. PIKE: Form.¶

7 THE WITNESS: It was oral sex perfo, d on her. There was strap-on penises util4it .¶

8 9 There was other sexual toys being u vibrator.¶

10 BY MR. KUVIN:¶

11 12 13 Q. Does she describe Mr. Epstein actually puts vagina or not? nec wingers inside of her¶

14 ?S” A. Yes.¶

15 MR. P . 1 OrM.¶

16 BY MR. KUVIN:¶

17 Q. does she state about that?¶

18 ?S M . PIKE: Form.¶

To) 7-T) (::) (his fingers in her vagina in an attempt to make”, ,her climax as she was masturbating him.: THE WITNESS: (That Mr. Epstein inserted;¶

24. (Sixteen.)

25 All right. At some point you have to stop¶

BY MR. KUVIN:)¶

All of this while she was how old?¶

2 Q. — any lawful reason why you could think 3 of why a 16-year-old girl could describe 4 Mr. Epstein’s penis?¶

5 MR. PIKE: Form.¶

6 THE WITNESS: No.¶

7 BY MR. KUVIN:¶

8 9 10 Q. Did Ms. Jane Doe No. 103 des be hether or not she had an ongoing sexual rela ship with Mr. Epstein and¶

11 A. Yes, she did. She s that —¶

12 MR. PIKE: For¶

(13) (THE WITNESS stated that when she)¶

14 (would come ov ere was, she would have,¶

E either rel with Nadia or — and at one¶

16 point sh¶

0E-7) (photo hs taken of her in the tub with Nadia.)¶

18 ^ M . PIKE: Form.¶

19 KUVIN:¶

20 Q. Did you ever recover those photographs?¶

21 A. No.¶

22 MR. PIKE: Form, move to strike the 23 previous response.¶

24 MS. EZELL: Mr. Kuvin, excuse me. I was 25 trying to object to the form of the previous¶

1 second paragraph from the bottom.¶

2 3 A. I know, but do you want to me to use her name or use the redacted portions of it?¶

4 5 Q. Yes. We’re discussing Ms. Jane Doe No. 103 at this point.¶

6 7 8 A. “Jane Doe No. 103 advised one day, 4e Doe No. 103 was unable to state the exact dates incident occurred.”¶

9 10 Q. I’m sorry. Read it to your and I will just ask you questions.¶

11 A. Okay.¶

12 13 14 Q. Sorry about ti t*. Did Ms. Jane Doe No. 103 describe to y aNncident that occurred in the massage room a pstein’s home?¶

15 A. Yes.¶

16 MR. tIKE: Form.¶

17 BY MR. KUV¶

18 19 20 And what did she describe to you with to Epstein and her and any contact that he have had with her?¶

21 MR. PIKE: Form.¶

24. Epstein were in the bedroom., (They were already)

25. naked.’ (She had removed her clothing There

4(:;)¶

THE WITNESS:’, She stated that she had gone)¶

up to the bedroom and that both and¶

0 (was an appointed time when her and Nadia began)¶

CD stated that she had achieved climax.¶

CD (point Mr. Epstein put her onto the sage¶

CD (vagina.)¶

9 BY MR. KUVIN: 5 11)¶

10 11 Q. Did she say whether or this was consensual or not?¶

12 MR. PIKE: For . AS; ‘ssr¶

13 THE WITNESS. Th was not consensual.¶

15 16 Q. And w she say occurred happened at that point?¶

kissing, touching on the massage table. (She)¶

(All the while this was occurring)¶

(Mr. Epstein was masturbating (At one¶

(table and inserted his penis intd r¶

c’¶

17 .PIKE: Form.¶

18 19 ry quick. He removed himself from her 20 vagina. THE WITNESS: She said this occurred for¶

21 B MR. KUVIN:¶

22 Q. Did she say whether or not she told him 23 no?¶

24 A. Yes.¶

25 MR. PIKE: Form, move to strike.¶

1 A. Yes.¶

2 Q. All right. And you were present?¶

4 Q. Tell us, if you would, how you found the 5 6 state of the home when you arrived on that date for the inspection? 44664 r¶

7 MR. PIKE: Form.¶

8 9 MR. KUVIN: Or for the execu ’ •f t he warrant, excuse me.¶

10 11 12 THE WITNESS: It was d fi ned, obviously when we were in the hou e, t t the house was Ass., somewhat sanitized. AS ,¶

13 MR. PIKE: m7Se¶

14 MR. KUVI scribe what you mean.¶

15 we just got disconnected.¶

16 Ms.¶

17 rief recess was held.)¶

18 iM iiir . KUVIN: We lost you, Kathy.¶

19 MS. EZELL: Sorry. Lost you for a minute.¶

20 . KUVIN:¶

21 ED (All right.) (You mentioned before we took¶

24. sanitized. (Can you describe what you mean by that?)

25. (MR. PIKE: (Form.

(quick break there that you felt that the house was,)¶

(or you determined that the house was somewhat)¶

1 THE WITNESS: The CPU’s were removed. (The)¶

CD (bottle that was way in the back.) (The dr¶

0 (were was empty (That’s what I me¶

10 THE WITNESS:’¶

11 BY MR. KUVIN:¶

12 13 14 15 Q. Okay. During ection that you did or the warrant, execu the warrant, did you determine whether there were any internal security camer e home?¶

16 A. Yes, th re were.¶

17 uvrp,PIKE: Form.¶

18 BY¶

19 20 21 And do you recall whether there were any ted based on your inspection in the upstairs area of the home?¶

22 MR. PIKE: Form.¶

23 THE WITNESS: Not in the upstairs area.¶

24 25 There was a covert clock in the downstairs office area and there was another covert clock¶

(CPU’s being the computers.) (The towers were¶

(removed.) (The wires were just left. (The)¶

(cabinet in which they claimed all the oils were;¶

(being kept were, was empty except for one,¶

(the bedroom where they claimed all th-t.ys¶

(MR. KUVIN: Sanitized?¶

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA¶

CASE NO. 08-CIV-80119-MARRA/IIIIIII¶

-VS-¶

CP S¶

VOLUME II OF lA r¶

08-80232, 08-08380, 08-8038 Ac ) 0994¶

08-80993, 08-80811, 08-80 -80469¶

09-80591, 09-80656, 09-81092¶

DETE “C l Tiv SITION ; OF RECAREY¶

Friday, Ilkch 19, 2010¶

9:37 - 5:12 p.m.¶

250 Australian Avenue South Suite 1500 West Palm Beach, Florida 33401¶

Cynthia RPR, FPR¶

1 IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA 2 CASE No.502008CA037319XXXXMB AB¶

3¶

B.B.¶

4¶

5¶

6 -vs-¶

7 JEFFREY EPSTEIN AND¶

8¶

9¶

10¶

11¶

12 DEPOS DETECTIV RECAREY¶

13¶

14 Fri rch 19, 2010¶

15 - 5:12 p.m.¶

16¶

17¶

18¶

19¶

%is) (.44: Sr VOLUME¶

20¶

21¶

22¶

23¶

24¶

25¶

{sup}25Cak)stralian Avenue South Suite 1500 Palm Beach, Florida 33401¶

IC IIIIiit¶

Reported By: Cynthia , RPR, FPR Notary Public, State of Florida Prose Court Reporting Job No.: 1509¶

1 2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 3 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA¶

4 5 CASE NO. 10-80309¶

6 JANE DOE NO. 103,¶

7 Plaintiff,¶

8 -vs-¶

VOLUME II OF II¶

9 JEFFREY EPSTEIN,¶

10 11 DEPOSITION OF 12 DETECTIVE JOSEPH RECAREY¶

13 14 Friday, March 19, 2010¶

15 9:37 - 5:12 p.m.¶

16 250 Australian Avenue South 17 Suite 1500 18 West Palm Beach, Florida 33401¶

19 20 21 22 Reported By: 23 Cynthia [REDACTED], RPR, FPR 24 Notary Public, State of Florida 25 Prose Court Reporting¶

(Do you recall e 13 C5D: 14 GIT) (It says otograph with (naked girl .l 15 (Okay) (Let’ poT at the next page,) six hat was taken from?)¶

GO gila Ce?{sup}s 16 17 taken out of the) II01 .1.;77;;)(master)¶

(bedroom.)¶

1 MR. PIKE: Form.¶

2 THE WITNESS: I was told it was Roy¶

3 Black’s office that had them.¶

4 BY MR. KUVIN:¶

5 Q. Gotcha. All right. Let’s keep goin 6 here. Item 58 was another massage table tha s 7 taken as evidence?¶

8 A. Correct.¶

9 MR. PIKE: Form. 5 1tv¶

4(40 11 Q. You saw that mass le?¶

10 BY MR. KUVIN:¶

12 Yes, sir.¶

18 (MR.) (PIKE (Form.¶

19 R. EfiVITR¶

20 21 (Could you tell by looking at the) (photograph whether it was an underage girl?)¶

22 (Form¶

23 017-71g)(17NYM)¶

24 25 (i) mean, (was)TE—ii)(young girl,) (a mature) 63.11,) (old?)¶

1¶

1 T.) 03-,) (it was a1(young girl)¶

2 IRO (PIKE (Same objection)¶

3 gHE WITNESS:’) (Veryyoung_girl)¶

4 (BY IKUVI¶

5 (0 (Could you tell the age from the photo?)¶

6 IFF13 (E n. 44 0,,¶

7 (THE WITNESS:’) (younger than ten)¶

8 BY MR. KUVIN:¶

(:!)¶

9 Q. Could you find any photogra \sJof girls 10 that were victims during the inv ation? Did you 11 find any photographs of girl were victims 12 during the investigation?¶

13 MR. PIKE:¶

14 THE WITN here were photographs taken 15 during the warrant, topless females that 16 were take ut, no, I did not locate one of 17 the vi s in the photos.¶

18 R. KUVIN: Okay. If we look at what 19 11 mark as Exhibit 5, appears to be a 20 21 22 supplement of the chain of custody log, two pages. Make sure I have got it. It’s three pages actually.¶

23 24 (Plaintiff’s Exhibit No. 5 was marked for identification.)¶

25¶

1 THE WITNESS: No.¶

2 BY MR. KUVIN:¶

3 Q. Narrative 18, it looks like you made 4 telephone contact with another , looks like WF, 5 I assume it means female, on November 8. 6 you recall which girl that may have been? Do¶

7 MR. PIKE: Form.¶

8 BY MR. KUVIN: d dit’¶

9 Q. Let me ask it this way: Wa is a 10 recounting of the incident with,,,1Cane Doe No. 11 103? C’¶

12 A. No.¶

13 Q. This is a A4Cre, P t girl? r¶

14 A. This is -rent girl.¶

15 MR. P orm to both questions.¶

16 THE SS: This was a different girl 17 and I rying to remember who it was.¶

18 BY MR IN:¶

19 Q. Do you recall the name ?¶

20 A. Yes.¶

1÷ 21 Q. Is that who this was?¶

22 MR. PIKE: Form.¶

23 THE WITNESS: Yes, it was.¶

24 BY MR. KUVIN:¶

(n) ((i) (Okay) (And apparently she had reportia¶

1 (sexual intercourse with Mr)(Epstein?)¶

2 0-0 (That is correct)¶

3 IM—Er) Form, ) (Thia75.7)¶

4 &TRICII(RTJWIsR¶

{sup}5 (0 (Did she report any sexual contact¶

6 giD(Epstein?)¶

7 50 (ED G O¶

8 (What type?)¶

9 (PIKE oF rm 5 Yr¶

10 (THE WITNESS :1 (She to have vaginal)¶

11 (intercourse)¶

12 (Mt) (PIKE IFo ov- to strike.)¶

13 (Er/FR:1(RDWIR¶

14 q5) (Did you ( S” ne how old she was when sh)¶

15. (reported haviC) vaginal intercourse with)

16 FID (Epstein?)¶

17¶

18 THE WITNESS Sixteen years of age¶

19 O MR. PIKE: Spencer, can you hold on?¶

20 MR. KUVIN: Yes, sir.¶

21 MR. PIKE: Let’s go off the record for a 22 second.¶

23 (A discussion was held off the record.)¶

24 MS. EZELL: If I could interject, I was¶

25 fumbling on mute and I wanted to move to strike¶

1 prepared dinner for them. At the conclusion of 2 dinner, they went upstairs to do the massage.¶

3 (Mr. Epstein left the deposition room.)¶

4 THE WITNESS: And that was the time that I 5 believe █ learned of this massage.¶

6 BY MR. KUVIN:¶

7 Q. And how did █ initially █ ct to that?¶

8 MR. PIKE: Form.¶

9 THE WITNESS: She had asked █ why they 10 were going to do the massage instead of the 11 modeling.¶

12 BY MR. KUVIN:¶

13 Q. All right. Did █ have to get or did 14 she get undressed according to her?¶

15 A. Yes, she did.¶

16 MR. PIKE: Form.¶

17 BY MR. KUVIN:¶

18 Q. And did she tell you whether or not she 19 gave Mr. Epstein a massage while he was naked?¶

20 MR. PIKE: Form.¶

21 THE WITNESS: Yes.¶

22 BY MR. KUVIN:¶

23 Q. Did she explain to you whether Mr. Epstein 24 touched her?¶

25 MR. PIKE: Form.¶

1                   (THE WITNESS:) (Yes,) (he did.)¶

2                   (BY MR.) (KUVIN:)¶

3                   (Q.) (Where?)¶

4                   (A.) (I) (believe he stroked her vagina.)¶

5                   (Q.) (Do you recall whether she discussed if he¶

6                   (touched her breasts) (as) (well?)¶

7                   (MR.) (PIKE:) (Form.)¶

8                   (THE WITNESS:) (He may have.) (I’m trying to¶

9                   (recall.) (I) (believe so.)¶

10                  (BY MR.) (KUVIN:)¶

11                  (Q.) (Okay.) (What did she tell you Mr. (Epstein)¶

12                  (was doing during this massage?)¶

13                  (MR.) (PIKE:) (Form.)¶

14                  (THE WITNESS:) (Masturbated.)¶

15                  BY MR. KUVIN:¶

16                  Q. Did he, did she tell you whether he 17 ejaculated eventually?¶

18                  MR. PIKE: Form.¶

19                  THE WITNESS: I believe he did.¶

20                  MR. PIKE: And leading.¶

21                  BY MR. KUVIN:¶

22                  Q. Did [REDACTED] discuss anything with you about 23 threats made by Mr. Epstein to her?¶

24                  MR. PIKE: Form. That would be double 25 hearsay.¶

1 2 THE WITNESS: She stated that if she spoke of this to anyone, bad things could happen.¶

3 BY MR. KUVIN:¶

4 (6) Did Ms. (tell you that)(she was afraid?)¶

5 (Forte¶

6 (THE WITNESS:)¶

7 (EV-RW.1 (RIK/MT) ACI. 0¶

8 (T.1 Ind she explain why she was¶

9 lid.W0i17,YRE—;) (P;(7>TITD¶

10 11 12 13 THE WITNESS:) ( i-;) (she (that because he was ver (She explained) y,) (you know,) (that he could pay so o hurt her or her (family)¶

15 16 17 Q. Did explain whether or not she received any a ional contact from Mr. Epstein or one of histri ts?¶

18 MR. PIKE: Form.¶

19 20 (::) THE WITNESS: I believe she went another time to the house.¶

21 MR. KUVIN:¶

22 23 24 25 Q. All right. If you would take a look at Page 20 of 22. It says here: stated that several days later she received a telephone call from who coordinated for to return¶

2 Q. And what occurred during this second time 3 she was at the home —¶

4 MR. PIKE: Form.¶

5 BY MR. KUVIN:¶

6 Q. — according to her?¶

7 A. She returned to the home with [REDACTED] and another 8 massage was conducted.¶

9 Q. All right. And did this massage involve¶

10 Mr. Epstein again getting naked?¶

11 (A) Correct.¶

12 MR. PIKE: Form.¶

13 BY MR. KUVIN:¶

14 Q. Did this massage, according to her, 15 involve any touching by Mr. Epstein of her?¶

16 MR. PIKE: Form.¶

17 THE WITNESS: Yes.¶

18 BY MR. KUVIN:¶

19 Q. Where did she tell you that Mr. Epstein 20 touched her?¶

21 MR. PIKE: Form.¶

22 THE WITNESS: She informed me that her 23 vagina was touched digitally while he was 24 masturbating.¶

25¶

2 3 Q. Okay. Did she describe during the second time whether or not Mr. Epstein climaxed?¶

4 MR. PIKE: Form.¶

5 THE WITNESS: Yes, she did.¶

6 BY MR. KUVIN:¶

7 AIS (cf), (And did she recouneg you wh or not)¶

B 9 ED 0 (Epstein made another threat to h e) (conclusion of this massage?) 1¶

10 00(1717i:1 (iUi17O talking¶

11 (about?’,¶

12 (14-1.)1KUVIN:¶

13 THE WITNES¶

14 IENTTgEHRUUM¶

15¶

16 510 1 @WEED¶

17 (She said that she was not to)¶

18 ak of this to anyone;)lbad things could)¶

19 ppen.¶

20 nit Aglil.ff<DTITI¶

21 22 23 (2;) 4: (When you talked to her) was (she afraid) bless you) (was she afraid that Mr)(Epstein would cid (something to her or her family)¶

24 lfiC.1 (MT.) (She was afraid that someone would hurtl¶

25 (either her or her family) 1 stuck around just to assist the victims.¶

2 BY MR.¶

3 4 5 6 7 8 Q. And when you talk about the statement that you provided, did you present testimony related to all of the minor females that you discovered to have come in contact with Jeffrey Epstein or four or five names that ultimately were of your probable cause affidavit? only atA;43, end¶

9 MR. PIKE: Form and compoun¶

10 11 12 13 THE WITNESS: As far the grand jury, I only A eked the questions that were asked of the state. At that testimony at point it was Lan el’hlavek.¶

14 15 I’m sorr t the last name. I don’t know how t e her last name.¶

16 BY MR.¶

17 18 19 20 (Z) n talking with the State Attorney’s (Officio uring the investigati6K (did you indicate to) (thee number of underage females(that you were) had come in contact sexually with Mr)(Epstein?)¶

21 22 (1711-.21 CEM—CE:.) (Form and assumes)(facts not (evidence) ci i)1¶

23 24 25 (THE WITNESS:’ (rec) they were aware of the (probable cause affidavit which indicated all) (the facts)¶

1 between the Palm Beach Police Department and the 2 State Attorney’s Office?¶

3 A. Yes, there was.¶

4 Q. And —¶

5 (AD I,This case was originally brought to their) 6 7 8 (do this,)(Lip until,)Lp until,)(Lip until meting with) 9 (Alan Dershowitz and the State Attorne’ And then it,) 10 (all took a turn) (attention very early on in the investigation which) (they were,)(you know,)(verygung-ho,) (very 1- go, EETITTID¶

11 (05-2) Were you at that¶

12 (TO (I• attended one 13 Dershowitz3krischer3 B lohlavek. i g where Idbelieve it¶

14 WIKE- • -ct to form.¶

15 (ETTE)¶

16 (6-.), What said during that meeting?¶

17 . (All right) (math regard to this) 18 of questioning, (“1”just want to be clear 19 t I’(have form objections to this line of) 20 (questioning.) (And the fact that under various) 21 (Federal Rules3ff,lbelieve it’s 408,)(410 as well) 22 23 24 25 (as various rules under Florida Evidence Code,) (some of these discussions are protected as) (potential plea negotiations) C9FCa(having said) (that.. )¶

1 OWIvr1R.¶

2 (1)71t (What was said during these)(this meeting) 3 (that you attended?)¶

4 FPO (several of the girls’ MySpaces were discussed) 5 (MySpace being the social network) (They all ha 1 6 (MySpaces. (And the girls,)(the girls were act who) 7 (had the MySpaces had inputtec)(you know) ous) 8 9 (or that) kind of thing) (different things regarding alcohol u rijuana use) ‘:1)¶

{sup}10(5; (And what was brought 11 (to the relevance of whethe 12 (that had been to Jeffre 13 (underage used alcohol( d ugaD 14 (of that?) that meeting as) these female tein’s house while) (What was the point)¶

15 (Funt. (Form.)¶

16 17 (To show that the character) rls were not,)(was not to be believed)¶

18 BY DWARDS:1¶

19 (Okay) (IT i)(specifically to attack their) 20¶

21 gR)PME: 4(TiEnT,)(move to strike)¶

22 (THE WITNESS:I (correct)¶

23 BY MR. •¶

24 Q. So, at that point in time who was making 25 those arguments on behalf of Jeffrey Epstein?¶

Appendix 2¶

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA¶

CASE NO. 08-CIV-80119-MARRA4IIIIIII¶

-vs-¶

VOLUME III OFA,¶

O¶

08-80232, 08-08380, 08-80381, 06-60994¶

08-80.993, 08-80611, 08-80893, 09-80469¶

09-80591, .09=8065.6_, 09-80802, 09-81092¶

Aqi“‘EPOSITION OF CTIVE RECAREY¶

x¶

S>’¶

Tuesday, April 219, 2010¶

10:03 - 5:12 p.m.¶

505 South Flagler Drive¶

Suite 1100¶

West Palm Beach, Florida 33401¶

Jeana Ricciuti, RPR, FPR, CLR¶

Certified Copy:,¶

or —¶

2 BY MR. WEINBERG:¶

3 (05.) (Well,)(let’s start with that time? -when¶

4 ign (Epstein was the customer.) Were any of the wozri 5 (going to his house engaging in prostitution?( your) 6 (gpina?)¶

8 (THE WITNESS:) (In my opinio¶

9 (BY MR. WEINBERGa¶

13 (4511t (And that (house who were above who were going to his• as ell as below)(IS,)(correct?)¶

14 Form.)¶

15 16 17 THE J~+itESil Like I.(was told,)(people that antervie hat were above 18j(What happened) Ibetwe hem were between two consenting adults)¶

18 (BY M EI ERG:)¶

19 (And so to your mind?(it’s not the giving of) 20 y? (it’s the negotiated agreement that constitutes) 21 (t e essential element that distinguishes prostitution) 22 (from simply a consensual act as long as) (the people who) 23 (engaged in it were both over 18?)¶

Iff§)(ARBOURa (Forte¶

(Yes¶

(TO (r1c7.1¶

O AS¶

24 IMS. ARBOUR:¶

25¶

1 qUitrint. (WEINBERG:)¶

2 (T.) (Correct?)¶

3 TIT) (ARBOUR:. (Same objection)¶

4 CITE WITNESS:) The negotiation part,) p) roTED¶

5 (BY T,FITONEINBERG¶

6 ((T). (So absent the negotiation,)(there is 7 (prostitution?)¶

( To.T) (ARBOUR:. p71717.1 8¶

9 (THE WITNESS:i (No.._3 ( :.05 /141 53Ir¶

10 BY MR. WEINBERG:¶

A(;;) 11 Q. And therefore, in y o nion, the women 12 going to see Mr. Epstein weGno going there pursuant 13 to a prostitution agreement correct?¶

14 A. Correct.¶

15 16 17 Q. They iwg Ig S trns. c o ng there as consenting adults or even consenting tors to do something other than prostitutiotly¶

18 MS. ARBOUR: Form.¶

19 20 21 (:7) THE WITNESS: They were going there to provide the massage but, you’re right, it wasn’t prostitution.¶

22 BY MR. WEINBERG:¶

23 24 there who were under 18, had they been over 18, then 25 this. entire case would have been a consenting massage Q. And in fact, had some of these girls that went 1 December of 2005, correct?¶

2 A. Ub-huh.¶

3 Q. So it began in March and it continued through 4 December of 2005, correct?¶

5 A. Yes.¶

6 Q. The first time you formalized a probe cause 7 affidavit was May 1, 2006, correct? OS¶

8 A. Uh-huh.¶

9 Q. And that probable cause affi v’t resulted 10 several months later when the Sta torney was 11 presenting a case to the gran¶

12 (2-2+-.) (That was — that 1 fia-sco with the State) 13 (Attorney’s office wher ally we were going -to g(i), 14 (to the grand jury,) postponed it,) land then we) 15 16 17 (cause affid 18 (affida d they came back and said no,)(we want to go) 19 tec t e grand jury (were going to go o the grand jury,) (their we) (postponed (&d hen they said no?(we want a probable) (73.—i.(submitted it as_ a probable cause)¶

20 21 mildly, miscommunication between the State Attorney’s 22 To cut through it, there was some, to put it office and the Palm Beach Police Department?¶

23 MR. : Object to the form.¶

24 MS. ARBOUR: Form.¶

25 MR. : Mischaracterizes his testimony.¶

1 BY MR. WEINBERG:¶

2 Q. Let me go back and start again. In April, 3 they told you they were going to conduct a grand jury 4 and subpoenas went out to certain people, okay?¶

5 A. It was prior to April, I believe. I hink we 6 were in March.¶

7 Q. So in March, the grand jury s as were served for an April appearance. make sense? Does C hronology¶

8¶

9¶

10¶

11¶

12¶

13¶

14¶

15¶

16¶

17¶

18¶

19¶

20¶

21¶

22¶

23¶

24¶

25¶

A. I think that’s when and forth about grand jury cussions were back¶

Q. And Ms:. Jane jury subpoena? DAsi 3 was served with a grand¶

A. drove gITIEFZena, (1 (served her with a grand jury)¶

Q. correct? (And Ithat grand jury was postponed or canceled,)¶

( es.¶

a*Tcrii(second grand jury was thereafter) ened during the summer of 2006,)‘,correct?(months) (after the first one?)¶

(2-1-) (Yes¶

Q. And taking that timeline, between the grand jury for which you subpoenaed Ms. Jane Doe 103 the first time and the grand jury that ultimately returned — was¶

1 written by Chief Reiter and sent to whom?¶

2 A. They were sent to some of the parents of the 3 victims.¶

4 Q. If I represent to you that at least some of 5 those letters were dated in May of 2006, would that jog 6 your memory as to when this meeting with Spec Agent 7 Ortiz occurred?¶

8 A. I believe it would have 9 letters. been /a J those¶

10 Q. But before the return 11 indictment? State grand jury¶

12 A. I don’t believe 13 I believe it was after Sbefore the grand jury.¶

14 Q. So your b mory, therefore, would be that 15 it would be•afte the letters and the grand jury?¶

16 A. Corr¶

17 18 Attorn dur ng this period, with one or more of the 19 Sta torneys? Q. r4 Y ad different conversations with the State¶

20 Yeah, Assistant State attorneys.¶

21 ‘d LQ. Which Assistant State attorney do you recall 22 talking to?¶

23 A. Lanna Belohlavek.¶

24 (.5!. eo you recall any conversation with¶

25 (t71 .) Selohlavek wherein you discussed whether or not your)¶

2 (MS. ARBOUR:I (Form)¶

3 4 5 6 (THE WITNESS (I recall her picking and) (choosing who she wanted to refer to as a victim) (Most of my conversations with her I know re) (documented in the report)¶

(witnesses were or were not victims?)¶

7 BY MR. WEINBERG:¶

{sup}8(57) 9 (were frustrated with her because one er opinions 10¶

11 ks. ARBOUR:)¶

12 13 (THE WITNESS:) ey s ecall that conversation,)¶

14 (BY MR. WEINBERG¶

15 (O (And you recall of that conversation?)¶

16 OD r her,)(after viewing some of the) 17 (materials were supplied to her by Dershowitz) she 18 (star to claim that the victims were not victims based) 19 materials that were supplied by the MySpaces)¶

20 The victims were not victims?)¶

21 (K) (That’s what she was claiming)¶

22 (J (And this is the State Attorney’s statements to) 23 (you based on her investigation which included her review) 24 (of materials provided to her by Defense Counsel) 25 (Professor Alan Dershowitz?¶

MS. (ARBOUR:) (EiriTO¶

THE WITNESS:) (I. wouldn’t consider what she did¶

)her investigation) a. (think she just looked at)¶

(these girls’) MySpace accounts) (f wouldn’t consider¶

that an investigation)¶

BY MR. WEINBERG:¶

Q. But she had in her possession a lgqls time your incident report? k¶

MS. ARBOUR: Form. (AL)¶

THE WITNESS.: Yes.¶

‘49 0¶

BY MR. WEINBERG:¶

MS. ARBOUR: r¶

Q. Your probable cASa . fidavit?¶

941;,I9 THE WITNE don’t know if it was- drafted yet. -s)¶

BY MR. WEINBER••¶

dit49 he had the raw materials of your many intery ws o er many months, correct? Q.¶

MS. ARBOUR: Form.¶

THE WITNESS: Yes.¶

BY ‘MR. WEINBERG:¶

not? Q. She had the results of the search, did she¶

A. Yes.¶

Q. She had the message pads available to her, did¶

1 A. Yes.¶

2 Q. Was amongst them Ms.¶

4 Q. Who else?¶

5 A. I believe this was it. I think that was the 6 initial — they were going to do it in sectilS and 7 they were going to pick those girls to¶

8 Q. And the criminal offense t 9 investigating at the time was felony citation? was¶

10 MS. ARBOUR: Form.¶

11 THE WITNESS: I d 12 looking into. I kngw~ihaE I was seeking. now what she was¶

13 BY MR. WEINBERG:¶

14 Q. You and 15 and charges, c disagreements about witnesses¶

16 A. Yes¶

17 18 19 20 Q. you had disagreements about whether or not) esses that you denominated victims and she said) victimst (you had disagreements over their) (the ibility?(did you not¶

21 (i) Not over their credibility) (It was over? 22 diT1,1 (the MySpace pages) (flied the feeling than (she was) 23 (trying to, —¶

24 (don’t mean to interrupt? but I. (want to stick) 25 (to conversations and evidence and not feelings? (gO) —¶

1 2 3 (fro (Go ahead and finish your answer? 517-J (Don’t let him interrupt you: (You can finish) (your answer)¶

4 5 6 (THE WITNESS:) (1. (had the feeling that she was) Lying to brush this case under the carpet.) That 464 r was my¶

7 BY MR. WEINBERG:¶

8 9 g the case, Q. You believed that she was mi correct?¶

10 A. (Non-verbal response)¶

11 12 13 Q. And you believed t t was minimizing the case w review of the MySpace _pages of some of your ases, correct? of the reasons she¶

14 15 16 17 A. I know th attitude of the State Attorney’s offi fiery pro-assisting us very beginning Otce Mr. Dershowitz became the investi +’ ye stage, everything changed. from the involved in¶

18 19 20 21 r So let’s talk about these MySpace min e f4ySpace pages are an Internet site asses herself would put information out wa available to whoever accessed the site, pages for a where the there that correct?¶

22 MS. ARBOUR: Form.¶

23 24 25 THE WITNESS: MySpace is a social you can basically create anything that create on a MySpace page. network that you want to¶

1 2 that the case wasn’t — it wasn’t — in my eyes? (i-0 wasn’t any justice served)¶

3 BY MR. WEINBERGE:¶

4 5 6 7 Q. Your disagreements with the State Attorney’s charge decision led you to go outside the State law enforcement community and transmit information out Mr. Epstein to Federal authorities?¶

8 MS. ARBOUR: Form, asked and ed.¶

9 10 THE WITNESS: And also to se there was any Federal nexus pertaining to ase.¶

11 BY MR. WEINBERG:¶

12 13 14 15 Q. But you sought a Federal nexus relating s case as a your disagreements with ch rge decisions that were being made by your Sta rney, correct? 4 Ntmine if was result of there¶

16 MS. BOU Form.¶

17 T ITNESS: I believe so.¶

18 19 MR7 WEINBERG: Why don’t we take a break and O re lunch.¶

20¶

21 MR. WEINBERG:¶

22 (A luncheon recess was taken.)¶

23¶

24¶

25¶

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA¶

CASE NO. 08-CIV-80119-MARRAIIIIIIII¶

-vs-¶

08-80232, 08-08380, 08-8038 0994¶

08-80993, 08-80811, 68-8 -80469¶

09-8059i, 09-80656, 09-8\ 9-81092¶

Ad 4ImE r¶

DEPOSITION ECTIVE OF RECAREY¶

VOLUME IV OF¶

CP¶

Tuesday, April 27, 2010¶

10:03 - 5:23 p.m.¶

505 South Flagler Drive¶

Suite 1100¶

West Palm Beach, Florida 33401¶

Jeana Ricciuti, RPR, FPR, CLR¶

1 A. I’m trying to recall what we discussed. I 2 served her with a subpoena and instructed her to call 3 the phone number that was on there to make arrangements.¶

4 Q. How long were you with her in Tallahassee on 5 this occasion?¶

6 A. I’d say about 40 minutes, 50 minu¶

7 Q. And did you decide that you we e the 8 person to serve the subpoena as cont s o any of the 9 different people working under or *th ou?¶

10 A. Yes, I am the one w s d the other search 11 warrant — subpoenas.¶

12 Q. (So you served\Sthe subpoenas?¶

13 A. al:ETTO¶

14 15 (Tallahassee t (Y) (And wa he only reason to go to)¶

16 17 18 (Al a s to her also regarding some phone calls] (that she ‘received which she felt was threatening in)¶

19 20 (And what were the results of those)¶

21 (TO (She had received a phone call from 22 23 (will be compensated and those that go against him’ 24 ‘basically would be dealt with.” (indicating to her that those that are with MrilEpstein¶

25 Q. We’re talking about March or April of 2006,¶

1 time, did she have a conversation with you regarding the 2- second subpoena’s conflicting with her finals schedule?¶

3 A. Correct-.¶

4 Opt (And she made a phone call to you to complain) 5 (about the service?)¶

6 (TC.) (Correct)¶

AimAr¶

7 (5) ‘And what was the conversation Jane Doa 8 (103 and you on that occasion?)¶

9 (1.1 It week and c Cld not leave ancil 10 (not take her final to come dow he grand jury.) a. 11 (recommended that she conta tate Attorney’s office) 12 4° 13 (office.)) <\S y (and make recommendation5(t , sse ough the State Attorney’s)¶

14 (And di 15 (if she had be 16 (the State Att y2) ave any followup with her to see) ally excused from the grand jury by)¶

17 A- (“did not)¶

18 ( id you learn that she didn’t show up at the) 19 jury?¶

20 OD (Yes¶

21 Q. Did you learn that she had not been excused by 22 the State Attorney?¶

23 A. I don’t think she officially came out and told 24 me that she was not excused.¶

25 Q. But you do know that she failed to appear?¶

1 A. {Non-verbal response).¶

2 Q. The time he was on work release, no request?¶

3 A. None.¶

4 Q. The time he was on probation, community 5 control?¶

6 A. No.¶

AlAr¶

7 Q. So you’ve never received an FBl Frt to, in 8 any way, investigate Mr. Epstein?¶

9 A. No. C¶

10 Q. Surveille Mr. Epstein, 40¶

11 A. No.¶

12 Q. Report to them n of your knowledge of 13 Mr. Epstein’s ongoing du ?¶

14 A. No.¶

15 Q. Same t n for the US Attorney’s office: 16 Have they ever n iated a call to you at any time after 17 Mn. Epstei t to jail asking you to do anything in 18 tonne on o their ongoing investigation of 19 Mr t in?¶

20 Absolutely not.¶

21 Q. And what about Probation? Has Probation ever 22 asked you to initiate any surveillance or investigation 23 of Mr. Epstein?¶

24 A. No. (ATiETD(from that one day that D(saw him) 25 (walking on the — along South Ocean Boulevardj(that was)¶

{sup}1To ghat was the only — and I’(didn’t even contact) 2 ‘Probation.) ’$‘believe Captain Frickl((phonetic)163(the) 3 4 ((phonetic).) (one who contacted Probation and something Sloan)¶

5 Q. Are you aware of any — putting yours4lf aside 6 and putting this one incident aside, are yo wae of 7 the Palm Beach Police Department having oing-role 8 in the investigation of Jeffrey Epst¶

9 A. As far as today?¶

10 Q. Yes, as of today.¶

11 A. No.¶

12 Q. How about at a4’.4me over the past yea-r, 13 starting with the t e lhs out on work release and 14 thereafter on co; ),11O control —¶

15 A. The¶

16 Q. e arrest?¶

17 A. investigation, not that I’m aware of.¶

18 19 working with you spoke to Probation about 20 Epstein’s ongoing activities? Is the one occasion the only time that you or¶

21 A. That was the only time I think¶

22 Q. That you were involved?¶

23 A. Yes.¶

24 Q. And is it the only time that you are aware 25 that anyone else has had communications to and from the 1 A. Yes, there was.¶

2 Q. How about Jane Doe 7?¶

4 Q. How about a girl that we haven’t discussed 5 named Jane Doe 5?¶

6 A. No.¶

7 Q. How about a girl named Jane Do d?-¶

8 A. No.¶

9 Q. How about Jane Doe¶

10 A. No.¶

11 12 speak to Jane Doe 5? 8. c Q. At any time duri investigation, did you¶

13 A. No.¶

14 Q. Did /gro CiSo” yoty,sp, ask to a girl named Jane Doe 6?¶

15 A. No.¶

16 Q. ever speak to a girl named Jane Doe 8?¶

17¶

18 19 20 (You were asked some questions earlier about e investigator following you and pulling your sh I believe you said)¶

{sup}21(W el (Yes¶

44 r¶

22 W( . (Can you tell me more about that?)¶

23 I IPIK Form.¶

24 (THE WITNESS) (Sometime during fEe) 25 (investigation,) (it was discovered that we had)¶

1 2 3 4 5 6 (private investigators) (following myself and former, ,Chief Reiter) When I. (would leave work and I’d go) (visit my children,) (would notice (car two lengths) (behind me doing the exact same move (did) If (sped up,) the sped up;) if (slowed down,)(he (down.? owed)¶

7 8 9 10 11 1 (purposely) — (1’ (purposely drov .under the) (speed limit just to see if he wo round) IR> (cars around us and he)(stayed ’ h ehind me) (L (made several U-turns)the d same exact thing) (So it was clearly evid being followed)¶

12 13 14 0(did manage-t o i a driver’s license) (plate number and back to a private) (investigator.)¶

15 16 17 III (wawa ly called by one of the PIs)(which) er came back to the Law Office of Roy) (Black¶

18 19 20 21 22 (far as my trash being pulled,) (it became) early evident the day after Thanksgiving where) tthere is no trash pickup in my neighborhood) at my ifIZZI)(the day after Thanksgiving) (it’s a holiday) (everybody’s cans were)(full and mine is empty)¶

23 IO if.YRE-:1 g5iilD (Move to strike)¶

24 (ARBOUR:)¶

25 43;) Did you ever do any research to determine the” 1 (identity of the private investigators that you believed) 2 (were following you?)¶

3 (i21.) (ei) a (did obtain — based on their license) 4 (plate,) was able to obtain who they were and which PI1 5 (firm. they represent)¶

7 (1741r) 1, CE: — ) (Same objection.)¶

O AS¶

c re) (o) (Did you ever speak to a re esentatives of) 10 (that PI firm?)¶

8 11W) SOU¶

11 (10 (WED¶

12 () 13 (anyone,) hired them t w you7) (Do you formation about who)(E)¶

14 00 (Aside t one phone call that came back) 15 (to Roy Black¶

16 17 11) (And t was the investigator’s calling you or) the investigators?) (you were¶

18 o. aLe r y actually called me by mistake)¶

19 (Q1Ay) (So you didn’t actually speak to anyone?)¶

20 (TO (1%0) (They asked me who I was)(iTc171. d sai 21 re you, (and they hung up) (I had the number on my) 22 23 (caller ID) ff.(pross referenced the phone number and it’ (came back to it)¶

24 Q. And to the best of your recollection, all of this occurred sometime in that September to May 2006 —¶

12711 (Did you ever speak to any¶

Appendix 3¶

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE¶

C O ‘S’A¶

2.9 OFFICE O,Cily PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY ,REPORT¶

”>-¶

stigation into the U.S. Attom ’ e for the Southern District of Florida’s Resolution of 06-2008 Federal Criminal Investigation of Jeffrey Epste and s Interactions with Victims during the Investigation¶

November 2020¶

NOTE: THIS REPORT CONTAINS SENSITIVE, PRIVILEGED, AND PRIVACY ACT PROTECTED INFORMATION. DO NOT DISTRIBUTE THE REPORT OR ITS CONTENTS WITHOUT THE PRIOR APPROVAL OF THE OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY.¶

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY¶

The Department of Justice (Department) Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) investigated allegations that in 2007-2008, prosecutors in the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida (USAO) improperly resolved a federal investigation into the criminal conduct of Jeffrey Epstein by negotiating and executing a federal non-prosecution agreement (NPA). The NPA was intended to end a federal investigation into allegations that Epstein engaged in illegal sexual activity with girls.’ OPR also investigated whether USAO prosecutors committed professional misconduct by failing to consult with victims of Epstein’s crimes before t e NPA was signed or by misleading victims regarding the status of the federal investigation atjpr e signing.¶

I. OVERVIEW OF FACTUAL BACKGROUND¶

The Palm Beach (Florida) Police Department (PBPD) began in effrey Epstein in 2005, after the parents of a 14-year-old girl complained that Epstei er for a massage. Epstein was a multi-millionaire financier with residences in Palm New York City, and other United States and foreign locations. The investigation scovery that Epstein used personal assistants to recruit girls to provide massages to d in many instances, those massages led to sexual activity. After the PBPD brought the State Attorney’s Office, a Palm Beach County grand jury indicted Epstein, o u 9 006, for felony solicitation of prostitution in violation of Florida Statute § 796.07 o r, because the PBPD Chief and the lead Detective were dissatisfied with the State andling of the case and believed that the state grand jury’s charge did not address~ttte a of Epstein’s conduct, they referred the matter to the Federal Bureau of Investigat’ in West Palm Beach for a possible federal investigation.¶

The FBI brought the matter stant U.S. Attorney (AUSA), who opened a file with her supervisor’s approval and owledge of then U.S. Attorney R. Alexander Acosta. She worked with two FBI case develop a federal case against Epstein and, in the course of the investigation, they discov ditional victims. In May 2007, the AUSA submitted to her supervisors a draft 60-co • ictment outlining charges against Epstein. She also provided a lengthy memoranda su a zing the evidence she had assembled in support of the charges and addressing the le sues fated to the proposed charges.¶

For s weeks following submission of the prosecution memorandum and proposed indictrnen SA’s supervisors reviewed the case to determine how to proceed. At a July 31 eeting with Epstein’s attorneys, the USAO offered to end its investigation if Epstein p guilty to state charges, agreed to serve a minimum of two years’ incarceration, registered as a sexual offender, and agreed to a mechanism through which victims could obtain monetary damages. The USAO subsequently engaged in additional meetings and communications with Epstein’s team of attorneys, ultimately negotiating the terms of a state-based resolution of the federal investigation, which culminated in the signing of the NPA on September 24, 2007. The¶

i As used in this Rcport, including in quoted documents and statements, the word “girls” refers to females who were under the age of 18 at the time of the alleged conduct. Under Florida law, a minor is a person under the age of 18.¶

NPA required Epstein to plead guilty in state court to the then-pending state indictment against him and to an additional criminal information charging him with a state offense that would require him to register as a sexual offender—specifically, procurement of minors to engage in prostitution, in violation of Florida Statute § 796.03. The NPA required Epstein to make a binding recommendation that the state court sentence him to serve 18 months in the county jail followed by 12 months of community control (home detention or “house arrest”). The NPA also included provisions designed to facilitate the victims’ recovery of monetary damages from Epstein. In exchange, the USAO agreed to end its investigation of Epstein and to forgo federal prosecution in the Southern District of Florida of him, four named co-conspirators, and “an potential co-conspirators.” Victims were not informed of, or consulted about, a potential state olution or the NPA prior to its signing.¶

The signing of the NPA did not immediately lead to Epstein’s guilty however. For the next nine months, Epstein deployed his extensive t to try to change the terms that his team had negotiated and he had app seeking to invalidate the entire NPA by persuading senior Departm federal interest at issue and the matter should be left to the di tio officials. Through repeated communications with the US defense counsel fought the government’s interpretation of 47t, E obtained review by the Department’s Criminal Division n General, primarily on the issue of federal jurisdi ’ n v quintessentially state matter.” After reviewing June 23, 2008, the Office of the Deputy At Deputy Attorney General would not intery his obligation under the NPA, and on J the pending state indictment charging to a criminal information chargin Upon the joint request of the de court immediately sentenced solicitation charge and 6 months of community control. E Beach County facili A incarceration, o 1carceration, nent attorneys e simultaneously ials that there was no state law enforcement nior Department officials, terms. They also sought and e Office of the Deputy Attorney hat the defense insisted was “a io2ls by the defense and the USAO, on eral informed defense counsel that the atter. Only then did Epstein agree to fulfill , he appeared in state court and pled guilty to citation of prostitution and, pursuant to the NPA, procurement of minors to engage in prostitution. the state prosecutor, and consistent with the NPA, the consecutive terms of 12 months’ incarceration on the iteration on the procurement charge, followed by 12 months began serving the sentence that day, in a minimum-security Palm of the NPA was filed under seal with the state court.¶

On Jul a victim, identified as “Jane Doe,” filed in federal court in the Southern District of Fl ergency petition alleging that the government violated the Crime Victims’ Rights A ), 18 U.S.C. § 3771, when it resolved the federal investigation of Epstein witho g with victims, and seeking enforcement of her CVRA rights.2 In responding to the petit! he government, represented by the USAO, revealed the existence of the NPA, but did not produ it to the petitioners until the court directed it to be turned over subject to a protective order; the NPA itself remained under seal in the federal district court. After the initial filings and hearings, the CVRA case was dormant for almost two years while the petitioners pursued civil rOc.PC against Epstein.¶

{sup}2Emcrgcncy Victim’s Petition for Enforcement of Crime Victim’s [sic] Rights Act, IS U.S.C. Section 3771, Doe v. United States, Case No. 9:08-cv-80736-KAM (S.D. Fla. July 7, 2008). Mother victim subsequently joined the litigation as “Jane Doe 2.”¶

Soon after he was incarcerated, Epstein applied for the Palm Beach County Sheriff’s work release program, and the Sheriff approved his application. In October 2008, Epstein began spending 12 hours a day purportedly working at the “Florida Science Foundation,” an entity Epstein had recently incorporated that was co-located at the West Palm Beach office of one of Epstein’s attorneys. Although the NPA specified a term of incarceration of 18 months, Epstein received “gain time,” that is, time off for good behavior, and he actually served less than 13 months of incarceration. On July 22, 2009, Epstein was released from custody to a one-year term of home detention as a condition of community control, and he registered as a sexual offender with the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. After victims and news media filed suit in Florida courts for release of the copy of the NPA that had been filed under seal in the state court file, a state judge in September 2009 ordered it to be made public.¶

By mid-2010, Epstein reportedly settled multiple civil lawsuits brought against him by victims seeking monetary damages, including the two petitioners in the CVRA litigation. During the CVRA litigation, the petitioners sought discovery from the USAO, which made substantial document productions, filed lengthy privilege logs in support of its withholding of documents, and submitted declarations from the AUSA and the FBI case agents who conducted the federal investigation. The USAO opposed efforts to unseal various records, as did Epstein, who was permitted to intervene in the litigation with respect to certain issues. Nevertheless, the court ultimately ordered that substantial records relating to the USAO’s resolution of the Epstein case be made public. During the course of the litigation, the court made numerous rulings interpreting the CVRA. After failed efforts to settle the case, the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment remained pending for more than a year.¶

In 2017, President Donald Trump nominated Acosta to be Secretary of Labor. At his March 2017 confirmation hearing, Acosta was questioned only briefly about the Epstein case. On April 17, 2017, the Senate confirmed Acosta’s appointment as Labor Secretary.¶

In the decade following his release from incarceration, Epstein reportedly continued to settle multiple civil suits brought by many, but not all, of his victims. Epstein was otherwise able to resume his lavish lifestyle, largely avoiding the interest of the press. On November 28, 2018, however, the Miami Herald published an extensive investigative report about state and federal criminal investigations initiated more than 12 years earlier into allegations that Epstein had coerced girls into engaging in sexual activity with him at his Palm Beach estate.{sup}3 The Miami Herald reported that in 2007, Acosta entered into an “extraordinary” deal with Epstein in the form of the NPA, which permitted Epstein to avoid federal prosecution and a potentially lengthy prison sentence by pleading guilty in state court to “two prostitution charges.” According to the Miami Herald, the government also immunized from prosecution Epstein’s co-conspirators and concealed from Epstein’s victims the terms of the NPA. Through its reporting, which included interviews of eight victims and information from publicly available documents, the newspaper painted a portrait of federal and state prosecutors who had ignored serious criminal conduct by a wealthy man with powerful and politically connected friends by granting him a “deal of a lifetime” that allowed him both to escape significant punishment for his past conduct and to continue his¶

³ Julie K. [REDACTED], “Perversion of Justice,” Miami Herald, Nov. 28, 2018. https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/article220097825.html.¶

abuse of minors. The Miami Herald report led to public outrage and media scrutiny of the government’s actions.4¶

On February 21, 2019, the district court granted the CVRA case petitioners’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, ruling that the government violated the CVRA in failing to advise the victims about its intention to enter into the NPA.5 The court also found that letters the government sent to victims after the NPA was signed, describing the investigation as ongoing, “mislead [sic] the victims to believe that federal prosecution was still a possibility.” The court also highlighted the inequity of the USAO’s failure to communicate with the victims while at the same time engaging in “lengthy negotiations” with Epstein’s counsel and assuring the defense t the NPA would not be “made public or filed with the court.” The court ordered the p to submit additional briefs regarding the appropriate remedies. After the court’s ord artment recused the USAO from the CVRA litigation and assigned the U.S. Att Office for the Northern District of Georgia to handle the case for the government. Am medics sought by the petitioners, and opposed by the government, was rescissiog1 b A and federal prosecution of Epstein.¶

On July 2, 2019, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the So istrict of New York obtained a federal grand jury indictment charging Epstein with one ex trafficking of minors and one count of conspiracy to commit sex trafficking of e indictment alleged that from 2002 until 2005, Epstein created a vast network of u • uns in both New York and Florida whom he sexually abused and exploited. Epstein on the charges on July 6, 2019. In arguing for Epstein’s pretrial detention, pro = cited that agents searching Epstein’s Manhattan residence found thousands of ph of • e and half-nude females, including at least one believed to be a minor. The court ord in detained pending trial, and he was remanded to the custody of the Bureau of Pris eld at the Metropolitan Correctional Center in Manhattan.¶

Meanwhile, after publi tion Dffhe November 2018 Miami Herald report, the media and Congress increasingly focused on on Acosta as the government official responsible for the NPA. On July 10, 2019, osta held a televised press conference to defend his and the USAO’s actions. Acosta stated tha aim Beach State Attorney’s Office “was ready to allow Epstein to walk free with no ’ time, thing.” According to Acosta, because USAO prosecutors considered this outcome un cceptable, his office pursued a difficult and challenging case and obtained a resolution th4put Epstein in jail, forced him to register as a sexual offender, and provided victims with the contro obtain monetary damages. Acosta’s press conference did not end the wever, and on July 12, 2019, Acosta submitted to the President his resignation as¶

{sup}4See. e.g., Ashley Coffman, “Stunning new report details Trump’s labor secretary’s role in plea deal for billionaire sex abuser,” The Business Insider, Nov. 29, 2018; Cynthia McFaddcn, “New Focus on Trump Labor Secretary’s role in unusual plea deal for billionaire accused of sexual abuse,” NBC Nightly News, Nov. 29, 2018; Anita Kumar, “Trump labor secretary out of running for attorney general after Miami Herald report,” McClatchy Washington Bureau, Nov. 29, 2018; Emily Peck, “How Trump’s Labor Secretary Covered For A Millionaire Sex Abuser,” Huffington Post, Nov. 29, 2018; Julie K. MI et al, “Lawmakers issue call for investigation of serial sex abuser Jeffrey Epstein’s plea deal,” Miami Herald, Dec. 6, 2018.¶

Marra). Doe v. United States, 359 F. Supp. 3d 1201 (S.D. Fla., Feb. 21, 2019) (Opinion and Order, 9:08-80736-C1V-¶

Secretary of Labor. In a brief oral statement, Acosta explained that continued media attention on his handling of the Epstein investigation rather than on the economy was unfair to the Labor Department.¶

On August 10, 2019, Epstein was found hanging in his cell and was later pronounced dead. The New York City Chief Medical Examiner concluded that Epstein had committed suicide.¶

As a result of Epstein’s death, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York filed a nolle prosequi to dismiss the pending indictment against Epstein. On August 27, 2019, the district court held a hearing at which more than a dozen f Epstein’s victims—including victims of the conduct in Florida that was addressed through t A—spoke about the impact of Epstein’s crimes. The court dismissed the Eps ent on August 29, 2019.¶

After Epstein’s death, the federal district court in Florida ov CVRA litigation denied the petitioners their requested remedies and closed the case moot Among its fmdings, the court concluded that although the government had violated the , the government had asserted “legitimate and legally supportable positions through litigation,” and therefore had not litigated in bad faith. The court also noted it ex government to “honor its representation that it will provide training to its emp t the CVRA and the proper treatment of crime victims,” as well as honoring its p eet with the victims.¶

On September 30, 2019, CVRA petitio e Doe 1” filed in her true name a petition for a writ of mandamus in the United Stat ou Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, seeking review of the district court’s order denyin II er requested remedies. In its responsive brief, the government argued that “as a matter t th legal obligations under the CVRA do not attach prior to the government charging a s, “the CVRA was not triggered in [the Southern District of Florida] because no na charges were brought.” Nevertheless, during oral argument, the government co ed t the USAO had not been “fully transparent” with the petitioner and had “made a mi causing her to believe that the case was ongoing when in fact the NPA had been si ’ On April 14, 2020, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals denied the petition, ruling that ‘gilts do not attach until a defendant has been criminally charged. On August 7, 202 a co granted the petition for rehearing en bane and vacated the panel’s opinion; as of th of this Report, a briefing schedule has been issued, and oral argument is set for Decembe 0.¶

IL t TION AND SCOPE OF OPR’S INVESTIGATION¶

Aft the Miami Herald published its investigative report on November 28, 2018, U.S. Senator Ben Sasse, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Oversight, Agency Action, Federal Rights and Federal Courts, sent a December 3, 2018 letter to OPR, citing the Miami Herald’s report and requesting that OPR “open an investigation into the instances identified in this reporting of possible misconduct by Department of Justice attorneys.” On February 6, 2019, the Department of Justice Office of Legislative Affairs advised Senator Sasse that OPR had opened¶

an investigation into the matter and would review the USAO’s decision to resolve the federal investigation of Epstein through the NPA.{sup}6¶

After the district court issued its ruling in the CVRA litigation, on February 21, 2019, OPR included within the scope of its investigation an examination of the government’s conduct that formed the basis for the court’s findings that the USAO violated the CVRA in failing to afford victims a reasonable right to confer with the government about the NPA before the agreement was signed and that the government affirmatively misled victims about the status of the federal investigation.¶

During the course of its investigation, OPR obtained and reviewed hundreds of thousands of records from the USAO, the FBI, and other Department components, including the Office of the Deputy Attorney General, the Criminal Division, and the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys. The records included emails, letters, memoranda, and investigative materials. OPR also collected and reviewed materials relating to the state investigation and prosecution of Epstein. OPR also examined extensive publicly available information, including depositions, pleadings, orders, and other court records, and reviewed media reports and interviews, articles, podcasts, and books relating to the Epstein case.¶

In addition to this extensive documentary review, OPR conducted more than 60 interviews of witnesses, including the FBI case agents, their supervisors, and FBI administrative personnel; current and former USAO staff and attorneys; current and former Department attorneys and senior managers, including a former Deputy Attorney General and a former Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division; and the former State Attorney and former Assistant State Attorney in charge of the state investigation of Epstein. OPR also interviewed several victims and attorneys representing victims, and reviewed written submissions from victims, concerning victim contacts with the USAO and the FBI.¶

OPR identified former U.S. Attorney Acosta, three former USAO supervisors, and the AUSA as subjects of its investigation based on preliminary information indicating that each of them was involved in the decision to resolve the case through the NPA or in the negotiations leading to the agreement. OPR deems a current or former Department attorney to be a subject of its investigation when the individual’s conduct is within the scope of OPR’s review and may result in a finding of professional misconduct. OPR reviewed prior public statements made by Acosta and another subject. All five subjects cooperated fully with OPR’s investigation. OPR requested that all of the subjects provide written responses detailing their involvement in the federal investigation of Epstein, the drafting and execution of the NPA, and decisions relating to victim notification and consultation. OPR received and reviewed written responses from all of the subjects, and subsequently conducted extensive interviews of each subject under oath and before a court reporter. Each subject was represented by counsel and had access to relevant contemporaneous documents before the subject’s OPR interview. The subjects reviewed and provided comments on their respective interview transcripts and on OPR’s draft report. OPR¶

{sup}6 The federal government was closed from December 22, 2018, to January 25, 2019. After initiating its investigation, OPR also subsequently received other letters from U.S. Senators and Representatives inquiring into the status of the OPR investigation.¶

carefully considered the comments and made changes, or noted comments, as OPR deemed appropriate; OPR did not, however, alter its findings and conclusions.¶

Finally, OPR reviewed relevant case law, statutes, regulations, Department policy, and attorney professional responsibility rules as necessary to resolve the issues presented in this case and to determine whether the subjects committed professional misconduct.¶

As part of its investigation, OPR examined the interactions between state officials and the federal investigators and prosecutors, but because OPR does not have jurisdiction over state officials, OPR did not investigate, or reach conclusions about, their conduct regarding the state investigation.{sup}7 Because OPR’s mission is to ensure that Department attorneys adhere to the standards of professional conduct, OPR’s investigation focused on the actions of the subject attorneys rather than on determining the full scope of Epstein’s and his assistants’ criminal behavior. Accordingly, OPR considered the evidence and information regarding Epstein and his assistants’ conduct as it was known to the subjects at the time they performed their duties as Department attorneys. Additional evidence and information that came to light after June 30, 2008, when Epstein entered his guilty plea under the NPA, did not affect the subjects’ actions prior to that date, and OPR did not evaluate the subjects’ conduct on the basis of that subsequent information.¶

OPR’s investigation occurred approximately 12 years after most of the significant events relating to the USAO’s investigation of Epstein, the NPA, and Epstein’s guilty plea. As a result, many of the subjects and witnesses were unable to recall the details of events or their own or others’ actions occurring in 2006-2008, such as conversations, meetings, or documents they reviewed at the time.{sup}8 However, OPR’s evaluation of the subjects’ conduct was aided significantly by extensive, contemporaneous emails among the prosecutors and communications between the government and defense counsel. These records often referred to the interactions among the participants and described important decisions and, in some instances, the bases for them.¶

III. OVERVIEW OF OPR’S ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK¶

OPR’s primary mission is to ensure that Department attorneys perform their duties in accordance with the highest professional standards, as would be expected of the nation’s principal law enforcement agency. Accordingly, OPR investigates allegations of professional misconduct against current or former Department attorneys related to the exercise of their authority to¶

{sup}7 In August 2019, Florida Governor Ron DeSantis announced that he had directed the Florida Department of Law Enforcement to open an investigation into the conduct of state authorities relating to Epstein. As reported, the investigation focuses on Epstein’s state plea agreement and the Palm Beach County work release program.¶

{sup}8 OPR was cognizant that Acosta and the three managers all left the USAO during, or not long after resolution of, the Epstein case, while the AUSA remained with the USAO until mid-2019. Moreover, as the line prosecutor in the Epstein investigation and also as co-counsel in the CVRA litigation until the USAO was recused from that litigation in early 2019, the AUSA had continuous access to the USAO documentary record and numerous occasions to review these materials in the course of their official duties. Additionally, in responding to OPR’s request for a written response, and in preparing to be interviewed by OPR, the AUSA was able to refresh her recollection with these materials to an extent not possible for the other subjects, who were provided with relevant documents by OPR in preparation for their interviews.¶

investigate, litigate, or provide legal advice.9 OPR also has jurisdiction to investigate allegations of misconduct against Department law enforcement agents when they relate to a Department attorney’s alleged professional misconduct.¶

In its investigations, OPR determines whether a clear and unambiguous standard governs the challenged conduct and whether a subject attorney violated that standard. Department attorneys are subject to various legal obligations and professional standards in the performance of their duties, including the Constitution, statutes, standards of conduct imposed by attorney licensing authorities, and Department regulations and policies. OPR finds misconduct when it concludes by a preponderance of the evidence that a subject attorney violated suc a standard intentionally or recklessly. Pursuant to OPR’s analytical framework, when OP ludes that (1) no clear and unambiguous standard governs the conduct in question or (2 ubj t did not intentionally or recklessly violate the standard that governs the conduct, th eludes that the subject’s conduct does not constitute professional misconduct. In some c may conclude that a subject attorney’s conduct does not satisfy the elements n r a professional misconduct finding, but that the circumstances warrant another fmd’ such cases, OPR may conclude that a subject attorney exercised poor judgment, e, or otherwise acted inappropriately under the circumstances. OPR may also that the subject attorney’s conduct was appropriate under the circumstances. to¶

IV. ISSUES CONSIDERED¶

In this investigation, OPR considered the negotiation, execution, and implementa interactions with Epstein’s victims and a of issues are described below and are a sets of allegations. The first relates to A. The second relates to the USAO’s the requirements of the CVRA. The two sets eparately in this Report.¶

A. The Negotiation and Implementation of the NPA¶

In evaluating whether f the subjects committed professional misconduct, OPR considered whether any the A’s provisions violated a clear or unambiguous statute, professional responsibili r standard, or Department regulation or policy. In particular, OPR considered whethe t e NP violated standards relating to (1) charging decisions, (2) declination of criminal cha deferred or non-prosecution agreements, (4) plea agreements, (5) grants¶

{sup}9 28 during th it c OPR’s attorneys. A a former Dcpartmcnt attorney violated state rules of professional conduct for attorneys could result in a referral to an appropriate state attorney disciplinary authority. Furthermore, findings resulting from investigations of thc conduct of Department attorneys, even former employees, may assist Department managers in supervising future cases. 9a(a)(I). OPR has authority to investigate the professional conduct of attorneys occurring nt by the Department, regardless of whether the attorney left the Department before or during n. Over its 45-year history, OPR has routinely investigated the conduct of former Department ugh former Department attorneys cannot be disciplined by the Department, OPR’s determination that¶

to In some instances, OPR declines to opcn an investigation based upon a review of thc initial complaint or after a preliminary inquiry into the matter. In December 2010, one of the attorneys representing victims in the CVRA litigation raised allegations that Epstein may have exerted improper influence over the federal criminal investigation and that the USAO had deceived the victims of Epstein’s crimes about the existence of the NPA. Pursuant to its standard policy, OPR declined to open an investigation into those allegations at that time in deference to the then-pending CVRA litigation.¶

of immunity, or (6) the deportation of criminal aliens. The potentially applicable standards that OPR considered as to each of these issues are identified and discussed later in this Report. OPR also examined whether the evidence establishes that any of the subjects were influenced to enter into the NPA, or to include in the NPA terms favorable to Epstein, because of an improper motive, such as a bribe, political consideration, personal interest, or favoritism. OPR also examined and discusses in this Report significant events that occurred after the NPA was negotiated and signed that shed additional light on the USAO’s handling of the Epstein investigation.¶

B. The District Court’s Conclusion That the USAO Violated the CVRA¶

To address the district court’s adverse judicial findings, OPR assessed the manner, content, and timing of the government’s interactions with victims both before and after the NPA was signed, including victim notification letters issued by the USAO and the FBI and interviews conducted by the USAO. OPR considered whether any of the subject attorneys violated any clear and unambiguous standard governing victim consultation or notification. OPR examined the government’s lack of consultation with the victims before the NPA was signed, as well as the circumstances relating to the district court’s finding that the USAO affirmatively misled Epstein’s victims about the status of the federal investigation after the NPA was signed.¶

V. OPR’S FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS¶

OPR evaluated the conduct of each subject and considered his or her individual role in various decisions and events. Acosta, however, made the pivotal decision to resolve the federal investigation of Epstein through a state-based plea and either developed or approved the terms of the initial offer to the defense that set the beginning point for the subsequent negotiations that led to the NPA. Although Acosta did not sign the NPA, he participated in its drafting and approved it, with knowledge of its terms. During his OPR interview, Acosta acknowledged that he approved the NPA and accepted responsibility for it. Therefore, OPR considers Acosta to be responsible for the NPA and for the actions of the other subjects who implemented his decisions. Acosta’s overall responsibility for the government’s interactions or lack of communication with the victims is less clear, but Acosta affirmatively made certain decisions regarding victim notification, and OPR evaluates his conduct with respect to those decisions.¶

A. Findings and Conclusions Relating to the NPA¶

With respect to all five subjects of OPR’s investigation, OPR concludes that the subjects did not commit professional misconduct with respect to the development, negotiation, and approval of the NPA. Under OPR’s framework, professional misconduct requires a finding that a subject attorney intentionally or recklessly violated a clear and unambiguous standard governing the conduct at issue. OPR found no clear and unambiguous standard that required Acosta to indict Epstein on federal charges or that prohibited his decision to defer prosecution to the state. Furthermore, none of the individual terms of the NPA violated Department or other applicable standards.¶

As the U.S. Attorney, Acosta had the “plenary authority” under established federal law and Department policy to resolve the case as he deemed necessary and appropriate, as long as his decision was not motivated or influenced by improper factors. Acosta’s decision to decline to¶

initiate a federal prosecution of Epstein was within the scope of his authority, and OPR did not find evidence that his decision was based on corruption or other impermissible considerations, such as Epstein’s wealth, status, or associations. Evidence shows that Acosta resisted defense efforts to have the matter returned to the state for whatever result state authorities deemed appropriate, and he refused to eliminate the incarceration and sexual offender registration requirements. OPR did not find evidence establishing that Acosta’s “breakfast meeting” with one of Epstein’s defense counsel in October 2007 led to the NPA, which had been signed weeks earlier, or to any other significant decision that benefited Epstein. The contemporaneous records show that USAO managers’ concerns about legal issues, witness credibility, and the impact of a trial on the victims led them to prefer a pre-charge resolution and that Acosta’s concerns abo the proper role of the federal government in prosecuting solicitation crimes resulted in his nce for a state-based resolution. Accordingly, OPR does not fmd that Acosta enga pr essional misconduct by resolving the federal investigation of Epstein in the way tat the other subjects committed professional misconduct through their implementatio a’s decisions.¶

Nevertheless, OPR concludes that Acosta’s decision to reso a th federal investigation through the NPA constitutes poor judgment. Although this ‘sr° within the scope of Acosta’s broad discretion and OPR does not find that it resu improper factors, the NPA was a flawed mechanism for satisfying the federal interes the government to open its investigation of Epstein. In Acosta’s view, the federal s role in prosecuting Epstein was limited by principles of federalism, under whic ndent authority of the state should be recognized, and the federal responsibility in t tio was to serve as a “backstop” to state authorities by encouraging them to do more. v Acosta failed to consider the difficulties inherent in a resolution that relied heavily o on numerous state officials over whom he had no authority; he resolved the federal before significant investigative steps were completed; and he agreed to severs nd problematic terms in the NPA without the consideration required under the ces. In sum, Acosta’s application of federalism principles was too expansive, it, f the federal interest in prosecuting Epstein was too narrow, and his understanding f the t to system was too imperfect to justify the decision to use the NPA. Furthermore, becaus sta assumed a significant role in reviewing and drafting the NPA and the other three is who were supervisors left the USAO, were transitioning to other jobs, or were absent t crit ctures, Acosta should have ensured more effective coordination and communicati uring e negotiations and before approving the final NPA. The NPA was a unique resolu • e that required greater oversight and supervision than Acosta provided.¶

B. ings and Conclusions Relating to the Government’s Interactions with ictims¶

OPIt further concludes that none of the subject attorneys committed professional misconduct with respect to the government’s interactions with victims. The subjects did not have a clear and unambiguous duty under the CVRA to consult with victims before entering into the NPA because the USAO resolved the Epstein investigation without a federal criminal charge. Significantly, at the time the NPA was signed, the Department did not interpret CVRA rights to attach unless and until federal charges had been filed, and the federal courts had not established a clear and unambiguous standard applying the CVRA before criminal charges were brought. In addition, OPR did not find evidence that the lack of consultation was for the purpose of silencing victims. Nonetheless, the lack of consultation was part of a series of government¶

interactions with victims that ultimately led to public and court condemnation of the government’s treatment of the victims, reflected poorly on the Department as a whole, and is contradictory to the Department’s mission to minimize the frustration and confusion that victims of a crime endure.¶

OPR determined that none of the subjects was responsible for communications sent to certain victims after the NPA was signed that described the case as “under investigation” and that failed to inform them of the NPA. The letters were sent by an FBI administrative employee who was not directly involved in the investigation, incorporated standard form language used by the FBI when communicating with victims, and were not drafted or reviewed by the subjects. Moreover, the statement that the matter was “under investigation” was not false because the government in fact continued to investigate the case in anticipation that Epstein would not fulfill the terms of the NPA. However, the letters risked misleading the victims and contributed to victim frustration and confusion by failing to provide important information about the status of the investigation. The letters also demonstrated a lack of coordination between the federal agencies responsible for communicating with Epstein’s victims and showed a lack of attention to and oversight regarding communication with victims.¶

After the NPA was signed, Acosta elected to defer to the State Attorney the decision whether to notify victims about the state’s plea hearing pursuant to the state’s own victim’s rights requirements. Although Acosta’s decision was within his authority and did not constitute professional misconduct, OPR concludes that Acosta exercised poor judgment when he failed to make certain that the state intended to and would notify victims identified through the federal investigation about the state plea hearing. His decision left victims uninformed about an important proceeding that resolved the federal investigation, an investigation about which the USAO had communicated with victims for months. It also ultimately created the misimpression that the Department intentionally sought to silence the victims. Acosta failed to ensure that victims were made aware of a court proceeding that was related to their own cases, and thus he failed to ensure that victims were treated with forthrightness and dignity.¶

OPR concludes that the decision to postpone notifying victims about the terms of the NPA after it was signed and the omission of information about the NPA during victim interviews and conversations with victims’ attorneys in 2008 do not constitute professional misconduct. Contemporaneous records show that these actions were based on strategic concerns about creating impeachment evidence that Epstein’s victims had financial motives to make claims against him, evidence that could be used against victims at a trial, and were not for the purpose of silencing victims. Nonetheless, the failure to reevaluate the strategy prior to interviews of victims and discussions with victims’ attorneys occurring in 2008 led to interactions that contributed to victims’ feelings that the government was intentionally concealing information from them.¶

After examining the full scope and context of the government’s interactions with victims, OPR concludes that the government’s lack of transparency and its inconsistent messages led to victims feeling confused and ill-treated by the government; gave victims and the public the misimpression that the government had colluded with Epstein’s counsel to keep the NPA secret from the victims; and undercut public confidence in the legitimacy of the resulting agreement. The overall result of the subjects’ anomalous handling of this case understandably left many victims feeling ignored and frustrated and resulted in extensive public criticism. In sum, OPR concludes¶

that the victims were not treated with the forthrightness and sensitivity expected by the Department.¶

VI. ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT¶

The Report is divided into three chapters. In Chapter One, OPR describes the relevant federal, state, and local law enforcement entities involved in investigating Epstein’s criminal conduct, as well as the backgrounds of the five subjects and their roles in the events in question. OPR provides a brief profile of Epstein and identifies the defense attorneys who interacted with the subjects.¶

In Chapter Two, OPR sets forth an extensive account of events rela to federal investigation of Epstein. The account begins with the initial complaint in M: 05 by a young victim and her parents to the local police—a complaint that launched an i n by local law enforcement authorities—and continues through the mid-2006 of the federal investigation; the September 2007 negotiation and signing of the Epstein’s subsequent efforts to invalidate the NPA through appeals to senior Departm i t o s; Epstein’s June 2008 guilty plea in state court; and, finally, efforts by the AUSA Epstein’s compliance with the terms of the NPA during his incarceration and until hi ome detention ended in July 2010. After describing the relevant events, OPR anal tonal misconduct allegations relating to the decisions made regarding the deve d execution of the NPA. OPR describes the relevant standards and sets forth its conclusions regarding the subjects’ conduct.¶

Chapter Three concerns the gov teractions with victims and the district court’s findings regarding the CVRA. OPR the relevant events and analyzes the subjects’ conduct in light of the pertinent sta¶

OPR sets forth the exte al detail provided in Chapters Two and Three, including internal USAO and Departm unications, because doing so is necessary for a full understanding of the subj ?…”. ’ actions and of the bases for OPR’s conclusions.¶

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY …	i
I. OVERVIEW OF FACTUAL BACKGROUND …	i
II. THE INITIATION AND SCOPE OF OPR’S INVESTIGATION…	v
III. OVERVIEW OF OPR’S ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK…	vii
IV. ISSUES CONSIDERED…	viii
A. The Negotiation, Execution, and Implementation of the NPA …	viii
B. The District Court’s Conclusion That the USAO Violated the CVRA …	ix
V. OPR’S FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS…	ix
A. Findings and Conclusions Relating to the NPA …	ix
B. Findings and Conclusions Relating to the Government’s Interactions with Victims…	x
VI. ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT…	xii
CHAPTER ONE: SIGNIFICANT ENTITIES AND INDIVIDUALS…	1
I. THE FEDERAL AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES …	1
A. The Department of Justice, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation…	1
B. The State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies…	4
II. THE SUBJECT ATTORNEYS AND THEIR ROLES IN THE EPSTEIN CASE…	4
III. JEFFREY EPSTEIN AND HIS DEFENSE ATTORNEYS…	8
A. Jeffrey Epstein …	8
B. Epstein’s Defense Attorneys…	8
CHAPTER TWO: THE NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENT …	11
PART ONE: FACTUAL BACKGROUND …	11
I. OVERVIEW …	11
II. MARCH 2005 – MAY 2006: EPSTEIN IS INVESTIGATED BY THE PALM BEACH POLICE DEPARTMENT AND THE PALM BEACH COUNTY STATE ATTORNEY’S OFFICE …	11
A. The Initial Allegations and the PBPD Investigation…	11
B. The State Attorney’s Office Decides to Present the Case to a State Grand Jury…	14
C. Florida State Procedure for Bringing Criminal Charges…	15
D. PBPD Chief Reiter Becomes Concerned with the State Attorney’s Office’s Handling of the State Investigation and Seeks a Federal Investigation…	16

TABLE OF CONTENTS¶

III. THE FBI AND THE USAO INVESTIGATE EPSTEIN, AND THE DEFENSE TEAM ENGAGES WITH THE USAO 16¶

• A. May 2006 February 2007: The Federal Investigation Is Initiated, and the USAO Opens a Case File 16
  • 1. The PBPD Presents the Matter to the FBI and the USAO 17
  • 2. May 2006: The USAO Accepts the Case and Opens a Case File 18
  • 3. July 14, 2006: Villafafia Informs Acosta and Sloman about the Case 18
  • 4. Late July 2006: The State Indicts Epstein, and the USAO Moves Forward with a Federal Investigation 20
  • 5. October 2006 February 2007: Epstein’s Defense Co Initiate Contact with Villafafta, Lourie, and Sloma Press for a Meeting 22
  • 6. February 2007: Defense Counsel Meet with a nd Villaicals and Present the Defense Objecj to ederal Case 24
• B. February— May 2007: Villafafia and the F e to Investigate; Villafafia Drafts a Prosecution Memoran posed Indictment for USAO Managers to Review 24
• C. May —June 2007: Miami Manag the Prosecution Memorandum and Proposed Charges 27
• D. Defense Counsel Seek a M to Senior USAO Managers, which Villafafta Opposes 30
• E. June 2007: Villaf ents the Prosecution Memorandum 33
• F. The June 26, 2 with Defense Counsel 33

IV. ACOSTA DECIDES T R EPSTEIN A TWO-YEAR STATE PLEA TO RESOLVE THE RAL INVESTIGATION 35¶

• A. June July 00 : The USAO Proposes a State Plea Resolution, the D fense Rejects 36 costa’s Explanation for His Decision to Pursue a State-based Resolution 37 July 2007: Villafana and Menchel Disagree about the Proposed State Resolution 40 Villafafla Attempts to Obtain the Computer Equipment Missing from Epstein’s Palm Beach Home, but the Defense Team Opposes Her Efforts 45

• C. July 2007: The Defense Continues Its Efforts to Stop the Federal Investigation 47

• D. Acosta Decides on a Resolution That Includes a Two-Year Term of Incarceration 48

  • I. The July 26, 2007 Meeting in Miami 48

• B.

• VI. SEPTEMBER 2007: THE PL PROCESS, THE REQ F IMPRISONMENT IS REDUCED 63

  • A. The Incarceratio Te educed from 24 Months to 20 Months 63
  • B. September 12, 2 e USAO and Defense Counsel Meet with the State
  • C. The fwiden Not Clearly Show Why the Term of Incarceration educed from 24 Months to 20 Months to 18 Months 66 arTies Continue to Negotiate but Primarily Focus on a Potential Plea eral Charges
• 2. The Subjects’ Explanations for the Decision to Offer Epstein a Sentence with a Two-Year Term of Incarceration 49

• E. Villafafla Drafts a “Term Sheet” Listing the Requirements of a Potential Agreement with the Defense 51

• V. THE USAO PRESENTS EPSTEIN WITH KEY TERMS OF A DEAL: PLEAD GUILTY TO STATE CHARGES REQUIRING A TWO-YEAR TERM OF INCARCERATION AND SEXUAL OFFENDER REGISTRATION, AND AGREE TO A MEANS FOR THE VICTIMS TO OBTAIN MONETARY DAMAGES 53

  • A. July 31, 2007: The USAO Presents Its Proposal to the Defense Tea which Makes a Counteroffer 54
  • B. In an August 3, 2007 Letter, the USAO States That a Two-Year Tenn of Imprisonment Is the Minimum That Will Vindicate the Fec ral Interest 55
  • C. August September 2007: Epstein Hires Additional Meet with Acosta 59
    • I. Acosta Agrees to Meet with Epstein ‘s meys
    • 2. Leading to the Meeting with Defe Steps Are Postponed, and the D Villafafta’s Efforts to Obtain ,Investigative tinues to Oppose ter Evidence
    • 3. September 7, 2007: Acoskt QCs ISSAO Attorneys, and FBI Supervisors Meet rthPpstem Attorneys Starr, Lefkowitz, and 59 60 62
  • D. TIATIONS INTENSIFY, AND IN THE 64 68
  • F. Parties Appear to Reach Agreement on a Plea to Federal Charges 72 Defense Counsel Offers New Proposals Substantially Changing the Terms of the Federal Plea Agreement, which the USAO Rejects 73
  • G. Villafafta and Lourie Recommend Ending Negotiations, but Acosta Urges That They “Try to Work It Out” 76
  • H. Acosta Edits the Federal Plea Agreement, and Villafafta Sends a Final Version to the Defense 77

I. J. K. L. VII. A. B. C. D. E. F.	The Defense Rejects the Federal Plea Agreement, Returns to the NPA “State-Only” Resolution, and Begins Opposing the Sexual Offender Registration Requirement The USAO Agrees Not to Criminally Charge “Potential Co-Conspirators” The USAO Rejects Defense Efforts to Eliminate the Sexual Offender Registration Requirement The Defense Adds a Confidentiality Clause SEPTEMBER 24, 2007: ACOSTA MAKES FINAL EDITS, AND THE NPA IS SIGNED VIII. POST-NPA NEGOTIATIONS September — October 2007: Sloman’s Concerns about Sel Attorney Representative Lead to a Proposed NPA Add October 12, 2007: Acosta and Defense Attorney Le Meet for Breakfast Acosta Agrees to the Defense Request to P the Parties Continue to Negotiate Issues Representative and Finally Reach A Epstein Further Delays His Guilty Epstein Seeks Departmental 1 7 Relating to Monetary Dama Despite Affirming the to It and Accuse Vil Improper Conduct 1. Decemb an Acosta th Federa vestigation and Villafafia 2. As USA d Acosta Agrees to Meet Again with Defense Counsel The Defense Notifies Acosta That It May Pursue a Department Review of the USAO’s Actions Monetary Damages, but the Defense Does Not Accept It 5. January 7, 2008: Acosta and Sloman Meet with M, Makes Additional Allegations of USAO Misconduct	78 79 81 83 84 87 87 89 Guilty Plea; the Attorney n he NPA Addendum 91 94 e NPA’s § 2255 Provision th Victims 94 e Counsel Intensify Their Challenges 98 , 2007: Starr and Lefkowitz Send to ters nd “Ethics Opinions” Complaining about 98 It of the Starr and Lefkowitz Submissions, the New Criminal Chief Begins a Full Review of the Evidence, 99 99 Acosta Attempts to Revise the NPA § 2255 Language concerning 100 Who 101
	6. Acosta Asks CEOS to Review the Evidence	102
IX.	FEBRUARY - JUNE 2008: THE DEPARTMENT’S REVIEW	103
A.	February — May 15, 2008: Review by CEOS and the Criminal Division	104

B.	May – June 23, 2008: Review by the Office of the Deputy Attorney General…	108
X.	JUNE 2008 – JUNE 2009: EPSTEIN ENTERS HIS PLEAS AND SERVES HIS CUSTODIAL SENTENCE…	110
	A. June 30, 2008: Epstein Enters His Guilty Pleas in State Court …	111
	B. Epstein Is Placed on Work Release …	113
XI.	POST-RELEASE DEVELOPMENTS…	117
	PART TWO: APPLICABLE STANDARDS…	119
I.	OPR’S ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK …	119
II.	APPLICABLE STANDARDS OF CONDUCT…	120
	A. The United States Attorneys’ Manual…	120
	1. USAM Provisions Relating to the Initiation and Declination of a Federal Prosecution…	120
	2. USAM § 9-2.031: The Petite Policy …	122
	3. USAM Provisions Relating to Plea Agreements …	123
	4. USAM Provisions Relating to Non-Prosecution Agreements …	124
	5. USAM Provisions Relating to Grants of Immunity…	125
	6. USAM/C.F.R. Provisions Relating to Financial Conflicts of Interest…	125
B.	Other Department Policies…	125
	1. Department Policies Relating to the Disposition of Charges…	125
	2. Department Policy Relating to Deportation of Criminal Aliens…	127
C.	Case Law…	127
	1. Prosecutorial Discretion…	127
	2. Plea Agreement Promises of Leniency towards a Third Party …	128
D.	State Bar Rules…	129
	1. FRPC 4-1.1 – Competence …	130
	2. FRPC 4-1.3 – Diligence…	130
	3. FRPC 4-4.1 – Candor in Dealing with Others …	130
	4. FRPC 4-8.4 – Conduct Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice …	131
	PART THREE: ANALYSIS…	133
I.	OVERVIEW …	133
II.	ACOSTA REVIEWED AND APPROVED THE TERMS OF THE NPA AND IS ACCOUNTABLE FOR IT …	133

III.	OPR FOUND THAT NONE OF THE SUBJECTS VIOLATED A CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS STATUTE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY RULE OR STANDARD, OR DEPARTMENT REGULATION OR POLICY, IN NEGOTIATING, APPROVING, OR ENTERING INTO THE NPA …	134
A.	U.S. Attorneys Have Broad Discretion to Resolve Investigations or Cases as They Deem Appropriate, and Acosta’s Decision to Decline to Prosecute Epstein Federally Does Not Constitute Professional Misconduct…	135
B.	No Clear and Unambiguous Standard Precluded Acosta’s Use of a Non-Prosecution Agreement to Resolve the Federal Investigation of Epstein …	136
C.	The NPA’s Individual Provisions Did Not Violate Any Clear and Unambiguous Standards …	137
	1. Acosta Had Authority to Approve an Agreement That Required Epstein to Plead to Offenses Resulting in an 18-Month Term of Incarceration …	137
	2. The USAO’s Agreement Not to Prosecute Unidentified “Potential Co-Conspirators” Did Not Violate a Clear and Unambiguous Department Policy …	139
	3. The NPA Did Not Violate Department Policy Relating to Deportation of Criminal Aliens …	140
IV.	THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT ESTABLISH THAT THE SUBJECTS WERE INFLUENCED BY IMPROPER MOTIVES TO INCLUDE IN THE NPA TERMS FAVORABLE TO EPSTEIN OR TO OTHERWISE EXTEND BENEFITS TO EPSTEIN…	140
	A. OPR Found No Evidence of Criminal Corruption, Such as Bribery, Gratuity, or Illegal Political or Personal Consideration …	141
	B. Contemporaneous Written Records and Witness and Subject Interviews Did Not Reveal Evidence Establishing That the Subjects Were Improperly Influenced by Epstein’s Status, Wealth, or Associations …	142
	1. The Contemporaneous Records Did Not Reveal Evidence Establishing That the NPA Resulted from Improper Factors …	142
	2. The Subjects Asserted That They Were Motivated by Reasonable Strategic and Policy Considerations, Not Improper Influences …	143
	3. Subject and Witness Interviews and Contemporaneous Records Identified Case-Specific Considerations Relating to Evidence, Legal Theories, Litigation Risk, and a Trial’s Potential Impact on Victims …	144
	C. Other Significant Factors Are Inconsistent with a Conclusion That the Subjects’ Actions Were Motivated by Improper Influences…	149

D.	OPR Does Not Find That the Subjects’ Preexisting Relationships with Defense Counsel, Decisions to Meet with Defense Counsel, and Other Factors Established That the Subjects Acted from Improper Influences or Provided Improper Benefits to Epstein…	150
	1. The Evidence Does Not Establish That the Subjects Extended Any Improper Benefit to Epstein because of Their Preexisting Relationships with His Attorneys …	150
	2. The Subjects Asserted That Their Relationships with Defense Counsel Did Not Influence Their Actions …	151
E.	The Evidence Does Not Establish That the Subjects’ Meetings with Defense Counsel Were Improper Benefits to Epstein …	155
	1. The Evidence Shows That the Subjects’ Decisions to Meet with Epstein’s Legal Team Were Warranted by Strategic Considerations…	155
	2. The Evidence Does Not Establish That Acosta Negotiated a Deal Favorable to Epstein over Breakfast with Defense Counsel …	160
F.	Villafaña’s Emails with Defense Attorney Lefkowitz during the NPA Negotiations Do Not Establish That Villafaña, or Other Subjects, Intended to Give Epstein Preferential Treatment or Were Motivated by Favoritism or Other Improper Influences …	163
G.	The Evidence Does Not Establish That Acosta, Lourie, or Villafaña Agreed to the NPA’s Provision Promising Not to Prosecute “Potential Co-conspirators” in Order to Protect Any of Epstein’s Political, Celebrity, or Other Influential Associates …	166
H.	OPR’s Investigation Did Not Reveal Evidence Establishing That Epstein Cooperated in Other Federal Investigations or Received Special Treatment on That Basis…	168
V.	ACOSTA EXERCISED POOR JUDGMENT BY RESOLVING THE FEDERAL INVESTIGATION THROUGH THE NPA …	169
	A. Acosta’s Decision to Resolve the Federal Investigation through a State Plea under Terms Incorporated into the NPA Was Based on a Flawed Application of the Petite Policy and Federalism Concerns, and Failed to Consider the Significant Disadvantages of a State-Based Resolution …	170
	B. The Assessment of the Merits of a Potential Federal Prosecution Was Undermined by the Failure to Obtain Evidence or Take Other Investigative Steps That Could Have Changed the Complexion of the Case …	175
	C. OPR Was Unable to Determine the Basis for the Two-Year Term of Incarceration, That It Was Tied to Traditional Sentencing Goals, or That It Satisfied the Federal Interest in the Prosecution …	179
	D. Acosta’s Decisions Led to Difficulties Enforcing the NPA …	182
	E. Acosta Did Not Exercise Sufficient Supervisory Review over the Process …	182

CHAPTER THREE: ISSUES RELATING TO THE GOVERNMENT’S INTERACTIONS AND COMMUNICATIONS WITH VICTIMS …	189
PART ONE: FACTUAL BACKGROUND …	189
I. OVERVIEW …	189
II. THE CVRA, 18 U.S.C. § 3771 …	189
A. History…	189
B. Enumerated Rights…	191
III. THE DEPARTMENT’S INTERPRETATION OF THE CVRA’S DEFINITION OF “CRIME VICTIM” AT THE TIME OF THE EPSTEIN INVESTIGATION …	192
A. April 1, 2005 Office of Legal Counsel “Preliminary Review”…	192
B. 2005 Attorney General Guidelines for Victim and Witness Assistance…	193
IV. USAO AND FBI VICTIM/WITNESS NOTIFICATION PRACTICE AT THE TIME OF THE EPSTEIN INVESTIGATION …	194
A. USAO Training…	194
B. The Automated Victim Notification System …	195
C. FBI Victim Notification Pamphlets …	196
V. THE INTRODUCTORY USAO AND FBI LETTERS TO VICTIMS…	196
A. August 2006: The FBI Victim Notification Letters …	196
B. August 2006: The USAO’s Letters to Victims …	198
C. USAO and FBI Letters Are Hand Delivered …	200
VI. AUGUST 2006 – SEPTEMBER 2007: FBI AND USAO CONTACTS WITH VICTIMS BEFORE THE NPA IS SIGNED …	200
A. The Case Agents and Villafaña Solicit Some Victims’ Opinions about Resolving the Federal Investigation…	201
B. Before the NPA Is Signed, Villafaña Expresses Concern That Victims Have Not Been Consulted…	202
1. July 2007: Villafaña’s Email Exchanges with Menchel …	202
2. Villafaña Asserts That Her Supervisors Gave Instructions Not to Consult Victims about the Plea Discussions, but Her Supervisors Do Not Currently Recall Such Instructions …	204
3. September 6, 2007: Villafaña Informs Sloman, Who Informs Acosta, of Oosterbaan’s Opinion That Consultation with Victims Was Required…	204
VII. SEPTEMBER 24, 2007 – JUNE 30, 2008: AFTER THE NPA IS SIGNED, THE USAO MAKES VARIOUS VICTIM NOTIFICATION DECISIONS…	206

A.	September – October 2007: The Case Agents Notify Some Victims about the NPA, but Stop When the Case Agent Becomes Concerned about Potential Impeachment…	207
B.	October 2007: Defense Attorneys Object to Government Victim Notifications…	210
C.	October – November 2007: The FBI and the USAO Continue to Investigate, and the FBI Sends a Notice Letter to One Victim Stating That the Case is “Under Investigation” …	211
D.	The USAO Informs the Defense That It Intends to Notify Victims by Letter about Epstein’s State Plea Hearing and the Resolution of the Federal Investigation, but the Defense Strongly Objects to the Notification Plan …	212
E.	December 19, 2007: Acosta Advises the Defense That the USAO Will Defer to the State Attorney the Decision Whether to Notify Victims of the State Plea Hearing, but the USAO Would Notify Them of the Federal Resolution, “as Required by Law” …	216
F.	January – June 2008: While the Defense Presses Its Appeal to the Department in an Effort to Undo the NPA, the FBI and the USAO Continue Investigating Epstein …	220
	1. Villafaña Prepares to Contact Victims in Anticipation That Epstein Will Breach the NPA …	220
	2. The FBI Uses VNS Form Letters to Re-Establish Contact with Victims …	221
	3. Villafaña, the FBI, and the CEOS Trial Attorney Interview Victims…	224
	4. February – March 2008: Villafaña Takes Additional Steps to Prepare for a Prosecution of Epstein, Arranges for Pro Bono Attorneys for Victims, and Cautions about Continued Delay …	227
	5. [REDACTED] – April 2008: Villafaña Continues to Prepare for Filing Federal Charges …	227
VIII.	USAO SUPERVISORS CONSIDER CVRA OBLIGATIONS IN AN UNRELATED MATTER AND IN LIGHT OF A NEW FIFTH CIRCUIT OPINION…	228
IX.	JUNE 2008: VILLAFAÑA’S PRE-PLEA CONTACTS WITH THE ATTORNEY REPRESENTING THE VICTIMS WHO LATER BECAME THE CVRA PETITIONERS …	229
X.	JUNE 2008: EFFORTS TO NOTIFY VICTIMS ABOUT THE JUNE 30, 2008 PLEA HEARING…	231
XI.	JUNE 30, 2008: EPSTEIN ENTERS HIS GUILTY PLEAS IN A STATE COURT HEARING AT WHICH NO VICTIMS ARE PRESENT…	234
XII.	SIGNIFICANT POST-PLEA DEVELOPMENTS…	235
	A. Immediately After Epstein’s State Guilty Pleas, Villafaña Notifies Some Victims’ Attorneys…	235

B.	July 7, 2008: The CVRA Litigation Is Initiated …	236
C.	July 2008: Villafaña Prepares and Sends a Victim Notification Letter to Listed Victims…	237
D.	July – August 2008: The FBI Sends the Victim Notification Letter to Victims Residing Outside of the United States…	238
E.	August – September 2008: The Federal Court Orders the USAO to Disclose the NPA to Victims, and the USAO Sends a Revised Victim Notification Letter…	239
F.	2010 – 2011: Department and Congressional Actions Regarding Interpretation of the CVRA …	241
G.	The CVRA Litigation Proceedings and Current Status …	242
PART TWO: APPLICABLE STANDARDS…		247
I.	STATUTORY PROVISIONS …	247
A.	The CVRA, 18 U.S.C. § 3771 …	247
B.	The Victims’ Rights and Restitution Act of 1990 (VRRA), 34 U.S.C. § 20141, Services to Victims (formerly cited as 42 USCA § 10607)…	248
II.	DEPARTMENT POLICY: THE 2005 ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR VICTIM AND WITNESS ASSISTANCE (2005 GUIDELINES)…	249
III.	FLORIDA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT…	253
A.	FRPC 4-4.1 – Candor in Dealing with Others …	253
B.	FRPC 4-8.4 – Conduct Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice …	253
PART THREE: ANALYSIS…		255
I.	OVERVIEW …	255
II.	THE SUBJECTS DID NOT VIOLATE A CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS STANDARD BY ENTERING INTO THE NPA WITHOUT CONSULTING THE VICTIMS …	255
A.	At the Time, No Clear and Unambiguous Standard Required the USAO to Notify Victims Regarding Case-Related Events until after the Filing of Criminal Charges …	256
B.	OPR Did Not Find Evidence Establishing That the Lack of Consultation Was Intended to Silence Victims…	258
III.	LETTERS SENT TO VICTIMS BY THE FBI WERE NOT FALSE STATEMENTS BUT RISKED MISLEADING VICTIMS ABOUT THE STATUS OF THE FEDERAL INVESTIGATION…	261
A.	The USAO Was Not Responsible for Victim Notification Letters Sent by the FBI in October 2007, January 2008, and May 2008 Describing the Status of the Case as “Under Investigation” …	262

• B. Because the Federal Investigation Continued after the NPA Was Signed, the FBI Letters Were Accurate but Risked Misleading Victims regarding the Status of the Federal Investigation 263
• IV. ACOSTA’S DECISION TO DEFER TO THE STATE ATTORNEY’S DISCRETION WHETHER TO NOTIFY VICTIMS ABOUT EPSTEIN’S STATE COURT PLEA HEARING DID NOT VIOLATE A CLEAR OR UNAMBIGUOUS STANDARD; HOWEVER, ACOSTA EXERCISED POOR JUDGMENT BY FAILING TO ENSURE THAT VICTIMS IDENTIFIED IN THE FEDERAL INVESTIGATION WERE ADVISED OF THE STATE PLEA HEARING 265
  • A. Acosta’s Decision to Defer to the State Attorney’s Discretion Whet to Notify Victims about Epstein’s State Court Plea Hearing Di Violate Any Clear or Unambiguous Standard 265
  • B. Acosta Exercised Poor Judgment When He Failed to E Victims Identified in the Federal Investigation Were I the State Plea Hearing 269
• V. VILLAFASA DID NOT COMMIT PROFESSION ONDUCT IN HER ORAL COMMUNICATIONS TO VICTIMS A ’ ATTORNEYS, IN WHICH SHE DESCRIBED THE CASE AS STIGATION” BUT DID NOT DISCLOSE THE EXISTEN NPA TO SOME VICTIMS 273
• VI. THE GOVERNMENT FAILED TO S FORTHRIGHTLY AND WITH SENSITIVITY WHEN IT F T TIMELY PROVIDE VICTIMS WITH IMPORTANT INFO N OUT THE RESOLUTION OF THE FEDERAL INVESTIGATIO 280 CONCLUSION 283 METHODOLOGY 1 1 287

Exhibit 1: State Indictm¶

Exhibit 2: Septem. 6, 2 7 Draft Non-Prosecution Agreement¶

Exhibit 3: Sep , 2007 Non-Prosecution Agreement¶

Exhibi m to the Non-Prosecution Agreement¶

CHAPTER ONE SIGNIFICANT ENTITIES AND INDIVIDUALS¶

I. THE FEDERAL AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES¶

A. The Department of Justice, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation¶

The Department of Justice (Department) is a cabinet-level executive b artment headed by the United States Attorney General. The stated mission of the Dep is enforce federal law and defend the interests of the United States; ensure public ovide federal leadership in preventing and controlling crime; seek just punishment fo ty of unlawful behavior; and ensure the fair and impartial administration of justic aliment enforces federal criminal law through investigations and prosecutions of vi atio s of federal criminal statutes. It also engages in civil litigation. During the pe re ant to this Report, the Department had approximately 110,000 employees in 41 nents. The Department’s headquarters are in Washington, D.C., and it conducts work through field locations around the nation and overseas.¶

The prosecution of federal criminal laws ledprimarily through 94 U.S. Attorney’s Offices, each headed by a presidentially appo advice and consent of the U.S. Senate) U.S. Attorney who has independent authorit r ht or her office but is overseen by the Attorney General through the Deputy Attorney G 1.1 e Department’s Criminal Division, headed by an Assistant Attorney General, inclu ents with specialized areas of expertise that also prosecute cases, assist in the p ti died by U.S. Attorney’s Offices, and provide legal expertise and policy guidance. e Criminal Division components mentioned in this Report are the Appellate Sectio the Ice of Enforcement Operations, the Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section, an st prominently, the Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section (CEOS).¶

CEOS, b: ington, D.C., comprises attorneys and investigators who specialize in investigatin ecuting child exploitation crimes, especially those involving technology, and they ttorney’s Offices in investigations, trials, and appeals related to these offenses. vides advice and training to federal prosecutors, law enforcement personnel, and g t officials. CEOS also works to develop and refine proposals for prosecution policies, lation, government practices, and agency regulations.¶

The U.S. Attorneys’ Manual (USAM) (revised in 2018 and renamed the Justice Manual) is a compilation of Department rules, policies, and guidance governing the conduct of Department employees. It includes requirements for approval by, or consultation with, the Criminal Division¶

Two U.S. Attorney’s Offices, in the judicial districts of Guam and of the Northern Mariana Islands, arc headed by a single U.S. Attorney. The Attorney General and the U.S. District Court have authority to appoint acting and interim U.S. Attorneys.¶

or other divisions having responsibility for specific criminal enforcement, such as the Civil Rights Division. In this Report, OPR applies the USAM provisions in effect at the relevant time.¶

During the period most relevant to this Report, the Attorney General was Michael Mukasey, the Deputy Attorney General was Mark Filip, and the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division was Alice Fisher. The Chief of CEOS was Andrew Oosterbaan.¶

The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida (USAO) handles federal matters in the Southern District of Florida “udicial district, which covers the counties of Miami-Dade, Broward, Monroe, Palm Beach, St. Lucie, Indian River, Okee obee, and Highlands, an area of over 15,000 square miles. During the period relevant to eport, the USAO had a staff of approximately 200 Assistant U.S. Attorneys (AUSA support personnel. The main office is in Miami; staffed branch offices are located in ort Lauderdale, West Palm Beach (covering Palm Beach County), and Fort Pierce; and an unstaf branch office is located in Key West. The West Palm Beach USAO office is approximately 20 miles from the Miami office. The USAO is headed by the U.S. Attorney; the seco d-in-command is the First Assistant U.S. Attorney (FAUSA), who serves as principal so e U.S. Attorney and supervises all components of the USAO, including the Crim’ il, and Appellate Divisions, each of which is headed by a Chief. During the period this Report, the West Palm Beach office consisted of two criminal sections and a Managing AUSA.¶

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) ’ p cipal federal law enforcement agency and is part of the Department. It maintains fie that work with U.S. Attorney’s Offices. The FBI field office in Miami, headed by a is ent in Charge, has satellite offices, known as Resident Agencies, one of which is loc in t Palm Beach and covers Palm Beach County. The Epstein investigation was handled ci I Agents assigned to a particular West Palm Beach Resident Agency squad, headed by sory Special Agent. FBI responsibility for advising crime victims of their rights anjL ct services available to them is handled by non-agent Victim Specialists.¶

The following ch ti ptior shows the Department’s organizational structure during the period relevant to this Report:¶

U.S. Department of Justice 2006 - 2008¶

B. The State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies¶

Florida state criminal prosecutions are primarily managed by an Office of State Attorney in each of the state’s 20 judicial circuits, headed by a State Attorney who is elected to a four-year term. Palm Beach County constitutes the 15th Judicial Circuit. Barry Krischer was the elected State Attorney for that circuit from 1992 until January 2009. During the period relevant to this Report, the Palm Beach County State Attorney’s Office, based in the City of West Palm Beach, had more than 100 attorneys and several investigators, and a Crimes Against Children Unit headed by Assistant State Attorney Lanna Belohlavek.¶

The incorporated Town of Palm Beach occupies the coastal barrier islan e city of West Palm Beach. Its law enforcement agency is the Palm Beach Police D en PBPD). Michael Reiter, who joined the PBPD in 1981, served as PBPD Chief from t I ebruary 2009.¶

The Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office (PBSO), based in the t Palm Beach, is the largest law enforcement agency in the county. Through its De rtm t of Corrections, the PBSO operates the Main Detention Center and, during the peri rele to this Report, housed minimum-security detainees, including those on work release ‘cockade facility. The current Sheriff has served continuously since January 2005.¶

II. THE SUBJECT ATTORNEYS AND THE IN THE EPSTEIN CASE¶

IL Alexander Mona was appointed In S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida in June 2005, at age 36. In June 2 ent W. Bush formally nominated Acosta, and after Senate confirmation, A s worn in as the U.S. Attorney in October 2006.¶

After graduating from law sc I, o a served a federal appellate clerkship; an 18-month term as an associate at the finn of Ellis in Washington, D.C.; approximately four years as a policy fellow and law sch I ec , and nearly two years as a Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Department’s Ct s Division. He was presidentially appointed in 2002 as a member of the National r e ations Board, and in 2003 as Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Departmen .1 Rights Division, where he served from August 2003 until his appointment as Int U. ttorney, and where he oversaw, among other things, the prosecution of human traffick nd child sex-trafficking cases. As U.S. Attorney, Acosta’s office was in the USAO’s Mia dq rters, although he traveled to the USAO’s branch offices.¶

D sta’s tenure as U.S. Attorney, the USAO initiated the federal investigation of Epstei , in plea discussions with Epstein’s counsel, and negotiated the federal nonprosecutio greement (NPA) that is the subject of this Report. Acosta made the decision to resolve the federal investigation into Epstein’s conduct by allowing Epstein to enter a state plea. Acosta was personally involved in the negotiations that led to the NPA, reviewed various iterations of the agreement, and approved the final agreement signed by the USAO. Acosta continued to provide supervisory oversight and to have meetings and other communications with Epstein’s attorneys during the nine-month period between the signing of the NPA on September 24, 2007, and Epstein’s entry of guilty pleas in state court pursuant to the terms of the agreement, on June 30, 2008. On December 8, 2008, after the presidential election and while Epstein was serving his state prison sentence, Acosta was formally recused from all matters involving the law firm of¶

Kirkland & Ellis, which was representing Epstein, because Acosta had begun discussions with the firm about possible employment.¶

After leaving the USAO in June 2009, Acosta became the of the Florida International University College of Law. In April 2017, Acosta became the U.S. Secretary of Labor, but he resigned from that post effective July 19, 2019, following public criticism of the USAO’s handling of the Epstein case.¶

Jeffrey H. Sloman joined the USAO in 1990 as a line AUSA. In 2001, he became Deputy Chief of the USAO’s Fort Lauderdale branch office Narcotics and Violent Crimes S tion, and in 2003, became the Managing AUSA for that branch office. In early 2004, Slo appointed Chief of the USAO’s Criminal Division. In October 2006, Sloman becam SA, and Sloman’s office was located with Acosta’s in the Miami office’s executive¶

As FAUSA, Sloman was responsible for supervising the 1, and Appellate Divisions, and he was part of the supervisory team that oversa pstein investigation. Although Sloman had relatively little involvement in the decisions an tiations that led to the NPA and did not review it before it was signed, he personally an addendum to the NPA, which he signed on behalf of the USAO in October 2007. rdinates Matthew Menchel and Andrew Lourie left the USAO, Sloman directly en it e line AUSA, Villafana, on Epstein matters, and participated in meetings and unications with defense counsel. After Acosta was formally recused from the Eps t in December 2008, Sloman became the senior USAO official supervising the matt Acosta left the USAO, Sloman became the Acting U.S. Attorney for the Southern • orida, and in January 2010, the Attorney General appointed Sloman to be the Inte ttorney for the district. Sloman left the USAO to enter private practice in June 2010.¶

Matthew I. Menchel join AO in 1998 after having served as a New York County (Manhattan) Assistant District 11 years. After several years as a line AUSA, Menchel became Chief of the USAO’s r rimes Section. In October 2006, Menchel became the Chief of the USAO’s Criminal ivision, based in Miami. As Criminal Division Chief, Menchel was part of the supervisory tea oversaw the Epstein investigation, and he participated in meetings and other commun ions ith defense counsel. Menchel participated in the decision to extend a two-year state-ba a lea proposal to Epstein and communicated it to the defense. Shortly after that plea offer was ext ded to Epstein in early August 2007, and before the precise terms of the NPA were, with defense counsel, Menchel left the USAO to enter private practice.¶

C. Lourie joined the USAO as a line AUSA in 1994, after having served for three years as anyAUSA in New Jersey. During his 13-year tenure at the USAO, Lourie served two terms on detail as the Acting Chief of the Department’s Criminal Division’s Public Integrity Section, first from September 2001 until September 2002, and then from February 2006 until July 2006. Between those two details, and again after his return to the USAO in July 2006, Lourie was a Deputy Chief of the USAO’s Criminal Division, serving as the Managing AUSA for the West Palm Beach branch office. Lourie was part of the supervisory team that oversaw the Epstein investigation and negotiated the NPA, participating in meetings and other communications with defense counsel. During September 2007, while the NPA was being negotiated, Lourie transitioned out of the USAO to serve on detail as the Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General¶

for the Department’s Criminal Division, a position in which he served as Chief of Staff to Assistant Attorney General Alice Fisher. Lourie left the Department in February 2008 to enter private practice.¶

Ann [REDACTED] C. Villafaña joined the USAO in September 2001 as a line AUSA. She served in the Major Crimes Section in Miami until January 2004, when she transferred to the West Palm Beach branch office. Villafaña handled the majority of the child exploitation cases in West Palm Beach, along with other criminal matters. In 2006, she was designated as the USAO’s first coordinator for Project Safe Childhood, a new Department initiative focusing on child sexual exploitation and abuse.{sup}2¶

In 2006, Villafaña assumed responsibility for the Epstein investigation. As the line AUSA, Villafaña handled all aspects of the investigation. Villafaña determined the lines of inquiry to pursue, identified the witnesses to be interviewed, conducted legal research to support possible charges, and sought guidance from others at the USAO and in the Department. Villafaña, along with the FBI case agents and the FBI Victim Specialist, had direct contact with Epstein’s victims. She handled court proceedings related to the investigation. She drafted a prosecution memorandum, indictment, and related documents, and revised those documents in response to comments from those in her supervisory chain of command. Villafaña participated in meetings between members of the USAO and counsel for Epstein, and prepared briefing materials for management in preparation for those meetings and in response to issues raised during those meetings. Although Acosta made the decision to utilize a non-prosecution agreement to resolve the federal investigation and approved the terms of the NPA, Villafaña was the primary USAO representative negotiating with defense counsel and drafting the language of the NPA, under her supervisors’ direction and guidance, and she signed the NPA on behalf of the USAO. Thereafter, Villafaña monitored Epstein’s compliance with the NPA and addressed issues relating to his conduct. After two victims pursued a federal civil lawsuit seeking enforcement of their rights under the Crime Victims’ Rights Act (CVRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (“the CVRA litigation” or “the CVRA case”), in July 2008, Villafaña served as co-counsel to the lead attorney representing the USAO until February 2019, when the USAO was recused from handling the litigation.{sup}3 Villafaña left the USAO in August 2019 to join another federal government agency.¶

The following chart shows the USAO positions filled by the subjects, or other USAO personnel, during the period of the Epstein investigation.¶

{sup}2 Project Safe Childhood is a nationwide initiative launched by the Department in May 2006 to combat the growing epidemic of technology-facilitated child sexual exploitation and abuse. Led by the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices and CEOS, Project Safe Childhood marshals federal, state, and local resources to locate, apprehend, and prosecute individuals who exploit children via the internet, as well as to identify and rescue victims.¶

{sup}3 After the district court issued its February 21, 2019 opinion finding misconduct on the part of the government, the Department re-assigned the CVRA case to the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Georgia.¶

USAO Roles and Responsibilities in Epstein Investigation Mid-2006 through Mid-2009¶

	2006	2007	2008	2009
United States Attorney	Alexander Acosta			Jeff Sloman (Acting)
United States Attorney	Means		Jeff Sloman
Grandjack Charter	Jeff Sloman	Matthew Menchel	[Redacted]
Managing Assistant:
United States Attorney
West Palm Bank Office	Andrew Logan		[Redacted]	[Redacted]
Assistant:
United States Attorney	Alexander Acosta
May 23, 2006 -
USAO open federal
investigation file

• plan registered | Sept 23, 2007 - NYAIT opened | | June 30, 2008 - Epstein place gally in Salt Creek | May 22, 2009 - Epstein revealed from incidentation |

III. JEFFREY EPSTEIN AND HIS DEFENSE ATTORNEYS¶

A. Jeffrey Epstein¶

Jeffrey Epstein was born in Brooklyn, New York, in 1953° Although he did not graduate from college, he taught physics and mathematics to teens at an elite private school in Manhattan from 1974 until 1976. Through connections made at the school, he was hired at the Wall Street firm of Bear Stearns, where he ■ from junior assistant to a floor trader to become a limited partner before leaving in 1981. An enigmatic individual whose source of wealth was never clear, Epstein reportedly provided wealth management and advisory services to a business trepreneur through whom Epstein acquired a mansion in midtown Manhattan, where he resi the early 1990s, Epstein acquired a large residence in Palm Beach, Florida. He also o pri to island in the U.S. Virgin Islands, a ranch in New Mexico, and a residence in Pari He traveled among his residences in a private Boeing 727 jet.¶

Epstein reportedly was an investor, founder, or principal in a businesses and other entities, in numerous locations. Although frequently referred to a naire, the sources and extent of his wealth were never publicly established durin time.5 He associated with prominent and wealthy individuals from business, polit mic, and social circles, and engaged in substantial philanthropy. Epstein maintai a corps of employees, including housekeeping staff and pilots, as well as numerous a onal assistants, several of whom traveled with him. B. Epstein’s Defense Attorney ti¶

Jeffrey Epstein employed nu ininal defense attorneys in responding to the allegations that he had coerced girl ging in sexual activity with him at his Palm Beach, Florida estate. As different la ment entities became involved in investigating the allegations, he added attorneys avtn icular relevant knowledge of, or connections with, those entities. At the outset of the vestigation, Epstein retained nationally prominent Miami criminal trial attorney It lack. He was also represented by a local criminal defense attorney who was a former Palm County Assistant State Attorney, and by nationally prominent Harvard Law Sch or and criminal defense attorney Alan Dershowitz, who was a selfdescribed close of Epstein. After initial plea negotiations with the State Attorney’s Office, Epstein repla’ I I attorney with Jack Goldberger, a prominent West Palm Beach criminal defense a ..ose law partner was married to the Assistant State Attorney handling the Epstei n Epstein hired Goldberger, the Assistant State Attorney was removed from the Epstein on the basis of that conflict of interest. Another prominent attorney who began representtn Epstein during the state investigation was New York City attorney Gerald Lefcourt,¶

{sup}4Epstein’s background has been extensively researched and reported in the media. a e. ., Landon Jr., “Jeffrey Epstein: International Moneyman of Mystery,” New York, Oct. 28, 2002; Vicky “The Talented Mr. Epstein,” Vanity Fair, Mar. 2003; James Barron, “Who Is Jeffrey Epstein? An Opulent Lifc, Celebrity Friends and Lurid Accusations,” New York Times, July 9, 2019; Lisette Voytko, “Jeffrey Epstein’s Dark Facade Finally Cracks,” Forbes, July 12, 2019.¶

After Epstein’s death, his net worth was estimated to be approximately $577 million, based on his will and trust documents. https://time.com/5656776/jeffrey-cpstein-will-estate.¶

whose law firm website cites his “national reputation for the aggressive defense” of “high-profile defendants in criminal matters.”¶

In late 2006, after the USAO opened its investigation. Epstein hired Miami criminal defense attorneys who were former AUSAs. One, Guy [REDACTED], had also served as the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida and as Director of the Department’s Executive Office for United States Attorneys, the component charged with providing close liaison between the Department and the U.S. Attorneys. Another, Lilly Ann [REDACTED], had served in the USAO and as a Deputy Chief in the Major Crimes Section before leaving in 2005. In August 2007, immediately after the USAO offered the terms that ultimately led to the NPA, two attorneys from the firm of Kirkland & Ellis, one of the largest law firms in the country, contacted the USAO on Epstein’s behalf: Kenneth Starr, former federal judge and Solicitor General, who was serving as [REDACTED] of Pepperdine University School of Law while of counsel to the firm; and Jay Lefkowitz, a litigation partner who had served in high-level positions in the administrations of Presidents [REDACTED] H.W. Bush and [REDACTED] W. Bush. They were joined by nationally prominent Boston criminal defense attorney [REDACTED] Weinberg. After the NPA was signed, former U.S. Attorney Joe D. Whitley joined the defense team, as did the former Principal Deputy Chief of CEOS and another former U.S. Attorney, who was also a retired federal judge.¶

CHAPTER TWO THE NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENT PART ONE: FACTUAL BACKGROUND¶

I. OVERVIEW¶

In the following sections in this chapter, the Office of Professional Responsi li OPR) details the significant events leading to, and during, the federal investigation the negotiation and signing of the NPA; and the defense’s subsequent nine-mon ort stop the NPA from taking effect. OPR also describes more briefly the events oc er Epstein pled guilty in state court, as the USAO sought to hold him to the terms of the a In describing events, OPR relies heavily on contemporaneous documents, pa ’ ails. In many instances, the emails not only describe meetings and identify the parti , but also set forth the issues under discussion, the alternatives considered, and the b: ’ fo in decisions. When helpful to explain the actions taken by the subjects, OPR als s the subjects’ explanations as provided in their written responses to, or interviews or explanations provided by witnesses.¶

A timeline of key events is set forth on the ’ i page.¶

II. MARCH 2005 - MAY 2006: BEACH POLICE DEPARTM ATTORNEY’S OFFICE S INVESTIGATED BY THE PALM THE PALM BEACH COUNTY STATE¶

A. The Initial Allefartio the PBPD Investigation¶

In March 2005, the pareShruda 14-year-old girl reported to the PBPD that a man had paid their daughter $300 to ’ him a massage in his Palm Beach home.6 The PBPD began investigating Epstein, iden to as the recipient of the massage, and two of his personal assistants, who were also im sated b the complainant. The investigation soon expanded beyond the initial claim, to encom0 a ations that during 2004 and 2005, Epstein, through his female assistants¶

{sup}6 As dyeviously noted, “girls” refers to females under the age of IS. Epstein’s contacts with girls and young women previously had come to the attention of the PBPD. In March 2004, a PBPD officer documented a telephone complaint that a I7-year-old girl had been giving Epstein topless massages at his rcsidcncc for several months for $200 per massage. The girl claimed that there were nude photos of other girls throughout Epstein’s home and offered to cooperate with a police investigation. The PBPD report relating to this complaint described the information as “unverified,” and it was not pursued.¶

On November 28, 2004, the police received and recorded information that young women had been observed coming and going from Epstein’s rcsidcncc. The police suspected Epstein was procuring prostitutes, but because the PBPD did not have evidence that the women seen entering Epstein’s home were minors, and typically did not investigate prostitution occurring in private residences, it did not open an investigation into the matter.¶

Timeline of Key Events for Federal Epstein Investigation – May 2006 through October 2008¶

and some of the victims as well, regularly recruited local high-school-age girls to give him massages in his home that, in some cases, led to sexual activity.¶

Through their interviews with victims, the police learned more about Epstein’s conduct. Some girls had only one encounter with Epstein, while others had many encounters with him. The nature of the massages varied. According to victims, some girls remained fully clothed while they massaged Epstein, some wore only their underwear, and some were fully nude. Victims stated that during these massages, Epstein masturbated himself. Some victims alleged that he touched them during the massage, usually fondling their breasts or touching their vaginas directly or through their clothing. Some victims reported that Epstein used a vibrator to masturbate them, and some stated that he digitally penetrated them. Some victims who stated that they saw him more often alleged that Epstein engaged in oral and vaginal sex with them. According to one victim, an Epstein female assistant participated, on at least one occasion, in sexual activity with the victim at Epstein’s direction.{sup}7¶

Although the allegations varied in the specific details, for the most part they were consistent in describing a general pattern of conduct by Epstein and several of his assistants. According to the information provided to, and evidence gathered by, the PBPD, Epstein assistants scheduled up to three massage appointments each day, often contacting the girls to make an appointment while Epstein was en route to Palm Beach from one of his other residences. Typically, when a girl arrived at Epstein’s home for a massage, she was taken upstairs to the bedroom and bathroom area by one of Epstein’s assistants, who set up a massage table and massage oils. When the assistant left the room, Epstein entered, wearing only a robe or a towel. After removing his clothing, Epstein lay face down and nude on the massage table, instructed the girl to remove her clothing, and then explained to her how he wished her to perform the massage. During the massage, Epstein masturbated himself, often while fondling the girl performing the massage. When Epstein climaxed, the massage was over. Usually, Epstein paid the girl $200 for the massage, and if she had not been to his home before, Epstein asked for her phone number to contact her in the future. Epstein encouraged the girls who performed these massages to find other girls interested in performing massages for him, and promised that if a girl brought a friend along to perform a massage, each girl would receive $200. Several of the victims acknowledged to the PBPD that they had recruited other girls on Epstein’s behalf.¶

The evidence regarding Epstein’s knowledge of the girls’ ages was mixed. Some girls who recruited other girls reportedly instructed the new recruits to tell Epstein, if asked, that they were over 18 years old. However, some girls informed the PBPD that they told Epstein their real ages. Police were able to corroborate one girl’s report that Epstein sent flowers to her at her high school after she performed in a school play. In addition, an employee of Epstein told the PBPD that some of the females who came to Epstein’s residence appeared to be underage.¶

Epstein was aware of the PBPD investigation almost from the beginning. He retained local criminal defense counsel, who in turn hired private investigators. In October 2005, the PBPD, with the assistance of the State Attorney’s Office, obtained a search warrant for Epstein’s residence. When police arrived at Epstein’s home on October 20, 2005, to execute the warrant,¶

{sup}7 According to the PBPD records, investigators obtained no allegations or evidence that any person other than this female assistant participated in the sexual activity with the girls.¶

they found computer monitors and keyboards in the home, as well as disconnected surveillance cameras, but the computer equipment itself—including video recordings and other electronic storage media—were gone. Nonetheless, the PBPD retrieved some evidence from Epstein’s home, including notepads on which Epstein’s assistants documented messages from many girls over a two-year span returning phone calls to confirm appointments. The police also found numerous photographs of naked young females of indeterminate age. Police photographs taken of the interior of Epstein’s home corroborated the victims’ descriptions to police of the layout of the home and [REDACTED] bedroom and bathroom area. The police also found massage tables and oils, one victim’s high school transcript, and items the police believed to be sex toys.¶

B. The State Attorney’s Office Decides to Present the Case to a State Grand Jury¶

State Attorney Barry Krischer explained to OPR that the Epstein case was unusual in that police brought the case to his office without having made an arrest. Krischer was unfamiliar with Epstein, and the case was assigned to the Crimes Against Children Unit. PBPD Chief Michael Reiter stated in a 2009 civil deposition that when the PBPD initially brought the case to the State Attorney’s Office in 2005, Krischer was supportive of the investigation and told Reiter, “Let’s go for it,” because, given the nature of the allegations, Epstein was “somebody we have to stop.” Krischer told OPR, however, that both the detectives and the prosecutors came to recognize that “there were witness problems.”¶

Assistant State Attorney and Crimes Against Children Unit Chief Lanna Belohlavek told OPR that she and an experienced Assistant State Attorney who initially worked with her on the case “were at a disagreement” with the PBPD “over what the state … could ethically charge.” According to Belohlavek, she did not believe the evidence the police presented would satisfy the elements of proof required to charge Epstein with the two felony crimes the police wanted filed, unlawful sexual activity with a minor (Florida Statute § 794.05(1)) and lewd and lascivious molestation of a minor (Florida Statute § 800.04(5)), and the police “were not happy with that.”{sup}8 In addition, victims had given contradictory statements to police, and the original complainant, who could have supported a charge requiring sexual offender registration, recanted her allegation of sexual contact. Belohlavek offered Epstein a resolution that would result in a five-year term of probation, which he rejected.{sup}9¶

Records publicly released by the State Attorney’s Office show that, beginning in early 2006, attorneys for Epstein sought to persuade the state prosecutors to allow Epstein to plead “no contest” rather than guilty. To that end, the defense team aggressively investigated victims and presented the State Attorney’s Office with voluminous material in an effort to undermine some of the victims’ credibility, including criminal records, victims’ social media postings (such as MySpace pages) about their own sexual activity and drug use, and victim statements that appeared to undercut allegations of criminal activity and Epstein’s knowledge of victims’ ages. Krischer¶

{sup}8 Belohlavek stated that she did not consider charging procurement of a minor for prostitution—the charge Epstein ultimately pled to pursuant to the NPA—because the police had not presented it.¶

{sup}9 In April 2006, the State Attorney’s Office offered Epstein an opportunity to plead guilty to the third degree felony of aggravated assault with the intent to commit a felony, with adjudication withheld and five years of probation with no unsupervised contact with minors.¶

told OPR that Epstein’s local counsel brought attorney Alan Dershowitz to see Krischer and the Assistant State Attorney, but Dershowitz was “overly aggressive” and threatened, “We’re going to destroy your witnesses; don’t go to court because we’re going to destroy those girls.” According to Krischer, Dershowitz so “tainted the waters” that Epstein also hired local attorney Jack Goldberger, with whom Krischer had “a working relationship.” Because the husband of the Assistant State Attorney was Goldberger’s law partner, Belohlavek recused the Assistant State Attorney to remove “even the appearance of any kind of conflict” of interest, and Belohlavek took over the case. Goldberger, together with Gerald Lefcourt, a nationally known New York criminal defense attorney also representing Epstein, then directed their efforts at Belohlavek and Krischer to dissuade the office from prosecuting Epstein, largely by attacking the credibility 4the victim witnesses.¶

Meanwhile, the State Attorney’s Office took the unusual step of p to present the case to a grand jury. Krischer told OPR that under state law as it exist nged in 2016, his office prosecuted minors as young as 14 for prostitution. 10 ty that Epstein’s victims themselves could have been prosecuted caused “great conste lion ‘thin the office,” and according to Krischer, resulted in the decision to put the case be nd jury. I I Belohlavek told OPR that her office took the allegations against Epste usly, because … it was an organized scheme to involve young girls by offering them d I wouldn’t say that we … thought they were prostitutes … [but] I think there was ” However, she said, although Epstein’s ‘behavior was reprehensible, . .. I’m lim’ the state statutes as to what I can charge.” Krischer told OPR, “There were so ma es nvolving the victim-witnesses that to my mind, in consultation with my [prosecute a o way to achieve, to my mind, real justice was to present the case to the grand jury an -file” criminal charges against Epstein.¶

C. Florida State Procedu nging Criminal Charges¶

Federal criminal proced by imprisonment for one year o Under Florida law, however, a penalty case.13 For all charges by means of a d Although Florida utilized in sensi public offic’ that a felony charge—that is, any charge punishable brought by a grand jury unless waived by a defendant.I2 jury is required to bring criminal charges only in a death cases, a State Attorney has concurrent authority to file criminal nt called an “information” or to seek a grand jury indictment. nal oases are routinely charged by information, state grand juries are often high-profile cases, such as those involving allegations of wrongdoing by da grand jury proceedings are subject to strict secrecy rules that, among¶

la k told OPR that prostitution was a misdemeanor charge, and she did not handle misdemeanors.¶

tt Bec the Florida Department of Law Enforcement investigation into the State Attorney’s Office’s handling of the Epstein case was pending at the time OPR interviewed Krischer, he declined to further explain to OPR his office’s prosecutivc decisions.¶

{sup}12U.S. Coast. amend. V; Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(a), (b). The sole exception under the rule is felony criminal contempt, which need not be charged by indictment. Fed. IL Crim. P. 7(a)(1).¶

{sup}13Fla. Const. Art. I, § 15(a).¶

{sup}14The Florida Bar, The Grand Jury, Reporters Handbook —The Grand Jury, available at https://www floridabar. orginews/resources/rpt-hbldrpt-hbk-13/.¶

other things, prohibit anyone from being present while grand jurors deliberate and vote, and proscribe the release of the notes, records, and transcripts of a grand jury. 15¶

D. PBPD Chief Reiter Becomes Concerned with the State Attorney’s Office’s Handling of the State Investigation and Seeks a Federal Investigation¶

In 2006, PBPD Chief Reiter perceived that Krischer’s attitude had changed and, according to Reiter’s statements in his 2009 deposition, Krischer said that he did not believe the victims were credible. Reiter was disturbed when Krischer suggested that the PBPD issue a notice for Epstein to appear in court on misdemeanor charges, leading Reiter to begin questionin Krischer’s objectivity and the State Attorney’s Office’s approach to the case. As Reiter ed in his deposition:¶

This was a case that I felt absolutely needed the attention of Attorney’s Office, that needed to be prosecuted in sta not generally something that’s prosecuted in a federal ourt. And I knew that it didn’t really matter what the facts w in case, it was pretty clear to me that Mr. Krischer did to prosecute this case.

¶

On May 1, 2006, Reiter submitted to Krisch package relating to Epstein, one of his personal ass first victimized and then used to recruit other g. public, Reiter criticized Krischer, noting tha these cases [to be] highly unusual.”I6 Re’ your office’s handling of this matter prosecuting Epstein.” cause affidavits and a case filing a young local woman whom Epstein transmittal letter, which was later made e State Attorney’s Office’s “treatment of ischer “to examine the unusual course that and to consider disqualifying himself from¶

III. THE FBI AND TH USA TIGATE EPSTEIN, AND THE DEFENSE TEAM ENGAGES THE USAO¶

A. May ry 2007: The Federal Investigation Is Initiated, and the USSO Ope a Case File¶

In ea a West Palm Beach FBI Special Agent who worked closely with AUSA illafatna on child exploitation cases—and who is referred to in this Report as “the c —mentioned to Villafafia in “casual conversations” having learned that the PBPD was inv ttng a wealthy Palm Beach man who recruited minors for sexual activity. The case agent told illafafia that the PBPD had reached out to the FBI because the State Attorney’s Office was considering either not charging the case or allowing the defendant to plead to a misdemeanor¶

{sup}15Ha. Stat. § 905.27 (2007).¶

{sup}16See Larry= “Palm Beach chief focus of fire in Epstein case,” Palm Beach Post, Aug. 14, 2006.¶

{sup}17As notcd, Krischer generally declined in his OPR interview to explain his office’s prosecutive decisions; however, regarding allegations of favoritism to Epstein’s defense counsel, Krischer told OPR, “I just don’t play that way.”¶

charge. Villafaña suggested meeting with the PBPD, but the case agent explained that before formally presenting the case to the FBI, the PBPD wanted to see how the State Attorney’s Office decided to charge Epstein.¶

1. The PBPD Presents the Matter to the FBI and the USAO¶

In May 2006, the lead Detective handling the state’s investigation met with Villafaña and the FBI case agent to summarize for them the information learned during the state’s investigation.{sup}18 At the time, neither Villafaña nor the case agent had heard of Epstein or had any knowledge of his background.¶

According to Villafaña, during this meeting, the Detective expressed concern that “pressure had been brought to bear on … Krischer by Epstein’s attorneys,” and he and Chief Reiter were concerned the state would charge Epstein with only a misdemeanor or not at all.{sup}19 The Detective explained that the defense had hired private investigators to trail Reiter and the Detective, had raised claims of various improprieties by the police, and, in the view of the PBPD, had orchestrated the removal of the Assistant State Attorney initially assigned to handle the matter, who was viewed as an aggressive prosecutor, by hiring a defense attorney whose relationship with the Assistant State Attorney created a conflict of interest for the prosecutor. Further, given the missing computer equipment and surveillance camera videotapes, the Detective believed Epstein may have been “tipped off” in advance about the search warrant.¶

During the meeting, Villafaña reviewed the U.S. Code to see what federal charges could be brought against Epstein. She focused on 18 U.S.C. §§ 2422 (enticement of minors into prostitution or other illegal sexual activity and use of a facility of interstate or foreign commerce to persuade or induce a minor to engage in prostitution or other illegal sexual activity) and 2423 (travel for purposes of engaging in illegal sexual conduct). As they discussed these charges, the Detective told Villafaña that Epstein and his assistants had traveled out of the Palm Beach International Airport on Epstein’s private airplane, and flight logs sometimes referred to passengers as “female” without a name or age, which the Detective suspected might be references to underage girls. However, the Detective acknowledged that he was unable to confirm that suspicion and did not have firm evidence indicating that Epstein had transported any girls interstate or internationally. Nevertheless, Villafaña believed Epstein could be prosecuted federally, in part because of his own interstate and international travel to the Southern District of Florida to abuse girls. Villafaña discussed with the Detective and the case agent the additional investigation needed to prove violations of the federal statutes she had identified. She told them that if the evidence supported it, the case could be prosecuted federally, but she assured them that opening a federal investigation would not preclude the State Attorney’s Office from charging Epstein should it choose to do so.¶

{sup}18 The Detective died in May 2018.¶

{sup}19 In his 2009 deposition, Reiter testified that after he referred the Epstein matter to the FBI, a Town of Palm Beach official approached Reiter and criticized his referral of the investigation to the FBI, telling Reiter that the victims were not believable and “Palm Beach solves its own problems.”¶

2. May 2006: The USAO Accepts the Case and Opens a Case Rile

On May 23, 2006, Villafafia prepared the paperwork to open a USAO case file. Villafafia told OPR that several aspects of the case implicated federal interests and potentially merited a federal prosecution: (1) the victimization of minors through the use of facilities of interstate commerce (the telephone and airports); (2) the number of victims involved; (3) the possibility that Epstein had been producing or possessing child pornography (suggested by the removal of the computer equipment from his residence); and (4) the possibility that improper political pressure had affected the State Attorney Office’s handling of the case. The investigation was named “Operation Leap Year” because the state investigation had identified approximatel 29 girls as victims of Epstein’s conduct?¶

Villafafia told OPR that from the outset of the federal investigatio 1>7l derstood that the case would require a great deal of time and effort given the number f po l victims and Epstein’s financial resources. Nonetheless, Villafafia was willing to p thin ort and believed that the FBI was similarly committed to the case. Villafafia discussed e c e with her immediate supervisor, who also “thought it would be a good case” and ap ve be opened within the USAO’s file management system, and on May 23, 2006, it w Ily initiated.¶

3. July 14, 2006: Villafana Info nd Sloman about the Case¶

Because Villafafia was not familiar with learned that he “took a scorched earth approac had hired multiple lawyers to interact with state case, and she believed he would 1 e researched his background and Lion. Villafafia was aware that Epstein ttomey’s Office in an effort to derail the the same in connection with any federal¶

investigation. coordinator.¶

Therefore, Villafafia arra Bret with U.S. Attorney Alexander Acosta and Jeffrey Sloman, who at the time was th Crtm ivision Chief.21 Villafafia told OPR that she had never before asked to meet with “ex ive anagement” about initiating a case, but the allegations that Epstein had improperly fluenc the State Attorney’s Office greatly troubled her. Villafafia explained to OPR that sh to ensure that her senior supervisors were “on board” with the Epstein investigati In ition, she viewed Sloman as a friend, in whom she had particular confidence. At mt, although Villafafia’s immediate supervisor was aware of the case, Villafafia did Andrew Lourie, who was then in charge of the West Palm Beach office and her sego supervisor, about the matter or that she was briefing Acosta and Sloman.¶

a met with Acosta and Sloman in Miami on July 14, 2006. She told OPR that at the meetin yshe informed them that the PBPD had identified a group of girls who had provided to¶

{sup}20 Villafana opened “Operation Leap Year” during the same month in which the Department launched its “Project Safe Childhood” initiative, and Acosta designated Villafana to serve as the USAO’s Project Safe Childhood¶

{sup}21Although Acosta had been formally nominated to the U.S. Attorney position on June 9, he was not confirmed by the Scnatc until August 3, 2006, and was not sworn in until October 2006. In September 2006, Acosta announced the appointments of Sloman as FAUSA and Matthew Menchel as Chief of the USAO’s Criminal Division, and they assumed their respective new offices in October 2006.¶

Epstein massages that were sexual in nature, and that Epstein had used “various types of pressure” to avoid prosecution by the state, including hiring attorneys who had personal connections to the State Attorney. Villafaña said that part of her goal in speaking to Acosta and Sloman at the outset of the federal investigation was to sensitize them to the tactics Epstein’s legal team would likely employ. Villafaña explained, “When you have a case that you know people are going to be getting calls about … you just want to make sure that they know about it so they don’t get … a call from out of the blue.” According to Villafaña, she told Acosta and Sloman that the FBI was willing to put the necessary resources into the case, and she was willing to put in the time, but she “didn’t want to get to the end and have [the] same situation occur” with a federal prosecution as had occurred with the state. She told OPR, “I remember specifically saying to them that I expected the case would be time and resource-intensive and I did not want to invest the time and the FBI’s resources if the Office would just back down to pressure at the end.” According to Villafaña, Acosta and Sloman promised that “if the evidence is there, we will prosecute the case.” In a later email to Lourie and her immediate supervisor, Villafaña recounted that she spoke with Acosta and Sloman because she “knew that what has happened to the state prosecution can happen to a federal prosecution if the U.S. Attorney isn’t on board,” but Acosta and Sloman had given her “the [REDACTED] light” to go forward with the Epstein investigation.¶

Both Acosta and Sloman told OPR that they did not recall the July 2006 meeting with Villafaña. Each told OPR that at the time the federal investigation was initiated, he had not previously heard of Epstein.{sup}22¶

Acosta told OPR that he understood from the outset that the case involved a wealthy man who was “doing sordid things” with girls, and that it “seemed a reasonable matter to pursue” federally. Epstein’s wealth and status did not raise any concern for him, because, as Acosta told OPR, the USAO had prosecuted “lots of influential folks.” When asked by OPR to articulate the federal interest he perceived at the time to be implicated by the case, Acosta responded, “the exploitation of girls or minor females.” Regarding Villafaña’s view that she had been given a “[REDACTED] light” to proceed with the investigation, Acosta told OPR that he would not likely have explicitly told Villafaña to “go spend your time” on the case; rather, his practice would have been simply to acknowledge the information she shared about the case and confirm that a federal investigation “sound[ed] reasonable.”¶

Sloman told OPR that he could not recall what he initially knew about the Epstein investigation, other than that he had a basic understanding that the State Attorney’s Office had “abdicated their responsibility” to investigate and prosecute Epstein. In his OPR interview, Sloman did not recall with specificity Villafaña’s concern about Epstein’s team pressuring the State Attorney’s Office, but he said he was never concerned that political pressure would affect the USAO, noting that as of July 2006, the USAO had recently prosecuted wealthy and politically connected lobbyist Jack Abramoff.¶

{sup}22 Lourie told OPR that when he first heard about the Leap Year investigation, he likewise was unaware of Epstein. On July 24, 2006, Villafaña emailed to Sloman a link to a Palm Beach Post article that described Epstein as a “Manhattan money manager” and “part-time Palm Beacher who has socialized with Donald Trump, Bill Clinton and Kevin Spacey.” Sloman forwarded the article to Acosta.¶

4. Late July 2006: The State Indicts Epstein, and the USAO Moves Forward with a Federal Investigation¶

Several days after Villafaña spoke with Acosta and Sloman, on July 19, 2006, Assistant State Attorney Belohlavek presented the case to the state grand jury.{sup}23 Krischer told OPR that “the whole thing” was put before the grand jury. According to a statement made at the time by the State Attorney’s Office spokesman, the grand jury was presented with a list of charges from highest to lowest, without a recommendation by the prosecutor, and deliberated with the prosecutor out of the room.{sup}24 The state grand jury returned an indictment charging Epstein with one count of felony solicitation of prostitution, in violation of Florida Statute § 796.07, a felony under state law because it alleged three or more instances of solicitation.{sup}25 The indictment did not identify the person or persons solicited and made no mention of the fact that Epstein had solicited minors.{sup}26 On July 23, 2006, Epstein self-surrendered to be arrested on the indictment, but was not detained, and the charges were made public.¶

Villafaña told OPR that she decided to move forward with the federal investigation at that point because she believed the State Attorney’s Office would permit Epstein to enter a plea to a reduced misdemeanor charge and that once he entered a guilty plea, the Department’s Petite policy might preclude a federal prosecution.{sup}27 Villafaña told OPR that at the time, she “definitely believed that we were going to proceed to [a federal] indictment, assuming that … we had sufficient evidence.”¶

{sup}23 Villafaña and the FBI obtained and examined records of the state grand jury proceeding, and Lourie reviewed them. Because the grand jury records have not been ordered released publicly, OPR does not discuss their substance in this Report.¶

{sup}24 Larry [REDACTED], “Police say lawyer tried to discredit teenage girls,” Palm Beach Post, July 29, 2006, citing statement by State Attorney’s Office spokesman Michael Edmondson.¶

{sup}25 Indictment in State v. Epstein, 2006CF9454AXX (July 19, 2006), attached as Exhibit 1 to this Report.¶

{sup}26 In pertinent part, the state indictment read, “[B]etween the 1st day of August [2004] and October 31, 2005, [Epstein] did solicit, induce, entice, or procure another to commit prostitution lewdness, or assignation, … on three or more occasions.” The 15-month time frame and lack of detail regarding the place or manner of the offense made it impossible to identify from the charging document which victim or victims served as the basis for the charge in the state indictment. Belohlavek explained to OPR that the charge did not list specific victims so that she could go forward at trial with whichever victim or victims might be available and willing to testify at that time.¶

{sup}27 The Petite policy is a set of guidelines used by federal prosecutors when considering whether to pursue federal charges for defendants previously prosecuted for state or local offenses. The Constitution does not prohibit the federal government from prosecuting defendants who have been charged, acquitted, or convicted on state charges based on the same criminal conduct. The Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld the long-standing principle that the prohibition against double jeopardy does not apply to prosecutions brought by different sovereigns. See, e.g., Gamble v. United States, 587 U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1966-67 (2019) (and cases cited therein); Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 195 (1959) (and cases citeited therein); and United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922). Nonetheless, to better promote the efficient use of criminal justice resources, the Department developed policies in 1959 and 1960 to guide federal prosecutors in the use of their charging discretion. See Chapter Two, Part Two, Section II.A.2, for a more detailed discussion of the Petite policy.¶

On July 24, 2006, Villafafta alerted Sloman, who informed Acosta, that the State Attorney’s Office had charged and arrested Epstein.28 On that same day, the FBI in West Palm Beach formally opened the case, assigning the case agent and, later, a co-case agent, to investigate it. Villafatla told Sloman that the FBI agents “are getting copies of all of the evidence and we are going to review everything at [the] FBI on Wednesday,” and she noted that her target date for filing federal charges against Epstein was August 25, 2006. Acosta emailed Sloman, asking whether it was “appropriate to approach [State Attorney Krischer] and give him a heads up re where we might go?” Sloman replied, “No for fear that it will be leaked straight to Epstein.""¶

Although Lourie learned of the case at this point from Sloman, and eventual’ active role in supervising the investigation, Villafafta continued to update A directly on the progress of the case.30 Villafafta’s immediate supervisor in W little involvement in supervising the Epstein investigation, and at times emails to Sloman, Menchel, and Lourie without copying her immed immediate supervisor’s view, however, “Miami” purposefully assum case, which the immediate supervisor regarded as “highly unusual.”3 ok a more d Sloman Im each had a directed her isor. In the uthority” for the¶

By late August 2006, Villafana and the FBI had idea veral additional victims and obtained “some flight manifests, telephone messages, c one records that show the communication and travel in interstate commerce” b and his associates. Villafafta reported to her supervisors that the State Attorney’s d not provide transcripts from the state grand jury voluntarily, and that she would in ‘th Chief Reiter “to convince him to relinquish the evidence to the FBI.” Villaf Id her supervisors that she expected “a number of fights” over her document dem an at some parties were refining to comply “after having contact with Epstein or his¶

A Villafafta’s reference to ant `fights” and lack of compliance led Sloman to ask whether she was referring to the c s.) illafafta responded that the problems did not involve victims, but rather a former e loyee of Epstein and some business entities that had objected to document demands as overly b some. Villafafta explained to Sloman and Lourie that some victims were “scared an embarrassed,” and some had been intimidated by the defense, but “everyone [with] whom th is have spoken so far has been willing to tell her story.” Villafafta¶

{sup}28On the Operation Leap ~loman emailed Louric, whom Villafafta had not yet briefed about the case, noting that a highly sensitive case involving some Palm Beach rich guy.”¶

{sup}29 likely that type of relati PR interview, Sloman did not recall what he meant by this remark, but speculated that it was ‘t trust the Palm Beach State Attorney’s Office,” and that he believed there may have been “some hip between somebody in the [State Attorney’s Office] and the defense team.”¶

{sup}70 After Villafafta sent a lengthy substantive email about the case to her immediate supervisor, Laurie, Sloman, and Acosta on August 23, 2006, Lourie emailed Sloman: “Do you and Alex [Acosta] want her updating you on the case?” Sloman responded, “At this point, I don’t really care. If Alex says something then I’ll tell her to just run it through you guys.”¶

{sup}31OPR understood “Miami” to be a reference to the senior managers who were located in the Miami office, that is, Acosta, Sloman, and Mcnchcl. Records show, and Villafafta told OPR, that she believed Epstcin’s attorneys “made a conscious decision to skip” her immediate supervisor and directed their communications to the supervisory chain above the immediate supervisor—Lourie, Menchel, Sloman, and Acosta.¶

also informed Sloman and Lourie that the FBI was re-interviewing victims who had given taped statements to the PBPD, to ensure their stories “have not changed,” and that “[a]ny discrepancies will be noted and considered.” She conceded that “[g]etting them to tell their stories in front of a jury at trial may be much harder,” but expressed confidence that the two key victims “will stay the course.” She acknowledged that the case “needs to be rock solid.”¶

The case agent told OPR that in this initial stage of the investigation, the FBI “partnered up very well” with the USAO. She recalled that there was little higher-level management oversight either from the FBI or the USAO, and “we were allowed to do what we needed to do to get our job done.” This included continuing to identify, locate, and interview victims d Epstein employees, and obtaining records relating to Epstein’s travel, communicatio financial transactions. The case agent viewed the case as “strong.”¶

5. October 2006 — February 2007: Epstein’s De ns Minsel Initiate Contact with Villafafia, Lourie, and Sloman for a Meeting¶

Just as Epstein had learned of the PBPD investigation at its ge, he quickly became aware of the federal investigation, both because the FBI ewing his employees and because the government was seeking records from his b • e of Epstein’s New York attorneys, Gerald Lefcourt, made initial contact w a in August 2006. As the investigation progressed, Epstein took steps to the USAO to decline federal prosecution.32 As with the state investigation, E oyed attorneys who had experience with the Department and relationships with i USAO personnel.33 One of Epstein’s Miami lawyers, Guy =, a former career U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida, made an overture on Epstein’s early November 2006.34 telephoned Villafafia, a call that Sloman joined a request. offered to provide Villafafia¶

{sup}32 Villafafta told OPR that EpstCOI vrycrs wanted to stop the investigation “prematurely.”¶

{sup}33Chapter One, Section f this Report identifies several of the attorneys known to have represented Epstein in connection ,with th odcral investigation, along with a brief summary of their connections to the Department, the USAD, or individuals involved in the investigation. At least one former AUSA also represented during civil depositions individuals associated with Epstein. Mcnchcl told OPR that he and his colleagues recognized Epstein was sel ring attorneys based on their perceived influence within the USAO, and they viewed this tactic as “ham-fisted” “clumsy.” Menchel told OPR, “[O]ur perspective was this is not going to … change anything.”¶

{sup}34 ed in the USAO for over 10 years, and was U.S. Attorney from 2000 to 2002. He then served for two years as rector of the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, the Department’s administrative office serving the U.S. Attorneys.¶

Early in the invesStion, Lourie voluntarily notified the USAO’s Professional Responsibility Officer that Lourie was friends with =and also had a close friendship with law partner, who also was a former AUSA and also represented Epstein. Lourie requested guidance as to whether his relationships with and law partner created either a conflict of interest or an appearance of impropriety mandating recusal. The Professional Responsibility Officer responded that Lourie’s relationships with the two men were not “covered” relationships under the conflict of interest guidelines but deferred to Sloman or Mcnchcl “to make the call.” Thereafter, Sloman authorized Laurie to continue supervising the case. During his OPR interview, Londe asserted that his personal connection to did not influence his handling of the case.¶

“‘anything’ she wanted” without the necessity of legal process. [REDACTED] asked to meet with Villafaña and Sloman to discuss the Epstein investigation, but Villafaña declined.¶

Shortly thereafter, Lilly Ann [REDACTED], a former AUSA, contacted Sloman and advised him that she also represented Epstein. [REDACTED] was employed by the USAO from 2000 to September 2005 and had been a Deputy Chief of the USAO’s Major Crimes section at the time Menchel was the Chief. According to Sloman’s contemporaneous email recounting the conversation, when [REDACTED] indicated to him that his participation in [REDACTED] call with Villafaña led the defense team to believe that the matter had been “elevated” within the USAO, Sloman tried to “disabuse” her of that notion. [REDACTED] said that Epstein “wanted to be as transparent and cooperative as possible” in working with the USAO. Despite the fact that [REDACTED] had already made contact with the USAO on Epstein’s behalf, [REDACTED] sent a letter to Villafaña on November 15, 2006, in which she asserted that she and Gerald Lefcourt were representing Epstein and asked that the USAO direct all contact or communications about Epstein to them. In response, Villafaña requested that the defense provide documents and information pertinent to the federal investigation, including the documents and information that Epstein had previously provided to the State Attorney’s Office, and “computers, hard drives, CPUs [computer processing units], and any other computer media” removed from Epstein’s home before the PBPD executed its search warrant in October 2005. In January 2007, [REDACTED] contacted Villafaña to schedule a meeting, but Villafaña responded that she wanted to receive and review the documents before scheduling a meeting with [REDACTED].¶

Immediately after receiving Villafaña’s response, Sanchez bypassed Villafaña and phoned Lourie, with whom she had worked when she was an AUSA, to press for a meeting. Lourie agreed to meet with [REDACTED] and Lefcourt. Lourie explained to Villafaña that [REDACTED] was concerned that federal charges were “imminent,” wanted to meet with the USAO and “make a pitch,” and promised that once given the opportunity to do so, if the USAO “wanted to interview Epstein, that would be a possibility.” Villafaña told Lourie that [REDACTED] had not yet provided the documents she had promised, and Villafaña wanted “the documents not the pitch.” Lourie explained to OPR, however, that it was his practice to grant meetings to defense counsel; he considered it “good for us” to learn the defense theories of a case and believed that “information is power.” Lourie further explained that learning what information the defense viewed as important could help the USAO form its strategy and determine which counts relating to which victims should be charged. Lourie also believed that as a general matter, prosecutors should grant defense requests to make a presentation, because “[p]art of [the] process is for them to believe they are heard.” In addition to agreeing to a meeting, Lourie sent [REDACTED] a narrowed document request, which responded to [REDACTED]’s complaint that the USAO’s earlier request was overbroad but which retained the demand for the computer-related items removed from Epstein’s home. The meeting was scheduled for February 1, 2007, and Lourie asked [REDACTED] to provide the documents and materials to the USAO by January 25, 2007.¶

Villafaña did not agree with Lourie’s decision to meet with [REDACTED] and Lefcourt. Indeed, two days after Lourie agreed to the meeting, Villafaña alerted him that she had spoken again with [REDACTED] and learned that Epstein was not going to provide the requested documents. As Villafaña told Lourie, “I just get to listen to the pitch and hear about how the girls are liars and drug users.” She told OPR that in her view, “it was way too early to have a meeting,” she already knew what the defense would say, and she could not see how a meeting would benefit the federal investigation. She explained to Lourie the basis for her objections to the meeting, but Lourie “vehemently”¶

disagreed with her position. Villafaña a and a West Palm Beach AUSA with whom she was consulting about the investigation, and who served for a time as her co-counsel, both recalled meeting with Lourie in his office to express their concerns about meeting with defense counsel. They perceived Lourie to be dismissive of their views.{sup}35 According to Villafañaa, Lourie believed that a meeting with the defense attorneys would be the USAO’s chance to learn the defense’s legal theories and would position the USAO to arrange a debriefing of Epstein, through which the USAO might learn information helpful to a prosecution. Villafañaa told OPR, however, that while this strategy might make sense in a [REDACTED]-collar crime case, she did not believe it was appropriate or worthwhile in a child exploitation case, in which the perpetrator would be unlikely to confess to the conduct. Villafañaa also told OPR that she did not believe the USAO could extract information about the defense legal theories without telling the defense the precise crimes the USAO intended to charge, which Villafañaa did not want to reveal.¶

6. February 2007: Defense Counsel Meet with Lourie and Villafañaa and Present the Defense Objections to a Federal Case¶

At the February 1, 2007 meeting with Lourie and Villafañaa, Sanchez and Lefcourt set out arguments that would be repeated throughout the months-long defense campaign to stop the federal investigation. In support of their arguments, the defense attorneys provided a 25-page letter, along with documents the defense had obtained from the state’s investigative file and potential impeachment material the defense had developed relating to the victims.¶

In the letter and at the meeting, defense counsel argued that (1) the allegations did not provide a basis for the exercise of federal jurisdiction; (2) the evidence did not establish that Epstein knew girls who provided him with massages were minors; (3) no evidence existed proving that any girl traveled interstate to engage in sex with Epstein; (4) the USAO would violate the Petite policy by initiating federal prosecution of a matter that had already been addressed by the state; and (5) there were “forensic barriers” to prosecution, referring to witness credibility issues. The letter suggested that “misleading and inaccurate reports” from the PBPD “may well have affected” the USAO’s view of the case. The letter also claimed that the State Attorney’s Office had taken into account the “damaging histories of lies, illegal drug use, and crime” of the state’s two principal victims (identified by name in the letter), and argued that “with witnesses of their ilk,” the state might have been unable “to make any case against Epstein at all.” Lourie told OPR that he did not recall the meeting, but Villafañaa told OPR that neither she nor Lourie was persuaded by the defense presentation at this “listening session.”¶

B. February – May 2007: Villafañaa and the FBI Continue to Investigate; Villafañaa Drafts a Prosecution Memorandum and Proposed Indictment for USAO Managers to Review¶

Correspondence between Villafañaa and defense counsel show that Villafañaa carefully considered the defense arguments concerning the victims’ credibility, and she reviewed audiotapes¶

{sup}35 Villafañaa told OPR that in a “heated conversation” on the subject, Lourie told them they were not being “strategic thinkers.” Her fellow AUSA remembered Lourie’s “strategic thinker” comment as well, but recalled it as having occurred later in connection with another proposed action in the Epstein case. Lourie did not recall making the statement but acknowledged that he could have.¶

of the state’s victim interviews and partial transcripts provided by defense counse1.36 Villafafta also pursued other investigative steps, which included working with the FBI to locate an expert witness to testify about the effect of sexual abuse on victims. She also continued collecting records relating to Epstein’s business entities, in part to help establish the interstate nexus of Epstein’s activity. On several occasions, Villafafia sought guidance from CEOS, which had considerable national expertise in child exploitation cases, about legal issues relating to the case, such as whether charges she was considering required proof that the defendant knew a minor victim’s age.¶

USAO procedures generally required that a proposed indictment be accompanied by a prosecution memorandum from the AUSA handling the case. The prosecution mem ndum was expected to explain the factual and legal bases for the proposed charges and addre ignificant procedural, factual, and legal issues of which the AUSA was aware; wi lat issues; expected defenses; and sentencing issues. Routine prosecutions could be a by lower-level supervisors, but in high-profile or complex cases, proposed indictments ire review and approval by the Criminal Division Chief, the FAUSA, or even the U.¶

Accordingly, Villafafia drafted an 82-page prosecution • mo m directed to Acosta, Sloman, Menchel (who had replaced Sloman as the USAO’s Division Chief the previous October, when Sloman became the FAUSA), Lourie, and Late supervisor, dated May 1, 2007, supporting a proposed 60-count indictment that c ern with various federal crimes relating to sexual conduct with and trafficking of tn. rosecution memorandum set forth legal issues and potential defenses relating to eac charge; explained why certain other statutes were rejected as proposed charges; e evidence supporting each count and potential evidentiary issues; and addressed t abt and credibility of each of the victims who were expected to testify at trial.¶

Villafafia’s immediate supe had only a few small edits to t immediate supervisor told OP case was complex and that Vill OPR that she read the prosecution memorandum, , and advised Lourie that she approved of it. The ‘viewed the case as prosecutable, but recognized that the ould need co-counsel.¶

In his OPR int ourie recalled thinking that the prosecution memorandum and proposed indictme ere thorough and contained a lot of hard work,” but that he wanted to employ a dill t tegy for charging the case, focusing initially only on the victims that presented ’ e cases” for Epstein—meaning those about whom Epstein had not already raised ues to use in cross-examination. Lourie told OPR that although he had some cone a case—particularly the government’s ability to prevail on certain legal issues and the t t it), challenges some of the victims would face—he did not see those concerns as insurmoun le and was generally in favor of going forward with the prosecution.¶

Although indictments coming out of the West Palm Beach office usually did not require approval in Miami, in this case, Lourie understood that “[b]ecause there was front office involvement from the get-go,” he would not be the one making the final decision whether to go¶

Lefcourt and provided the recordings during a follow-up meeting with Lourie and Wistaria on February, 20, 2007, and thereafter furnished the transcripts.¶

forward with charges in this case. Lourie forwarded a copy of the prosecution memorandum to Menchel. Lourie’s transmittal message read:¶

did a 50 [sic] page pros memo in the Epstein case. I am going to start reading it tonight… It’s a major case because the target is one of the richest men in the country and it has been big news. He has a stable of attorneys, includisi.ershowitz, [Roy] Black, Lefcourt, =, and Lily [sic] Jeff Sloman is familiar with the investigation. The state intentionally torpedoed it in the grand jury so it was brought to us. I am going to forward the pros memo to you so you can start reading it at the same time I do. The FBI is pushing to do it in Mid [sic] May, which I think is not critjeal, but we might as well get a jump on it. I have some ideas about the indictment (needs to be ultra lean with only clean victims) so I am not sending that yet.

¶

Louie explained to OPR that by “clean” victims, he meant tho m the defense did not have impeachment evidence to use against them.¶

A few days later, Lourie emailed Menchel, as ellichel had read the prosecution memorandum. Lourie directed Menchel’s attenti tcular pages of the prosecution memorandum, noting that the “keys” were wheth O could prove that Epstein traveled for the purpose of engaging in sexual acts, and t some minor victims told Epstein they were 18.37 Lourie asked for Menchel’s “v ne mion as to whether this is a case you think the office should do,” and reminded Me I t the State Attorney’s Office “went out of their way to get a no-bill on this … and th ged adult solicitation, which they would bargain away to nothing.”¶

During his OPR intervi el said that Lourie’s email transmitting the prosecution memorandum was his “official uction” to the case and at that point in time, he had never heard of Epstein and ha o information about his background. He recalled that the USAO had been asked to review the cause the state had not handled it appropriately. Menchel told OPR, however, th he ha ittle memory about the facts of the case or what contemporaneous opinions he form out it.¶

Ac memorandti prosecut case with OPR that he could not recall whether he ever read Villafaha’s prosecution lathing that he “would typically rely on senior staff” who had more perience, and that instead of reading the memorandum, he may have discussed the man, Menchel, and Lourie, who he assumed would have read the document. Acosta¶

{sup}37In various submissions to the USAO, the defense contended that the federal statute required proof that engaging in a sexual act was the “paramount or dominant purpose of Epstein’s travel, but that Epstein’s travel was motivated by his desire to live outside of New York for over half of each year for tax purposes. The defense also asserted that the federal statutes at issue required proof that the defendant knew the victims were under 18, but that Epstein ‘ook affirmative steps to ensure that every woman was at least 18 years of age.” In her prosecution memorandum, however, Villafafia set forth her conclusion that the statute only required proof that engaging in a sexual act was one of the motivating factors for the travel. She also concluded that the statutes did not require proof that the defendant knew the victims were minors.¶

recalled generally having conversations with Sloman and Menchel about the Epstein case, but he could not recall with specificity when those conversations took place or the details of the discussions.¶

Sloman told OPR that because of his broad responsibilities as FAUSA, he left it to Menchel, as a highly experienced trial attorney and the Criminal Division Chief, to work directly with Acosta, and Sloman recalled that it was Menchel and Lourie who conducted a “granular review” of the charging package. Acosta confirmed to OPR that Sloman and Menchel “were a team” who became involved in issues as needed, and if Sloman perceived that Menchel was taking the lead on the Epstein matter, Sloman may have deferred to Menchel.¶

C. May —June 2007: Miami Managers Consider the ProsecutpllM4en andum and Proposed Charges¶

When she submitted the prosecution memorandum, Villafafia o file charges by May 15, 2007, and the FBI planned to arrest Epstein immediately th aft illafafia, however, had not obtained authorization to indict on that schedule. The manag iami wanted time to analyze the lengthy prosecution memorandum and consider he ential charges and charging strategy. Just a few days after he received the prosecutio dum, and after learning that the FBI was planning a press conference for May 15, SI Villafafia that “Wills Office has not approved the indictment. Therefore, please cIR [c t us to anything at this time..i38¶

On May 10, 2007, with Menchel’s prosecution memorandum to CEOS Chief and another CEOS attorney, asking them describing it as a “highly sensitive” c CEOS reviewed the materials, °oath ce, Lourie sent a copy of Villafafia’s terbaan, who in turn sent it to his deputy ess the legal issues involved in the case and g “a high profile, very rich defendant.”39 After ponded to Lourie with an email stating that the memorandum was “exhaustive” 5 “Wtl}• one” and noting that Villafafia “has correctly focused on the issues as we see them.” e sumnfarized CEOS’s analysis of the application of key facts to the statutes she proposed charg concurring in Villafafia’s assessments but noting that further research was needed to etemune whether certain statutes required proof of a defendant’s knowledge of victims’ ag terbaan offered to assign a CEOS attorney to work with Villafafia on the case. Lourie rw d Oosterbaan’s email to Menchel and Villafafia.¶

Mean an early empomneous emails show that Lourie, at least, was already considering f the case through a pre-indictment plea agreement.4° After Lourie spoke with¶

{sup}38 r reported to Menchel that the FBI had “wanted to arrest [Epstein] in [the] Virgin Islands during a beauty pagca . where he is a judge.” The case agent recalled that she and her co-case agent were disappointed with the decision, and that the Supervisory Special Agent was “extremely upset” about it. After the federal investigation began, and except for his self-surrender to fact the state indictment in July 2006, Epstein largely stayed away from west Palm Beach, only returning occasionally.¶

{sup}39 Before becoming Chief of CEOS, Oosterbaan was an AUSA at the USAO for about ten years and was good friends with Laurie.¶

{sup}4o In her prosecution memorandum, Villafana argued against prc-charge plea negotiations, arguing that it “may undermine our arguments for pretrial detention.” Menchel, however, told OPR that he did not consider strengthening a bail argument to be a valid ground to decline to meet with defense counsel about a case.¶

the FBI squad supervisor on May 9, 2007, to explain that charges against Epstein would not be quickly approved, he reported to Menchel that the FBI was “not happy” about the delay, adding, “I did not even tell them I think we should bring [Epstein] in, once we decide to charge him, and offer a pre-indictment deal, figuring a judge might never agree to such a deal post indictment. That would have sent them thru the roof.” Lourie explained to OPR that he thought a judge, after seeing an indictment charging the full nature and scope of Epstein’s conduct, might not agree to a plea involving substantially less time or to dismiss substantive charges.{sup}41¶

Lourie told OPR that despite Oosterbaan’s favorable opinion of the case, “[t]his was … a bit of uncharted territory,” involving facts that were unlike the case law Oosterbaan had cited. Although Lourie had some concerns about the legal issues and about the witnesses, he “probably” did not see any impediment to going forward with the case; in fact, Lourie “was not in favor of walking away, which is what the defense wanted [the USAO] to do.” But while Lourie “thought we could have won and we could have prevailed through appeal,” he “didn’t think the odds were nearly as good as you want in a criminal case, and … the things that we had to gain [through a plea agreement] were much more than [in] a normal criminal case,” in which the only cost of a loss would be that the defendant did not go to jail. Lourie told OPR that to the best of his recollection, he thought a plea agreement would be a good result, and although the government might have to “give up some jail time,” there were other benefits to a plea, such as the ability to require Epstein to register as a sex offender and the availability of monetary damages for the victims. Lourie recalled “thinking that this case should settle and we should set it up so we can settle it” by, for example, charging Epstein by complaint and then negotiating a plea to limited charges in a criminal information. Villafaña told OPR that she agreed with Lourie that a criminal complaint charging an “omnibus conspiracy” containing “all of the information related to what the case was about” would be a good way to “get things moving” toward a pre-indictment plea.¶

Although Lourie and Villafaña believed a pre-indictment plea agreement was a desired resolution, there was no guarantee that Epstein would agree to plead guilty, and they continued to work together to shape an indictment. On May 10, 2007, Lourie emailed Villafaña:¶

[M]arie¶

I believe that Epstein att[orneys] are scared of the victims they don’t know. Epstein has no doubt told them that there were many. Thus I believe the f[ir]st indictment should contain only the victims they have nothing on at all. We can add in the other ones that have myspace [sic] pages and prior testimony in a [superseding indictment]. I think for the first strike we should make all their nightmare[s] come true. Thoughts?{sup}42¶

{sup}41 Lourie explained to OPR that the government’s dismissal of counts in an indictment required the court’s approval, and that, while “it’s rare,” it was possible that a judge, seeing the nature and extent of Epstein’s conduct as set forth in an extensive indictment, might not allow substantive counts to be dismissed.¶

{sup}42 Lourie’s references to MySpace pages and “prior testimony” referred to the impeachment information brought forward by defense counsel.¶

Lourie followed up his email to Villafafta with one to Menchel, in which Lourie reiterated the potential benefits of a pre-indictment plea, explaining that he and Villafafia believed “the best thing to do is charge Epstein by complaint, assuming we decide to charge him… . The [sentencing] guidelines will be in the 20 year range, so we would need to plead him to one or two conspiracies to cap him and there is no telling if a judge would go for that once we indict.”43 Menchel responded that he and Acosta would read the prosecution memorandum and “[w]e can discuss after that.”¶

Later that afternoon, Villafafia sent Lourie an email, which Lourie forwarded to Menchel, explaining that a “conservative calculation” of Epstein’s potential sentencing expos under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines would be 168 to 210 months, and that in her view, th warranted an upward departure from that range. Villafafia told OPR that although Lo rop some changes to the draft indictment, at that point no one had told her that the ev as insufficient to support the proposed charges or that the office did not want to go forty: e case.¶

In an email to Acosta and Menchel on May 11, 2007, Louie recommended charging Epstein by complaint and seeking a pre-indictment plea:¶

My current thoughts are that we should cha agree with the charging strategy as it is n we only need to get on the same page the conduct and whether the cond I think the answer to both is yes of the statutes as this is unch decide later what the [chargj and which victims thou of sure that I is point I think r the statutes cover we should charge. here is some risk on some ry to some degree. We can ent] should look like precisely ed.

¶

I also think if we complaint, ants a pre-indictment a plea than1twe counts. p1 go forward, we should start with a in him … and then try to see if he wants tion. That would give us more control [over] indict him and need the court’s approval to dismiss eed to cap him with conspiracy counts to make a and the court could give us a hard time with that if we smiss indicted counts.

¶

Al supervisors were communicating among themselves about the case, Villafafia was unaw ose discussions and was frustrated that she was not receiving more feedback. She con u preparing to charge Epstein. Two weeks after submitting the prosecution memoran , on May 14, 2007, Villafafia informed Lourie and Menchel by email that Epstein was flying to New Jersey from the Virgin Islands, and she asked whether she could file charges the next day. Menchel responded that “[y]ou will not have approval to go forward tomorrow,” and explained that Acosta “has your [prosecution] memo,” but was at an out-of-town conference, adding, “This is obviously a very significant case and [Apex wants to take his time making sure¶

{sup}43 Lourie told OPR that he was referring to one or two counts of conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371, the general “omnibus” federal conspiracy statute that carries a maximum sentence of five years.¶

he is comfortable before proceeding.” Menchel told Villafafta he had “trouble understanding” why she was in a “rush” “given how long this case has been pending.”44¶

OPR questioned Lourie, Menchel, Sloman, and Acosta about the timeline for reviewing the prosecution memorandum and the proposed charges. Acosta and Menchel believed Villafafta’s timeline was unrealistic from the start. Acosta told OPR that Villafafta was “very hard charging,” but her timeline for filing charges in the case was “really, really fast.” Menchel described Villafafta as “out over her skis a little bit” and “ahead of Acosta in terms of his analysis of the case.45 Menchel said it was clear to him that Acosta “was going to be the one making the call” about whether to go forward with charges, and Acosta needed more time to make a decis. . Menchel told OPR, “This [was] not a case [we were] going to review in two weeks and decision on.” Sloman told OPR that although he did not conduct a “granular revie the roposed charges, he believed Menchel and Lourie had done so and “obviously” h uded that “the facts and the law didn’t suggest that the right thing to do was to automatic .” Lourie told OPR that he believed “the case was moving ahead.”¶

Villafafta continued to seek direction from her managers Sloman, noting that “[i]t seemed from our discussion yesterd not do any good. Am I right about that?” Sloman responde weeks after submitting the prosecution memorandum asking for “a sense of the direction where we are hea like the current draft, a complaint to allow f drastically different from the current draft?” S On 15, 2007, she emailed tering Alex [Acosta] will ” On May 21, 2007, three proval of an indictment something ctment negotiations, an indictment emailed Sloman and Menchel ponded only, “Taken care ofs46¶

D. Defense Counsel Seek g with Senior USAO Managers, which i Ilafalla Opposes¶

Meanwhile, Epstein’s def federal investigation and a m 2007 email to Menchel, Lourie I continued to seek additional information about the ng wit senior USAO managers, including Acosta. In a May 10, orted that Epstein’s attorneys “want me to tell them the statutes¶

{sup}44 Villafana exp “In terms of the iss time concern.” notes that in th expressed conflicts testimony R that the “rush” related to her concern that Epstein was continuing to abuse girls: the hurry, because child sex offenders don’t stop until they’re behind bars. That was our ever, told OPR that he did not recall Villafana offering this explanation to him. OPR iJc statements to OPR and in their comments on OPR’s draft report, Menchel and Villafaha accounts or interpretations of certain events. When it was necessary for OPR to resolve those reach its findings and conclusions, OPR considered the extensive documentary record and the subjects and witnesses, to the extent available.¶

{sup}43 Sloman similarly recalled that Mcnchel thought Villa faha was “ahead of where the office was internally” and that caused “discontent” between Villafaha and Menchel. Villafaha was not the only one, however, who was surprised that the indictment was not approved immediately. The case agent told OPR that it seemed “everything changed” after Villafana submitted the prosecution memorandum, and the momentum towards an indictment abated. Villafana’s immediate supervisor told OPR that from her perspective, it appeared “Miami didn’t want the case prosecuted.” However, Menchel rebuked Villafaha in his July 5, 2007 email to her for having “led the agents to believe that [filing charges in] this matter was a foregone conclusion.”¶

{sup}44 Sloman could not recall during his OPR interview what he meant by this remark, but he speculated that he had spoken to Menchel, and Menchel was going to take care of it.¶

we are contemplating so Dershowitz canow tell us why they don’t apply.”{sup}47 Lourie told Menchel, “I don’t see the downside,” but added, “[REDACTED] is against it.” Menchel responded that it was “premature” to provide the information. During his OPR interview, Menchel could not specifically recall why he believed it was “premature” to provide the defense with the requested information, but speculated that it was too soon after the prosecution memorandum had been circulated for Acosta to have made a decision about how he wanted to proceed. This recollection is consistent with the May 2007 emails reflecting that Acosta wanted time to consider the proposed prosecution.¶

On May 22, 2007, defense counsel Lefcourt emailed Lourie a letter to “confirm” that Epstein’s attorneys would be given an opportunity to meet with Lourie before the USAO reached a final decision on charging Epstein. Lourie forwarded the letter to Menchel and Sloman, but noted that Epstein’s defense team was “really ready for the next level,” rather than another meeting with him. Lourie suggested that Menchel meet with defense counsel, adding, “Whether Alex would be present or grant them another meeting after that is his call.” Lourie also emailed Lefcourt, clarifying that Lourie had not promised to call Epstein’s counsel before filing charges, and suggesting that Epstein’s counsel make their next presentation to Menchel.¶

Although Lourie’s emails show that he had no objection to more senior USAO managers meeting with defense counsel, Villafaña opposed such a meeting. Several emails indicate that Menchel traveled to West Palm Beach to meet with Lourie and Villafaña on the afternoon of May 23, 2007.{sup}48 On that same date, Villafaña drafted an email, which she planned to send to Sloman and Menchel, expressing her disagreement with meeting with defense counsel. Although the email was written for Sloman and Menchel, Villafaña sent it as a draft only to her immediate supervisor, seeking her “guidance and counsel” as to how to proceed.¶

Hi Jeff and Matt – I just want to again voice my disagreement with promising to have a meeting or having a meeting with Lefcourt or any other of Epstein’s attorneys. As I mentioned, this is not a case where we will be sitting down to negotiate whether a defendant will serve one year versus two years of probation. This is a case where the defendant is facing the possibility of dozens of years of prison time. Just as the defense will defend a case like that differently than they would handle a probation-type case, we need to handle this case differently. Part of our prosecution strategy was already disclosed at the last meeting, and I am concerned that more will be disclosed at a future meeting.¶

My co-chair … who has prosecuted more of these cases than the rest of us combined and who actually worked on the drafting of some of the child exploitation statutes, also opposes a meeting. We have been accused of not being “strategic thinkers” because of our¶

{sup}47 Dershowitz had joined Lefcourt and [REDACTED] in representing Epstein for the federal case.¶

{sup}48 During her OPR interview, Villafaña could not recall the meeting with specificity, but believed the purpose was to discuss whether the USAO should agree to additional meetings with Epstein’s counsel. Menchel, similarly, told OPR that he could not remember anything specific about the meeting.¶

opposition to these meetings, but we are simply looking at this case as a violent crime prosecution involving stiff penalties rather than as a collar or public corruption case where the parties can amicably work out a light sentence.49¶

With respect to the “policy reasons” that Lefcourt wants to discuss, those were already raised in his letter (which is part of the indictment package) and during his meeting with Andy and myself. Those reasons are: (1) he wants the Petit [sic] policy to trump our ability to prosecute Epstein, (2) this shouldn’t be a federal offense, and (3) the victims were willing participants so the crime shouldn’t be prosecuted at all. Unless the Office thinks that any of t arguments will be persuasive, a meeting will not be benefici prosecution, it will only benefit the defense. With Lefcourt’s promised legal analysis, that also has men provided. The only way to get additional analysis is to pos to the defense the other charges that we are consideri In opinion this would seriously undermine the prosecuti¶

The defense is anxious to have a mee er to delay the investigation/prosecution, to find out o a t our investigation, and to use political pressure to sto v igation.¶

I have no control over the 0 isions regarding whether to meet with the defense or t o e facts and analysis of the case will be disclosed. How all do decide to go forward with these meetings in a h etrimental to the investigation, then I will have to ask e t case reassigned to an AUSA who is in agreement with a ha g of the case.¶

After receiving th. draft, t e immediate supervisor cautioned Villafafta, “Let’s talk before this is sent, please."" Vi told OPR that the supervisor counseled Villafafia not to send the email to Sloman o ench because Villafafta could be viewed as insubordinate. She also told Villafafta that if fta did not stay with the case, “the case would go away” and Epstein “would never serve a is ‘5¶

Vill Id OPR that at that point in time, she believed the USAO was preparing to file charges at Epstein despite agreeing to accommodate the defense request for meetings. She also told 0 on the other hand, that she feared the USAO was “going down the same path that the State Attorney’s Office had gone down.” Villafafta believed the purpose of the defense request¶

{sup}49In commenting on OPR’s draft report, Mcnchcl’s counsel noted Menchcl’s view that the nature of a defendant’s crimes and potential penalty does not affect whether prosecutors are willing to meet with defense counsel to discuss the merits of a case.¶

so The immediate supervisor recalled telling Villafana that she and Villafafta were “not driving the ship,” and once “the bosses” made the decision, “there’s nothing else you can do.”¶

for meetings was to cause delay, but “the people in my office either couldn’t see that or didn’t want to see that,” perhaps because of “their lack of experience with these types of cases” or a misguided belief “that [Epstein’s] attorneys would not engage in this behavior.” Villafafia told OPR that she “could not seem to get [her supervisors] to understand the seriousness of Epstein’s behavior and the fact that he was probably continuing to commit the behavior, and that there was a need to move with necessary speed.” Nonetheless, Villafafia followed the guidance of her immediate supervisor and did not send the email.¶

Like Lourie, Menchel told OPR that he believed meeting with defense counsel was good practice. Menchel told OPR that he saw “no downside” to hearing the defense t of view. Defense counsel might make a persuasive point “that’s actually going to chang mind,” or alternatively, present arguments the defense would inevitably raise if the case t fo ard, and Menchel believed it would be to the USAO’s advantage to learn about such is in advance. Menchel also told OPR that he did not recall Villafafia ever articulating a at Epstein was continuing to offend, and in Menchel’s view, Epstein was “already undttlit scope, at least in Florida,” and it would have been “the height of stupidity” for Epstein tkcontjnue to offend in those circumstances.¶

E. June 2007: Villafafia Supplements the P ck Memorandum¶

While Villafafia’s supervisors were conside to go forward with the proposed charges, Villafafia took additional steps to support them. fJlriune 14, 2007, she supplemented the prosecution memorandum with an addendum a ssing “credibility concerns” relating to one of the victims. In the email transmitting th ddendum to Lourie, Menchel, Sloman, and her immediate supervisor, Villafafia reported, ” of Jane Doe has been identified and interviewed,” and the “different strategies” about ho re the charges left Villafafia unsure whether “to make … changes now or wait unti received approval of the current charging strategy.” The addendum itself related to a ctim referred to as the minor who “saw Epstein most frequently” and who had alleg dly eSs ged in sexual activity with both Epstein and an Epstein assistant. In the addendum, iia identified documents she had found corroborating four separate statements mad this victim.¶

Villafafia t OP hat the only victim about whom any supervisor ever articulated specific credibili t es was the victim discussed in the addendum. Lourie told OPR that he had no specific io of the addendum, but it was “reasonable” to assume that the addendum addressed ular victim because no one had identified specific concerns relating to any other v’ afaha’s immediate supervisor similarly told OPR that to her recollection, the discus= a ut credibility issues were generic rather than tied to specific victims.¶

F. The June 26, 2007 Meeting with Defense Counsel¶

Menchel agreed to meet with defense counsel on June 26, 2007, communicating directly with about the arrangements. At Menchel’s instruction, on June 18, 2007, Villafafia sent a letter to defense counsel identifying what she described as “the statutes under consideration.”31¶

{sup}51 Villafafta sent copies of this letter to both Menchel and M. Villafana told OPR that she objected to sending this information to the defense. Although Menchel did not recall directing Villafana to send the letter to¶

On that same day, Villafafia emailed Lourie, Menchel, Sloman, and her immediate supervisor complaining that she had received no reply to her query about making changes to the proposed indictment and asking again for feedback. During his OPR interview, Lourie observed that Villaftula’s request for feedback reflected her desire to “charge this case sooner than … everybody else,” but Acosta was still considering what strategy to pursue. Sloman told OPR that he did not know whether Villafafia received any response to her request, but he believed that at that point in time, Menchel and Lourie were evaluating the case to make a decision about how to proceed.¶

The day before the June 26 meeting, defense counsel Lefcourt transmitted to the USAO a 19-page letter intended to provide “an overview of our position and the materials we to present in order to demonstrate that none of the statutes identified by you can rightly b ‘ed to the conduct at issue here.” Reiterating their prior arguments and themes, defen uns strongly contested the appropriateness of federal involvement in the matter. Among gtl1 ues, Lefcourt’s letter argued:¶

• Voluntary sexual activity involving “young adults-1t or J7 years of age”—was “strictly a state concern.”
• Federal statutes were not meant to apply reasonably believed that the person wit 18 years of age. ces in which the defendant engaged in sexual activity was
• One of the chief statutes the U ocused upon, 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), was intended to address use of th t e o prey upon child victims through “intemet trolling,” but Epstein did Internet to lure victims.
• The “travel” statu .C. § 2423(6), prohibits travel “for the purpose of engaging in illi sex onduct, but Epstein traveled to Florida to visit family, oversee his Flo b ed flight operations, and “engage in the routine activities of daily livint7t

Lefcourt also argu again that “irregularities” had tainted the state’s case and would “have a significant impa o y federal prosecution.s52¶

Lo o Menchel, with a copy to Villafafla, an email dividing the defense arguments into “weak stronger” points. Lourie disagreed with the argument that 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) was lira intemet trolling,” and described this as “our best charge and the most defensible for federal terest.” On the other hand, Lourie believed the defense argument that Epstein did not travel to Florida “‘with the purpose”’ of engaging in illicit sex with a minor was more persuasive.¶

Lefcourt, he told OPR that he “wouldn’t take issue” with Villafana’s claim that he had done so. Menchel also told OPR that he did not recall Villafafia objecting at that point to providing the information to the defense.¶

{sup}52Lefcourt claimed there were deficiencies in the PBPD search warrant and “material misstatements and omissions” in the PBPD probable cause affidavit. As an example, he contended that the police had lacked probable cause to search for videotapes, “since all the women who were asked whether they had been videotaped denied knowledge of any videotaping.” (Emphasis in original).¶

Lourie opined that the government could argue “that over time [Epstein] set up a network of illegal high school massage recruits that would be difficult to duplicate anywhere else,” which supported the conclusion that the massages must have been a motivating purpose of his travel, if not the sole purpose. However, Lourie expressed concern about “getting to the jury” on this issue and noted that he had not found a legal case factually on point. Villafafia told OPR that she disagreed with Lourie’s analysis of the purpose of travel issue and had discussed the matter with him.53 Villafafia also recalled that there were aspects of the defense submissions she and her colleagues considered “particularly weak.”¶

On June 26, 2007, Sloman, Menchel, Lourie, Villafafia, the case agent, and t West Palm Beach squad to r met at the Miami USAO with Epstein attorneys D tz, Black, Lefcourt, and Dershowitz led the defense team’s presentation. m USAO perspective, the meeting was merely a “listening session.” 54 Echoing • ents made in Lefcourt’s letter, Dershowitz argued that the USAO should permit the andle the case because these were “traditionally state offenses.” The case agent g uncomfortable that the defense was asking questions in an attempt to gain in at n about the federal investigation, including the number of victims and the types se contact that had been involved.¶

Villafafia told OPR that when Epstein’s attom meeting, they appeared to be “under the impression that they had convinced us not c . ’ But Menchel told OPR, “[T]hey obviously did not persuade” the USAO because’ i t drop the investigation.” According to Villafafia, Lourie, and Menchel, during rt st-meeting discussion at which Lourie expressed concern about the purpose of tra ue nd Menchel raised issues related to general credibility of the victims, the prevailing s e a g the USAO participants was that the defense presentation had not been persuasive. a told OPR that she “left [the meeting] with the impression that we were continuin ” filing charges.¶

IV. ACOSTA DECIDES C 0 0 R EPSTEIN A TWO-YEAR STATE PLEA TO RESOLVE THE FED INVESTIGATION¶

USAO internal co cations show that in July 2007, Acosta developed, or adopted, the broad outline of m t that could resolve the federal investigation. The agreement would leave the case i s court by requiring Epstein to plead guilty to state charges, but would accomplish s important to the federal prosecutors: Epstein’s incarceration; his registration al offender; and a mechanism to provide for the victims to recover monetary¶

{sup}53 Villafana also told OPR that Louric had, at timcs, expressed concern about the prosecution’s ability to prove Epstein’s knowledge of the victims’ ages, particularly with regard to those who were 16 or 17 at the time they provided massages.¶

{sup}54In his written response to OPR, Menchel indicated that he had no independent recollection of the June 26. 2007 meeting. In his OPR interview, Menchel said that although he had little memory of the meeting, to the best of his recollection the USAO simply listened to the defense presentation, and in a contemporaneous email, Menchel opined that he viewed the upcoming June 26 meeting as “more as [the USAO] listening and them presenting their position.”¶

damages.55 During a two-month period, the subject attorneys were involved to varying degrees in converting the broad outline into specific terms, resulting in the NPA signed by Epstein on September 24, 2007. The subjects, including Acosta, were generally able to explain to OPR both the larger goals and the case-related factors they likely considered during the process of conceptualizing, negotiating, and finalizing this resolution. However, the contemporaneous emails and other records do not reflect all of the conversations among the decision makers, and their deliberative and decision-making process is therefore not entirely clear. In particular, Menchel and Acosta had offices located near each other and likely spoke in person about the case, but neither had a clear memory of their conversations. Therefore, OPR could not determine all of the facts surrounding the development of the two-year state plea resolution or the NPA.¶

In the following account, OPR discusses the initial key decision to ve t11Rb federal investigation through state, rather than federal, charges, and sets forth the numerous communications that reflect the negotiations between the parties that led t al NPA. OPR questioned each of the subjects about how the decision was reached state resolution, and OPR includes below the subjects’ explanations. The subj mfimories of particular conversations about this topic were unclear, but from their state i is t , a general consensus emerged that there were overlapping concerns about the of the legal theories, the willingness of the victims to testify, the impact of a trial o 4 s, the overall strength of the case that had been developed at that time, and the unc t the USAO’s ability to prevail at trial and through appeal. In addition, Acosta was bout usurping the state’s authority to prosecute a case involving an offense that was a handled by state prosecutors. Based on this evidence, OPR concludes that Acosta a ave formulated the initial plan to resolve the matter through a state plea. In any ev acknowledged to OPR that, at a minimum, he approved of the concept of a state-b: tion after being made aware of the allegations and the evidence against Epstein •rth in Villafafia’s prosecution memorandum. Furthermore, Acosta approved of t fipltl i s of the NPA.¶

A. June — July 2 Defense Rejects USAO Proposes a State Plea Resolution, which the¶

A few days after tl e 26, 2007 meeting, emailed Villafiaia, advising her that Epstein’s defense wou submit additional material to the USAO by July I I, 2007, and hoped “to be able to r e-based resolution shortly thereafter.”56 In a July 3, 2007 email, Villafana told Sloman, a el, Lourie and her immediate supervisor that she intended to initiate plea discussio b ing “to discuss a resolution of the federal investigation that could¶

{sup}55Staglaws require that a person convicted of specified sexual offenses register in a database intended to allow law enforcement and the public to know the whereabouts of sexual offenders after release from punitive custody, and, in some cases, to restrict such individuals’ movements and activities. The Florida Sexual Offender/Predator Registry is administered by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. The Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 established a comprehensive, national sex offender registration system called the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), to close potential gaps and loopholes that existed under prior laws and to strengthen the nationwide network of sex offender registrations.¶

{sup}56In this email, also requested a two-week extension of time for compliance with the USAO’s demands for records, which included a demand for the computer equipment that had been taken from Epstein’s residence before the October 2005 state search warrant and that Villafarla had been requesting from the defense since late 2006.¶

include concurrent time.” The email primarily concerned other issues, and Villafafia did not explain what the resolution she had in mind would entail.57 Villafafia requested to be advised, “[i]f anyone has communicated anything to Epstein’s attorneys that is contrary to this.” Villafafia, who was aware that Menchel and Lourie had been in direct contact with defense counsel about the case, explained to OPR that she made this request because “people were communicating with the defense attorneys,” and she suspected that those communications may have included discussions about a possible plea.¶

In response to Villafafia’s email, Menchel notified Villafafia that he had told state plea [with] jail time and sex offender status may satisfy the [U.S. Attorney],” had responded that it “was a non-starter for them.s58 During his OPR interview, independent recollection of his conversation with and did not remem deemed the pro sal a ‘non-starter.” However, Menchel explained that he the proposal to without Acosta’s knowledge. He also pointed out before the June 26, 2007 meeting, he repeatedly noted that Acosta wanted to do with the Epstein case. Acosta agreed, telling OPR that a a specific conversation with Menchel concerning a state-based discussed a potential resolution with “without havin el had no by t i defense not have made merous emails eciding what he he did not remember enchel would not have ed it with me.”¶

1. Acosta’s Explanation for Hi to Pursue a State-based Resolution¶

Subsequent events showed that the dec pivotal, and OPR extensively questioned A explained the various factors that influen said that although he, Sloman, and M what he did,” they were concerned terms of testimony.sS9 Acosta victims would “do on the stand lye the case through state charges was is reasoning. In his OPR interview, Acosta mon to pursue a state-based resolution. Acosta ieved the victims” and “believed [Epstein] did me of the legal issues . .. and some of the issues in d discussions with his “senior team” about how the¶

Acosta told OPR t “from the earliest point” in the investigation, he considered whether, because the state had indi y Fre case, the USAO should pursue it.¶

{sup}57 Villa substantive rccomm would rec Ashcroft Mc to OPR that she intended to recommend a plea to a federal conspiracy charge and a sistent with the Ashcroft Memo, which would be the most readily provable offense,” with “a the sentence on the federal charges run concurrent with the state sentence, or that [Epstein] it for time in state custody towards his federal release date.” See n.65 for an explanation of the¶

{sup}58 Villafafta was then in trial and on July 4, 2007, likely before reading Mcnchcl’s email, Villafafia responded to defense counsel regarding the demand for records and also noted, “If you would like to discuss the possibility of a federal resolution … that could run concurrently with any state resolution, please leave a message on my voicemail.”¶

{sup}59In commenting on OPR’s draft report, Sloman stated he had no involvement in assessing the Epstein case or deciding how to resolve it, and that OPR should not identify him as among the people upon whom Acosta relied in reaching the two-year-state-plea resolution through the NPA. However, Sloman also told OPR that he had little recollection of the Epstein case, while Acosta specifically recalled having discussed the case with both Sloman and Menchel.¶

[The prosecution] was going forward on the part of the state, and so here is the big bad federal government stepping on a sovereign… state, saying you’re not doing enough, [when] to my mind … the whole idea of the [P]etite policy is to recognize that the []state … is an independent entity, and that we should presume that what they’re doing is correct, even if we don’t like the outcome, except in the most unusual of circumstances.¶

Acosta told OPR that “absent USAO intervention,” the state’s prosecution of Epstein would have become final, and accordingly, it was “prudent” to employ Petite policy analysis. As Acosta explained in a public statement he issued in 2011, “the federal responsibility” is unique situation was merely to serve as a “backstop [to] state authorities to ensure h was] no miscarriage of justice.”66 Furthermore, Acosta saw a distinction between a t originated as a federal investigation and one that had already been indicted by the star= rought to the federal government because of a perception that the state charge w ate. In the latter circumstance, Acosta viewed the USAO’s role only as preventing a ” nif t injustice.”6I Acosta explained that “no jail time” would have been a manifest injuse B was his understanding that if Epstein had pled guilty to state charges and received o ear sentence to a registrable offense, “it would never have come to the office in the fyr p and therefore would not be viewed as a manifest injustice.¶

Acosta also told OPR he was concerned th in unfavorable precedent, because the Epstei “prostitution,” which Acosta described as a an emerging matter of federal interest. extremely unusual for any United solicitation case, even one involvi state prosecutors.” Acosta told some individuals who would h case.” Acosta was concerned t \ e prosecution in this case would result ddled the line between “solicitation” or tate concern, and “trafficking,” which was ntended that in 2006, “it would have been omey’s Office to become involved in a state e teens,” because solicitation was “the province of not saying it was the right view — but there are at least at this and said, this is a solicitation case, not a trafficking he USAO convicted Epstein of a federal charge, an appeal might result in an advers nion about the distinction between prostitution and sex trafficking.¶

Acosta al ld O that he was concerned that a trial would be difficult for Epstein’s victims. In Aco stimation, a trial court in 2007 might have permitted “victim shaming,” which would traumatic for them. In addition, the fact that the state grand jury returned a one-co ent with a charge that would not require jail time suggested to Acosta that the state ound little merit to the case.62 Acosta told OPR:¶

{sup}60Letter from R. Alexander Acosta “To whom it may concern” at I (Mar. 20, 2011), published online in The Daily Beast.¶

{sup}61Acosta was referring to the Petite policy provision allowing the presumption that a prior state prosecution has vindicated the relevant federal interest to be “overcome … if the prior [state] sentence was manifestly inadequate in light of the federal interest involved and a substantially enhanced sentence … is available through the contemplated federal prosecution.” USAM § 9-2.031D.¶

{sup}62Acosta told OPR he was unaware that USAO prosecutors believed the State Attorney’s Office had deliberately undermined the case before the state grand jury. Marche] told OPR that he understood that the State¶

I do think it’s important to look back on this, and try to be in the shoes of the thought process in 2006 and ‘07 when trafficking prosecutions were fairly new, when … more so than today, some jurors may have looked at this as prostitution, and … [a] judge’s tolerance for victim shaming may have … caused more hesitation on the part of victims … 63¶

Finally, Acosta told OPR that a state-based resolution offered more flexibility in fashioning a sentence, because he believed prosecutors would have difficulty persuading a federal district court in the Southern District of Florida to approve a federal plea for a stipulated bin g sentence that differed from the otherwise applicable federal sentencing guidelines range.Ӧ

In summarizing his thinking at the time, Acosta told OPR,¶

The way the matter came to the office was, the state enough. It didn’t provide for prison time. It didn’ registration, and then you had the restitution issue. The issues … There were witness issues. And … and we may or may not prevail. Altem a pre-indictment resolution, and at vari back and forth between a federal pre state pre-indictment resolution. g e for legal uld go to trial could look at the office went resolution, and a¶

Acosta told OPR that, in the end, “there wa, part, the facts of the Epstein case at the ti rather than trafficking, and a federal pr that he did not view it as problema Epstein case played out, the fed the defense tried to get the sta ce for deferring to the state” because, in to constitute solicitation or prostitution ould be “uncharted territory.” Acosta explained resolution of the case to the state, although as the me “more intrusive” than he had anticipated, because vent and undermine” the outcome.¶

Attorney’s Office could have pl c cd against Epstein by way of an information, but decided to go into the grand jury because the State Attorney’ fficc “didn’t likc the case” and wanted “political cover” for declining the case or proceeding on a Isstkr ge.¶

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1XC) allows the parties to agree on a specific sentence as part of a plea agreement. The court is required to impose that sentence if the court accepts the plea agreement; if the court does not accept the agreed upon plea and sentence, the agreement is void. Villafatla told OPR that Rule 11(c) pleas were “uncommon” in the Southern District of Florida, as the “judges do not like to be told … what sentence to impose.” Menchel similarly told OPR that the USAO viewed federal judges in the Southern District of Florida as averse to Rule 11(c) pleas, although Menchel had negotiated such pleas. Villafana told OPR that she had never offered a Rule 11(c) plea in any of her cases and had no experience with such pleas.¶

{sup}63 Mcnchel to PR however, that the federal judges in West Palm Beach were highly regarded and were generally viewed prosecution.”¶

{sup}61 Acosta snid that “dismissing a number of counts and then doing a [R]ulc 11 is not something that [South Florida federal district] judges tend to do.” Other subjects also told OPR that the federal judges in the Southern District of Florida were generally considered averse to pleas that bound them on sentencing, commonly referred to as “Rule 11(e) pleas.”¶

Menchel could not recall who initially suggested a state plea, but noted to OPR that his own “emails . make clear that this course of action was ultimately decided by Alex Acosta.” He referenced, among others, his May 14, 2007 email to Villafaila informing her that Acosta was deciding how he wanted to handle the case. Menchel surmised that a state resolution accomplished two things that Acosta viewed as important: first, it resolved any Petite policy concerns, and second, it afforded more flexibility in sentencing than a federal plea would have allowed. Menchel told OPR that the state plea proposal did not reflect any minimization of Epstein’s conduct and that any state plea would have been to an offense that required sexual offender registration. He told OPR, “I don’t think anybody sat around and said, you know, it’s not that big a deal. That was not the reaction that I think anybody had from the federal side of this case.” Rather, nchel said, “The concern was if we charge him [as proposed], there’s going to be a trial.”¶

2. July 2007: Villafana and Menchel Disagree abo roposed State Resolution¶

Villafafia told OPR that she was angry when she received Me July email explaining that he had proposed to resolving the federal investi tio ugh a state plea. In Villafafia’s view, the proposed state resolution “didn’t make e” and “did not correspond” to Department policy requiring that a plea offer refl st serious readily provable offense.”65 In her view, a plea to a state charge “obvious,y veld t of satisfy this policy. Villafafia also told OPR that in her view, the USAM requi e USAO to confer with the investigative agency about plea negotiations, and Villafafia did lieve the FBI would be in favor of a state plea. Villafafia also believed the CVRA req eys for the government to confer with victims before making a plea offer, but the tim not been consulted about this proposal. Villafaila told OPR she had met with so of victims during the course of the investigation who had negative impressions of the S ey’s Office, and she believed that “sending them back to the State Attorney’s Office a po mething” those victims would support.¶

See also Chapter Two, Part Two, Section II.B.1.¶

{sup}6\$ This policy was set fo tember 22, 2003 memorandum from then Attorney General John Ashcroft regarding “Department .Policy ming Charging Criminal Offenses, Disposition of Charges, and Sentencing” (known as the “Ashcroft Memo” , which provided, in pertinent part:¶

c tin[Iln all federal criminal cases, federal prosecutors must charge and pursue the ost serious, readily provable offense or offenses that arc supported by the facts of the case, except as authorized by an Assistant Attorney General, United States ttorncy, or designated supervisory attorney in the limited circumstances described below. The most serious offense or offenses arc those that generate the most substantial sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines, unless a mandatory minimum sentence or count requiring a consecutive sentence would generate a longer sentence. A charge is not “readily provable” if the prosecutor has a good faith doubt, for legal or evidentiary reasons, as to the Government’s ability readily to prove a charge at trial. Thus, charges should not be filed simply to exert leverage to induce a plea. Once filed, the most serious readily provable charges may not be dismissed except to the extent permitted [elsewhere in this Memorandum].¶

In light of these concerns, Villafafta emailed Menchel, expressing her strong disagreement with the process:¶

[I]t is inappropriate for you to enter into plea negotiations without consulting with me or the investigative agencies, and it is more inappropriate to make a plea offer that you know is completely unacceptable to the FBI, ICE [Immigration and Customs Enforcement], the victims, and me. These plea negotiations violate the Ashcroft memo, the U.S. Attorney[s’] Manual, and all of the various iterations of the victims’ rights legislation. Strategically, you have started the plea negotiations as though we are in a positio of weakness, anxious to make the case go away, by tellin defense that we will demand no federal conviction. We meeting on June 26th in a stronger position than when we and your statement that a state resolution would sal es away that advantage. If you make it seem like the S. rney doesn’t have faith in our investigation, Epstein ono tive to make a deal.

¶

Second, your discussion makes it appear “show” only and completely unde Epstein’s attorneys directly… estigation is for ility to deal with

¶

I would like to make [Sloman], Andy [Lo and a revised incli raised by Epstei of the case. ion to the U.S. Attorney, Jeff ou with our side of the investigation e presentation will address the points and will convince you all of the strength¶

In the mea counsel to please direct all communications from Epstein’s¶

Menc R he realized Villafafia was “very anxious” to file charges in the case. Villafafia “tremendous” amount of effort into the investigation, and Menchel “was not unsympat I to her desires” to pursue a federal case. However, as Menchel told OPR, Villaf ‘sors, including Acosta, were “trying to be a little bit more dispassionate,” and her urgenc as “not respectful” of Acosta’s position. Menchel viewed the tone of Villafafta’s email as “highly unacceptable,” and her understanding of applicable law and policy incorrect. In particular, Menchel pointed out that although the Ashcroft Memo requires prosecutors to charge the “most readily provable offense,” there is nevertheless room for “flexibility,” and that the U.S. Attorney has discretion—directly or through a designated supervisor such as Menchel—to waive the policy.¶

Menchel’s reply email began with a rebuke:¶

Both the tone and substance of your email are totally inappropriate and, in combination with other matters in the past, it seriously calls your judgment into question.¶

As you well know, the US Attorney has not even decided whether to go forward with a prosecution in this matter, thus you should have respected his position before engaging in plea negotiations.¶

Along that same line, despite whatever contrary representations you made to the agents in this matter, it was made clear to you by the US Attorney and the First Assistant from the time when you were first authorized to investigate Mr. Epstein that the office had concerns about taking this case because of petit [sic] policy and a number of legal issues. Despite being told these things, you prepared a pros memo and indictment that included a definitive date for indictment. It has come to my attention that you led the agents to believe that the indictment of this matter was a foregone conclusion and that our decision to put off that date and listen to the defense attorneys’ concerns is indicative of the office having second thoughts about indicting. As you well knew, you were never given authorization by anyone to seek an indictment in this case.{sup}66¶

In the email, Menchel went on to explain the circumstances of his conversation with [REDACTED] and respond to Villafaña’s complaints:¶

Lilly [REDACTED] called me before, not after, the June 26th meeting. It was an informal discussion and not in the nature of an official plea offer but rather a feeling out by both sides as to what it might take to resolve the matter. As you are also well aware, the only reason why this office even agreed to look into the Epstein matter in the first instance was because of concerns that the State had not done an adequate job in vindicating the victims’ rights. As you and the agents conceded, had Epstein been convicted of a felony that resulted in a jail sentence and sex offender status, neither the FBI nor our office ever would have interceded. You should also know that my discussion with Lilly [REDACTED] was made with the US Attorney’s full knowledge. Had Lilly [REDACTED] expressed interest in pursuing this avenue further, I certainly would have raised it with all the interested individuals in this case, including you and the agents. In any event, I fail to see how a discussion that went nowhere has hurt our bargaining position. I am also quite confident that no one¶

{sup}66¶

Menchel also sent this message to Sloman and copied Lourie.¶

on the defense team believes that the federal investigation in this matter has been for show.¶

Nor are your arguments that I have violated the Ashcroft memo, the USAM or any other policy well taken. As Chief of the Criminal Division, I am the person designated by the US Attorney to exercise appropriate discretion in deciding whether certain pleas are appropriate and consistent with the Ashcroft memo and the USAM — not you.¶

As for your statement that my concerns about this case hurtin Project Safe Childhood are unfounded, I made it clear to you those concerns were voiced by the US Attorney.67 Whethe you ate correct, matters of policy are always within his pu any decisions in that area ultimately rest with him.¶

Finally, you may not dictate the dates and people ou met with about this or any other case. If the U.S. o or the First Assistant desire to meet with you, they will • ow. Nor will I direct Epstein’s lawyers to commune th you. If you want to work major cases in the dis t understand and accept the fact that there is a chai f and — something you disregard with great regularity.¶

Villafafia acknowledged to OPR that deviate from the Ashcroft Memo requi offense. She disagreed, however, and Sloman regarding the Epst meeting.68 Villafafia told OP mentioned, and she had not b final Division Chief, Menchel had authority to thy pleas be to the most serious readily provable presentation about her initial meeting with Acosta gation, noting that Menchel had not been at that one had communicated to her the “concerns” Menchel an opportunity to respond to those concerns.69¶

A week later, Vil jr• replied to Menchel’s email, reiterating her concerns about the process and that fir c op, char against Epstein was not moving forward:¶

• a - My trial is over, so I now have [ ] time to focus back on e and our e-mail exchange. There are several points in your

¶

{sup}67Neither Menchel nor Villafafta could recall for OPR to what concerns they were referring. In commenting on OPR’s draft report, Acosta’s attorney noted that Acosta’s concerns were “the possibility that bringing a case with serious evidentiary challenges pressing novel legal issues could result in an outcome that set back the development of trafficking laws and result in an aggregate greater harm to trafficking victims.”¶

{sup}68Menchel confirmed to OPR that he was not involved in the decision to initiate the federal investigation.¶

{sup}69 Villafafta characterized Menchel’s email as “meant to intimidate” and told OPR that she felt “put in [her] place” by him. She perceived that Mcnchcl was making it clear that she should not “jump the chain of command.” Menchcl, however, asserted to OPR that Villafaria had a “history of resisting supervisory authority” that warranted his strong response.¶

e-mail that I would like to address, and I also would like to address where we are in the case.¶

First, I wanted to address the comment about jumping the chain of command. After that concern was brought to my attention several months ago, I have tried very hard to be cognizant of the chain of command… . If there is a particular instance of violating the chain of command that you would like to discuss, I would be happy to discuss it with you.¶

…¶

The statement that I have not respected Alex’s position regarding the prosecution of the case demonstrates why you hear the frustration in the tone of my e-mail. For two and a half months I have been asking about what that position is. I have asked for direction on whether to revise the indictment, whether there are other issues that Alex wants addressed prior to deciding, whether there is additional investigation that needs to be done, etc. None of that direction has been forthcoming, so I am left with … victims, and agents all demanding to know why we aren’t presenting an indictment. Perhaps that lack of direction is through no fault of yours, but I have been dealing with a black box, so I do not know to whom I should address my frustration. My recollection of the original meeting with Alex and Jeff is quite different than your summary. In that meeting, I summarized the case and the State Attorney’s Office’s handling of it. I acknowledged that we needed to do work to collect the evidence establishing a federal nexus, and I noted the time and money that would be required for an investigation. I said that I was willing to invest that time and the FBI was willing to invest the money, but I didn’t want to get to the end and then have the Office be intimidated by the high-powered lawyers. I was assured that that would not happen. Now I feel like there is a [REDACTED] ceiling that prevents me from moving forward while evidence suggests that Epstein is continuing to engage in this criminal behavior. Additionally, the FBI has identified two more victims. If the case is not going to go forward, I think it is unfair to give hope to more girls.¶

As far as promising the FBI that an indictment was a foregone conclusion, I don’t know of any case in the Office where an investigation has been opened with the plan NOT to indict. And I have never presented an indictment package that has resulted in a declination. I didn’t treat this case any differently. I worked with the agents to gather the evidence, and I prepared an indictment package that I believe establishes probable cause that a series of crimes have been committed. More importantly, I believe there is¶

proof beyond a reasonable doubt of Epstein’s criminal culpability. Lastly, I was not trying to “dictate” a meeting with the U.S. Attorney or anyone else. I stated that I “would like” to schedule a meeting, asking to have the same courtesy that was extended to the defense attorneys extended to the FBI and an Assistant in the Office. With respect to your questions regarding my judgment, I will simply say that disagreements about strategy and raising concerns about the forgotten voices of the victims in this case should not be classified as a lapse in judgment. This Office should seek to [REDACTED] spirited debate about the law and the use of prosecutorial discretion … [M]y first and only concern in this case (and my other child exploitation cases) is the victims. If our personality differences threaten their access to justice, then please put someone on the case whom you trust more, and who will also protect their rights.¶

In the meantime, I will be meeting with the agents on Monday to begin preparing a revised indictment package containing your suggestions on the indictment and responding to the issues raised by Epstein’s attorneys… . If there are any specific issues that you or the U.S. Attorney would like to see addressed, please let me know.{sup}70¶

Villafaña did not get the meeting with Acosta that she requested. She viewed Menchel’s message as a rejection of her request to make a presentation to Acosta, and she told OPR that even though she regarded Sloman as a friend, she did not feel she could reach out even to him to raise her concerns.{sup}71 Menchel, however, told OPR that he did not “order” Villafaña to refrain from raising her concerns with Acosta, Sloman, or Lourie, and he did not believe his email to Villafaña foreclosed her from meeting with Acosta. Rather, “the context of this exchange is, she is running roughshod over the U.S. Attorney, and what I am saying to her is, there is a process. You’re not in charge of it. I’m not in charge of it. [Acosta’s] in charge of it.” Acosta, who was apparently not aware of Villafaña’s email exchange with Menchel, told OPR that from his perspective, Villafaña was not “frozen out” of the case and that he would have met with her had she asked him directly for a meeting.¶

B. Villafaña Attempts to Obtain the Computer Equipment Missing from Epstein’s Palm Beach Home, but the Defense Team Opposes Her Efforts¶

As the USAO managers considered in July 2007 how to resolve the federal investigation, one item of evidence they did not have available to assist in that decision was the computer equipment removed from Epstein’s home before the PBPD executed its search warrant. Although Villafaña took steps to obtain the evidence, defense counsel continued to oppose her efforts.¶

{sup}70 Menchel forwarded this email to Sloman.¶

{sup}71 Villafaña told OPR that she later spoke to Menchel, asking Menchel to redirect [REDACTED] to Villafaña, but that Menchel responded it was not Villafaña’s “place” to tell him to whom he should direct communications.¶

Early in the federal investigation, Villafaña recognized the potential significance of obtaining the missing computer equipment. Villafaña told OPR that she and the FBI agents went through every photograph found in Epstein’s house, but found none that could be characterized as child pornography. Nevertheless, Villafaña told OPR that investigators had learned that Epstein used hidden cameras in his New York residence to record his sexual encounters, and she believed he could have engaged in similar conduct in his Palm Beach home. In addition, the computer equipment potentially contained surveillance video that might have corroborated victim statements about visiting Epstein’s home. More generally, in Villafaña’s experience, individuals involved in child exploitation often possessed child pornography.{sup}72 Villafaña’s co-counsel, who had substantial experience prosecuting child pornography cases, similarly told OPR, “Epstein was a billionaire. We knew his house was wired with video, it would be unusual [for] someone with his capabilities not to be video recording” his encounters.¶

As the investigation continued, Villafaña took various steps to acquire the computer equipment removed from Epstein’s Palm Beach residence. As noted previously in this Report, in her initial request to Epstein’s counsel for documents, she asked defense counsel to provide “[t]he computers, hard drives, CPUs, and any other computer media (including CD-ROMs, DVDs, floppy disks, flash drives, etc.) removed from” the residence. Although Lourie subsequently narrowed the government’s request for documents, the request for computer equipment remained. The defense, however, failed to comply with the request.¶

Villafaña learned that the computer equipment was in the possession of a particular individual. After consulting the Department’s Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section and Office of Enforcement Operations about the appropriate legal steps to obtain the computer equipment, Villafaña described her plan in an email to Menchel. She asked Menchel for any comments or concerns, but OPR did not find an email response from him, and Menchel told OPR that he did not recall Villafaña’s efforts to obtain the computer equipment.¶

In May 2007, following the plan she had outlined to Menchel, Villafaña initiated action requiring production of the computer equipment by a particular date. In her email to Villafaña on June 29, 2007, [REDACTED] requested a two-week extension, indicating that she hoped a “state-based resolution” to the case would soon be reached.{sup}73 Villafaña advised her supervisors of the request, and responded to Sanchez that she “would like to get the computer equipment as soon as possible.” Nonetheless, Villafaña eventually agreed to an extension.¶

Meanwhile, Epstein attorney Roy Black wrote separately to Villafaña, demanding to know whether Villafaña had complied with applicable Department policies before seeking the computer¶

{sup}72 In addition, Villafaña became aware that in August 2007, FBI agents interviewed a minor victim who stated that she had been photographed in the nude by Epstein’s assistant, who told the victim that Epstein took pictures of the girls.¶

{sup}73 This email led Villafaña to ask her supervisors if any of them had discussed with the defense a possible resolution of the case, which resulted in Villafaña’s exchange of emails with Menchel about their respective views of the case. See Section IV.A.2 in this Part.¶

equipment.74 After further communications on this issue involving Black, Villafafia, and Lourie, Black took legal action that effectively halted production of the computer equipment to the USAO until the issue could be decided by the court—which, as explained below, never happened because the parties entered into the NPA.¶

C. July 2007: The Defense Continues Its Efforts to Stop the Federal Investigation¶

In addition to their efforts to stop the government from obtaining the computer equipment, defense counsel also sent letters to the USAO, dated July 6, 2007, and July 25, 2007, reiterating their objections to a federal investigation of Epstein. The July 25, 2007 letter inclu a lengthy “case analysis chart” purporting to support the defense argument that Epstein h mitted no federal offense. The July 25 letter also noted that the defense had been consult’ ith i e former Principal Deputy Chief of CEOS, reporting that she “supports our position ation that this is not a matter upon which the federal statu[t]es should be brought to¶

While the defense was reiterating its objections to the f ral investigation, CEOS expressed its endorsement of Villafafta’s legal analysis and prop ed es. On July 18, 2007, CEOS Chief Oosterbaan emailed Sloman, Menchel, and stating that he had read Villafafta’s prosecution memorandum “closely,” and noti he did a terrific job. As we opined to Andy [Lourie] back in May, [CEOS] agree legal analysis. Her charging decisions are legally sound.” Oosterbaan observed:¶

A I have also reviewed the argu ined in the letters from defense counsel. Their legal sis etailed and comprehensive, but I find none of their arg nt uasive. That is not to say that all the arguments are co void of merit. I expect the judge to consider some of is closely. Nevertheless, while the law applicable h n always crystal clear, the balance of available prec t fa us. From the prosecution memorandum it is clear that a anticipated the strongest legal arguments, scrutinize e applicable law, and has charged the case accordingly. And, whit this prosecution the government clearly faces a stro and termined defense team, it is a challenge well worth I also happen to know that there is absolutely no concern .. . ing the challenges this case presents.¶

In closi aan renewed his offer to have CEOS “help you with this prosecution,” and to send “w ev and whoever you need” to assist.¶

{sup}74Villafana forwarded Black’s letter to Menchel, explaining the circumstances relating to the removal of the computer equipment from Epstein’s home, the steps she had taken to make the required consultations in the Department, and that she and Louric had worked together on her response to Black.¶

{sup}75The news that the former CEOS Principal Deputy Chief was advising the Epstein team led to an email exchange between Sloman and CEOS Chief Oostcrbaan, who commented, “By the way, let mc know if you want mc to put something in writing to you with our position and detailing all of the child prostitution cases she supervised with similar facts.”¶

D. Acosta Decides on a Resolution That Includes a Two-Year Term of Incarceration¶

The next critical step in the development of the NPA was the decision to propose a twoyear term of imprisonment. Although presented to the defense as the “minimum” the USAO would accept, in actuality the two-year proposal became only the starting point for the negotiations, with the result that the defense continued to chip away at it as the negotiations continued. The contemporaneous emails make no mention of any rationale for the decision to propose two years as the government’s beginning negotiating position, and nobody with whom OPR spo ce was able to recall how the decision was made. As discussed below, Acosta did offer OPR ap$planation, but OPR was unable to find contemporaneous evidence supporting it.%¶

While the defense was communicating its objections to the fe. vestigation to Villafafia, Lourie, Menchel, and Sloman, Villafafia continued moving to and i g charges. On July 19, 2007, the day after receiving Oosterbaan’s email support’ tial prosecution, Villafafia emailed Lourie and Menchel seeking approval to take investigative steps regarding three of Epstein’s assistants. However, Menchel direc Vi a to “hold off… until we decide what course of action we are going to take on which should happen next week.” Menchel told OPR that he did not specifically re asked Villafafia to wait, but he assumed it was because Acosta was deciding what u o ). ion to take on the case. 9sm.¶

pa On Monday, July 23, 2007, Menchel sub • he would be leaving the USAO effective Augi {sup}77 gnation notice to Acosta, stating that¶

1. The July 26, 2007 in Miami¶

Early on the morning of Thu 6, 2007, Villafafia informed Menchel that she was preparing a new draft indictment tni revisions he had suggested, including removal of all but three of the “travel counts” ge number of [the] overt acts,” and the addition of overt acts and counts relating to tw ional victims; she would not, however, have the revised indictment ready in time” r our iscussion today” at their 2:00 p.m. meeting. Menchel told OPR that the fact that he had b posed revisions to the indictment and also directed Villafafia to delay the investiga st volving the assistants indicated that he was “trying to do something” with the case, bu waiting for Acosta to decide the “underlying issue” of whether to proceed with federal¶

e that decision on or before July 26, 2007. On that afternoon, Villafafia met in Miami enchel. She told OPR that Sloman, as well as the FBI case agents and their supervise were also present, with Lourie participating by telephone. Villafafia told OPR that she expected that the meeting, requested by Menchel, would address the direction of the investigation. However, Villafafia told OPR that after everyone had assembled, Menchel entered the room and stated that Acosta “has decided to offer a two-year state deal.” According to¶

{sup}76See Section IV.D.2 in this Part.¶

T7 As early as May 4, 2007, Menchel had informed Acosta that he was intending to leave the USAO to enter private practice.¶

Villafafia, Menchel left the meeting after almost no discussion, leaving Villafafia “shocked and stunned.”¶

Menchel told OPR that he did not recall the July 26, 2007 meeting. Nonetheless, he strongly disputed Villafafia’s description of events, asserting that it would have been “directly at odds with his management style” to convene such a meeting, announce Acosta’s decision, and leave without discussion. Acosta told OPR that he had “decided and endorsed this resolution at some point,” but he did not recall being aware that Menchel was going to announce the decision at the July 26 meeting; in addition, although Acosta did not recall the circumstances of Menchel’s relaying of that decision, he said it “would have been consistent with” his decision fo do so. Neither Sloman nor Lourie recalled the meeting. The FBI case agent re meeting at the USAO in Miami with her co-case agent and supervisors, toge Lourie (by telephone), Menchel, and Sloman, at which they discussed ho Epstein case. According to the case agent, at this meeting the FBI i registered for life as a sexual offender, and the co-case agent advocatcdto had ruled on the USAO’s ability to obtain Epstein’s computer equip rue) t enchel to ttending a ith oceed with the at Epstein be ng until the court¶

Regardless of exactly how Acosta’s decision communicated to Villafafia and the FBI agents, and re specific term, the record shows that Acosta ultimate resolution that included a two-year term of imprison the two-year term was who initially proposed the e decision to offer Epstein a acknowledged.78¶

2. The Subjects’ Explana with a Two-Year Te odfiltica rceration e Decision to Offer Epstein a Sentence¶

Villafafia asserted that she was decision was made.79 Villafafia tol none of her supervisors had iden • explained the decision to exte Menchel provided no explanati did not ask for an expla Villafafia described the p people, so 24 monj tjust to 24 months wit nsu ted about the specific two-year term before the she had worked hard to develop a strong case, and any specific problem with the case that, in her view, for a two-year sentence. Villafafia also told OPR that is decision during the July 26, 2007 meeting, and Villafafia on because she accepted his statement that it was Acosta’s decision. as “random,” and told OPR, “[W]e’re all [sentencing] guidelines kes no sense in the context of the guidelines. There’s no way to get set of offenses.s80¶

s that Villafafia did not appear hesitant to send cmails to her supervisors setting forth her views and objections, a there is no reference before this meeting in any of her emails indicating that a decision had been made to offer a two-year term of incarceration. Therefore, given that a meeting had been arranged involving Menchel and Villafafia, and possibly most of the other primary USAO and FBI participants, it seems logical that Acosta made a decision to resolve the case with a two-year state plea not long before the meeting.¶

{sup}79 OPR found no evidence in the documentary record indicating that Villafana had knowledge of Acosta’s decision or the two-year term before the July 26, 2007 meeting at which she said she teamed of it.¶

{sup}80 From the time the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines went into effect in 1987, they have been the mechanism for calculating federal criminal sentences. Since 2005, the Guidelines have been non-binding, but the federal courts are required to consider them. As noted in the commentary to USAM § 9-27.710,¶

Sloman also told OPR that he did not know how the decision to offer a two-year plea offer was reached, but he believed that Acosta made the decision based on recommendations from Menchel, Lourie, and Villafaña. He opined to OPR that the decision was likely based on an assessment by Menchel and Lourie of the litigation risks presented by the case.{sup}81 Sloman added that he did not know how a two-year sentence might have related to specific charges or to either state or federal sentencing guidelines. Lourie likewise told OPR he did not recall how the two-year term was decided upon, or by whom, but he speculated that it may have been presented by the defense as the most Epstein would accept, and that the decision would have been reached by Acosta following “extended consideration, research, and discussion,” among Acosta, Sloman, Menchel, Lourie, and Villafaña.{sup}82¶

Menchel told OPR that he did not recall discussing a two-year plea deal with Acosta or who reached the decision that two years was an appropriate sentence. Menchel also told OPR, however, that he recalled believing that if the USAO had filed the contemplated federal charges, Epstein would have felt he had “nothing to lose” and “undoubtedly” would have chosen to take the case to trial. Menchel recalled believing there was a real risk that the USAO might lose at trial, and in so doing, might cause more trauma to the victims, particularly those who were reluctant to testify. Menchel told OPR that he did not believe that anyone at the time looked at two years “as a fair result in terms of the conduct. I think that was not the issue. The issue was whether or not if we took this case to trial, would we risk losing everything,” and “if we … felt we could have gotten more time, we would have, without having to press it to the trial.”¶

Acosta told OPR that “I had decided and endorsed” the two-year resolution “at some point,” and that it resulted from “back and forth” discussion “over the course of some days or a week or two.” As noted earlier in this Report, Acosta viewed the USAO’s role in this case merely as a “backstop” to the state’s prosecution, which he explained to OPR was “a polite way of saying, ‘Jencouraging the state to do a little bit more.[]’”{sup}83 Acosta said that he understood two years’ imprisonment to have represented the sentence Epstein faced under one of the original charges the PBPD was considering at the outset of the state investigation.{sup}84 Acosta also told OPR that he¶

the attorney for the government has a continuing obligation to assist the court in its determination of the sentence to be imposed. The prosecutor must be familiar with the guidelines generally and with the specific guideline provisions applicable to his or her case. In discharging these duties, the attorney for the government should … endeavor to ensure the accuracy and completeness of the information upon which the sentencing decisions will be based.¶

{sup}81 In Sloman’s view, Menchel and Lourie were “two of the finest trial lawyers” in the USAO.¶

{sup}82 Lourie noted that Sloman and Menchel were “two extraordinarily experienced people in [Acosta’s] front office who had tried … gobs and gobs of cases.”¶

{sup}83 In commenting on OPR’s draft report, Acosta’s attorney asserted that OPR’s use of Acosta’s quote, “a little bit more,” “unfairly minimized” Acosta’s and the USAO’s efforts to achieve justice in this case. Acosta’s attorney also asserted that the phrase was “clearly soft-spoken understatement,” that the terms obtained were “substantially more onerous than the state’s alternative resolution,” and that Acosta was “clearly declining the invitation to take the State to task and soft-pedaling an obvious distinction.”¶

{sup}84 OPR examined this assertion and was unable to verify that the proposed two-year term of imprisonment corresponded with the charges that the PBPD considered at the outset of the state investigation or with the charge in¶

understood that the PBPD would not have asked the FBI to investigate Epstein if the state had pursued the appropriate charges. In other words, in Acosta’s view, “[T]his was, rightly or wrongly, an analysis that distinguished between what is necessary to prevent manifest injustice, versus what is the appropriate federal outcome to that.” Acosta told OPR that he believed he had discussed his concerns about the case with Lourie, Sloman, or Menchel, although he could not recall any specific conversation with them.¶

E. Villafafia Drafts a “Term Sheet” Listing the Requirements of a Potential Agreement with the Defense¶

A meeting with defense counsel was scheduled for Tuesday, July 31, 2007 afafia told OPR that between July 26 and July 30, 2007, she had “some sort of di ion’ ith her supervisors that resulted in her creation of a “term sheet” identifying ti osed terms for resolving the federal investigation through state charges. Sometime dun od, Villafafia left a voicemail message for Menchel. During their OPR inte er Villafafia nor Menchel could recall what Villafafia said in that message. On July 0, 2907, Menchel emailed Villafafia:¶

I received your voicemail this morning. change our approach. I think telling resolves this in a way that appropriate the interests of the victims, we wi that we are serious. While Lil past that this would likely n these terms before. In an US Attorney feels corn I any reason to unless the state es our interests and [t3feral charges] conveys ] has represented in the never conveyed it in quite is the course of action that the ing at this juncture.

¶

The following day, Jul Non-Prosecution Agreement” t before seen or heard of a non-p to her.85 Villafafia told O Villafafia emailed a one-page “Terms of Epstein Menchel, and Lourie. Villafafia told OPR she had never on agreement and that it was a concept “completely foreign” that the idea of styling the two-year state plea agreement with Epstein¶

The terms “deferred prosecution agreement” and “non-prosecution agreement” have often been used loosely by prosecutors, defense counsel, courts and commentators. As the terms arc used in these Principles [of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations], a deferred prosecution agreement is typically predicated upon the filing of a formal charging document by the government, and the agreement is filed with the appropriate court. In the non-prosecution agreement context, formal charges are not filed and the agreement is maintained by the parties rather than being filed with a court. Clear and consistent use of these terms will enable the Department to more effectively identify and share best practices and to track the use of such agreements. These Principles do not apply¶

the state indic no obvious R fonsidcred various potential state charges involving various numbers of victims and found e sentencing guidelines calculation that would have resulted in a two-year sentence.¶

ss resolving ce rosccution and non-prosecution agreements were standard, though infrequently used, vehicles for n federal criminal cases against corporate entities. A 2008 Departmental memorandum explained:¶

as a “non-prosecution agreement” came from Acosta, although Menchel may have communicated that terminology to her. According to Villafafta, she asked that it include a mechanism for the victims to be provided monetary compensation through 18 U.S.C. § 2255 in lieu of the restitution that would have been available if Epstein were pleading guilty to federal charges.86 Acosta told OPR that he “developed and approved” the term sheet.”¶

Before the document was presented to defense counsel, two terms were dropped from Villafafia’s draft—one providing that the agreement would apply only to already-identified victims, and another requiring the deal to be accepted, and Epstein to plead guilty, within the ASA month. The final term sheet was as follows:¶

0¶

?s,¶

to plea agreemen court proceeding. ve the formal conviction of a corporation in a¶

Memorandum from Acting D United States Attorneys at n.2 manual-I 63-selection Attorney General Craig S. Morford to Heads of Departmental Components and , 2008), available at https://www.justice.gov/archives/jmkriminal-resouree- [tors. Villafafia did not have significant experience prosecuting corporate entities.¶

{sup}86A civil criminal code March 6, 2 personal injuries suffered by victims of certain crimes is provided for in the federal .C. § 2255. Subsection (a) of the statute, as in effect from July 27, 2006, to as follows:¶

y person who, while a minor, was a victim of a violation of section 2241(c), 2242, 2243, 2251, 2251A, 2252, 2252A, 2260, 2421, 2422, or 2423 of this title and who suffers personal injury as a result of such violation, regardless of whether the injury occurred while such person was a minor, may sue in any appropriate United States District Court and shall recover the actual damages such person sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee. Any person as described in the preceding sentence shall be deemed to have sustained damages of no less than $150,000 in value.

¶

Villafaaa also told OPR that she asked that the terms include the requirement that Epstein plead to an offense that required him to register as a sexual offender; however, sex offender status was also mentioned in Menchel’s July 3, 2007 email to Villafatia recounting his preliminary discussions with M.¶

CONFIDENTIAL PLEA NEGOTIATIONS¶

TERMS OF EPSTEIN NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENT¶

• Epstein pleads guilty (not nolo.Contendere) to an Information filed by the Palm Beach County State Attorney’s Office charging hint with: (a). lewd and lascivious battery on a child, in violation of Fl. Stat. 800.04(4);
  • (b) solicitation of minors to engage in prostitution, in violation Stat. 796.03; and
  • (c) engaging in sexual activity with minors at least sixt of age, in violation of Fl. Stat.. 79.4.05.
• Epstein and the State Attorney’s Office make a joint, ‘riding recommendation that Epstein serve at least two years in prison, without any opportunity for withholding adjudicatio4 or se en g; and without probation or community control in lieu of iup ament.
• Epstein agrees to waive all challenges h runt ion filed by the State and the right to appeal.
• Epstein agrees that, if any of identified in the federal investigation file suit purse t 18 .S.C. § 2255, Epstein will not contest. the jurisdiction of the U Court for the Southern District of Florida over his pe tbject matter. Epstein will not contest that the identified vice • ns who, while minors, were victims of violations of T’ ed States Code, Sections(s) 2422 and/or 2423.
• After. Epstein e his state court plea and is sentenced, the FBI and the U.S. At Office will close their investigations.

V. THE US411S RE ENTS EPSTEIN WITH KEY TERMS OF A DEAL: PLEAD GUI T STATE CHARGES REQUIRING A TWO-YEAR TERM OF IN TION AND SEXUAL OFFENDER REGISTRATION, AND AGREE ANS FOR THE VICTIMS TO OBTAIN MONETARY DAMAGES¶

Al ugh the USAO term sheet was presented to Epstein’s defense team on July 31, 2007, it took almost another two months to reach a final agreement in the form of the NPA. The contemporaneous emails show that over the course of those two months, defense counsel offered multiple counter-proposals to the USAO’s stated terms, and alternated between working out the state plea disposition and seeking an alternative federal plea arrangement. The emails make clear that as the negotiations intensified in September 2007, the prosecutors became increasingly frustrated, particularly with what they perceived as the defense tactic of agreeing to terms and provisions but then backtracking or altering the agreed-upon terms in subsequent communications. It is apparent that the defense persistence achieved some measure of success, at least concerning the period of imprisonment, because the USAO failed to hold firm to its proposal of “at least two years in prison.” The USAO did, however, consistently reject defense proposals to change other terms, particularly the requirement that Epstein register as a sexual offender.¶

A. July 31, 2007: The USAO Presents Its Proposal to the Defense Team, which Makes a Counteroffer¶

Menchel Sloman, Lourie, Villafafia, and the case agents met with Epstein attorneys Lefcourt, and Black on July 31, 2007, with Menchel “leading the meeting” for the USAO.87 The USAO presented the term sheet, and Villafafia distributed a fede sentencing guidelines calculation showing that if prosecuted federally, Epstein faced a sen range of 188 to 235 months’ incarceration.¶

Villafafia recalled that during the meeting, Epstein’s attorneys op e7kquirement of sexual offender registration, argued that Epstein would not be safe in p ‘sbn ted that Epstein serve a sentence of home confinement or “community control"" • lieu of incarceration, and emphasized that a state resolution provided greater sentencing I ib Villafafia told OPR that when Epstein’s attorneys expressed concern during the about Epstein’s security in a state prison and argued for a home confinement sentence e e suggested Epstein plead to a federal charge so that he could serve his time in a fede . A few days after the meeting, Villafafia emailed Menchel, stating that she had ‘Ti: ay to do a federal plea with a 2-1/2 year cap.”¶

Although Acosta had authorized a p to slate charges, emails and other correspondence show that during the negotiations, the pgi considered structuring a plea around federal¶

The Comm Control supervision program was created as a diversion to incarceration t risonmenk therefore it is an intensive supervision program where you arc nfined to your home unless you are working, attending school, perk ing pu lic service hours, participating in treatment or another special tivity t has been approved in advance by your officer. The program was designed to build accountability and responsibility along with providing a + hunisiiment alternative to imprisonment. While on Community Control supervision (also known as “house arrest”) you will not be allowed to leave your omc to visit family or friends, go out to dinner or to the movies, go on vacation, or many of the other activities you arc used to being able to do .. ., but it does allow you to continue to work to support yourself and your family or attend school in lieu of being incarcerated and away from loved ones.¶

Florida Dept. of Corrections, Succeeding on Community Control at 1, http://www.dc.state.fl.us/cc/ceforms/ Succecding-on-Community-Control.pdf.¶

{sup}87Villafana was the only witness PR spokc who had a substantive memory of this meeting.¶

{sup}88According to the Florida De of Corrections fact sheet for defendants subjected to community control,¶

{sup}89Villafafia told OPR that she was concerned about a state resolution because the defense team “had a lot of experience with the state system. We did not.” Villafana anticipated there would be ways to “manipulate” a state sentence and the USAO would be “giving up all control,” and she told OPR that she discussed this concern with Louric, although she could not recall when that discussion occurred.¶

charges in addition to state charges. On behalf of the defense team, July 31, 2007 meeting with an August 2, 2007 letter to Menchel: followed up on the¶

We welcomed your recognition that a state prison sentence is neither appropriate for, nor acceptable to, Mr. Epstein, as the dangers of the state prison system pose risks that are clearly untenable. We acknowledge that your suggestion of a plea to two federal misdemeanors was an attempt to resolve this dilemma. Our proposal is significantly punitive, and if implemented, would, we believe, leave little doubt that the federal interest was demonstrably vindicated.90

¶

added, “We must keep in mind that Jeffrey Epstein is a 54-year-o been arrested before. He has lived an otherwise exemplary life.” who has never¶

mandatory incarceration. Instead, The “significantly punitiveloal described in the defers ener suggested two years of ho finement, with regular nvolved no period of reporting to and visits from a community control officer; pa f restitution, damages, court and probationary costs, and law enforcement costs; ran testing; community service; psychological counseling; and a prohibition on unsup t with the victims. The letter specifically referred to the victim damages-recovery at the government had proposed under 18 U.S.C. § 2255 and represented that Epst repared to fully fund the identified group of victims which are the focus of the — that is, the 12 individuals noted at the meeting on July 31, 2007.” Under the def ro , the state would incarcerate Epstein only if he failed to comply with the terms of sujt ustody. also advised that the defense team was seeking a meeting with Acos¶

B. In an August 3, Imprisonment er, the USAO States That a Two-Year Term of nimum That Will Vindicate the Federal interest¶

Villafafia told OP and she conferred with Lo Menchel’s signatu lette to be the minimu Villafafia’s appropriat Rule of for a tw at that she and her managers agreed the counteroffer was unacceptable, Menchel about the government’s response. Villafafta drafted for erting that the USAO considered a two-year term of imprisonment tence that would “vindicate” the federal interest in the Epstein investigation. that the USAO “has never agreed that a state prison sentence is not pstein,” but was willing to allow Epstein to enter a guilty plea under Federal rocedure 11(c)(1)(C) to a federal felony charge with a binding recommendation ear ern of incarceration. Villafafta specified that Epstein would also be required to concede lia ility under 18 U.S.C. § 2255 for all of the victims identified during the federal investigation, “not just the 12 that formed the basis of an initial planned charging instrument.”¶

{sup}90The USAO countered, however, that it “never agreed that a state prison sentence is not appropriate” and that “a plea to two federal misdemeanors was never extended or meant as an offer.” Records show that throughout the Epstein matter, the USAO attorneys identified instances when dcfcnsc attorneys misstated or otherwise did not accurately describe events or statements. Accordingly, in evaluating the subject attorneys’ conduct, OPR did not rely on uncorroborated defense assertions.¶

Menchel made several substantive changes to Villafafia’s draft letter. He specified that “a two-year term of state imprisonment” was the minimum sentence that would satisfy the federal interest in the case. (Emphasis added.) With regard to the option of a federal plea, Menchel wrote that the USAO “would be willing to explore a federal conviction” and retained the reference to a Rule 11(c) plea. Menchel also removed the reference to the specific state offenses to which Epstein would be required to plead guilty. Menchel forwarded the redraft to Acosta, suggesting that they speak about it the next morning, as well as to Sloman, Lourie, and Villafafia.¶

The final letter, as shown on the following pages, was identical to Menchel’s redraft, except¶

that it omitted all reference to a federal plea under Rule 11(c).9’ O C¶

{sup}91Menchel told OPR that he did not disfavor Rule 11(c) pleas but knew that the USAO believed the judges were generally averse to them. He did not recall why the provision was dropped from the letter, but “assumed” it was a decision by Acosta. In a September 6, 2007 email, Villafana told Sloman that she and Menchel had discussed a Rule I I (c) plea, but she opined that Menchel “must have asked Alex about it and it was nixed.” Villafafta told OPR that Lourie, too, had told her Acosta did not want to do a Rule 11(c) plea.¶

U.S. Deportment ofJustice¶

Untied States Attorney ‘Southern DLit*: of Florida¶

R. ALEX4hillai.16257.1 MITI WAFT- ATTORIVET¶

Lill Ann Esc¶

Re: Jeffrey Epstein¶

Dear Lilly;¶

Thank you frir your leder o f August g Your &apse! on how tO resolVc the Epstein matter.¶

•9➢N6 &arid • Arai ILIUM 9.514100 -Telepeas OM .1.10.4441-¶

August 3, 2007¶

cos¶

As we explained at our meeting on July 31 ,200i, the Office believes that the federal interest will not be vindicated in the absince of a two-year term of state imprisonment for Mr. Epstein. That 0ff& wag.not meant as a Starting point for negotiations, ;Os the minimum. term of imprisonment thit will obviate the need ‘for federal prosecution. The Office has never agreed that a state prison sentence is not appropriate for Mr. Epstein. Rather we. simply stated that if Mi. Epstein preferred to serve hissentence in a federal penetentiary, we would be willing to explore a federal conviction that may allow that in lieu of Any state. resolution. Fauther,. as 1 niadc altar in. our follow up telephone conversation after the. meeting, A plea to two federal misdemeanors was never extended& meant as an offer.¶

We also would reiterate that the agreement to Section 2255 liability applies to all of the minor gi di identified during the federal investigation; not just the 12 that form !hi basis ,J\ lanlinitial planned charging instrument.¶

As you know, the ability. to engage. in flexible plea negotiations is• dramatically changed upon the return of an indictment. Once an indictment is returned, thd Officedoes • not intend to file a Superseding Information containing a lesser charge or to dismiis the case in favor of state prosecution.¶

MO Amt. ES.. . Aucusr 1,Acm 2¶

‘Please let us lcnowy0ur client’s decision by no later than August 17. thaw conferred with US: Attorney Acosta who has asked me to communicate that the two-year term of . “incarceration is a non-negotiable minimuni to vindiCate a federal interest, and, at this time; ‘he is not inclined to meet with counsel for Mr. Epstein.¶

cc: Roy Black Gerald B. Lefetnat Alexander Accsta Jeffrey Sloman Angigspourie. A.¶

:Sincerely,¶

R. Aleicuider Arnsta United States Attemek¶

B-c) y: t. ’ Matthew Menchel Chief, CiAf V iVisiOn•¶

Menchel told OPR view, the two-year sentence established a “floor” for negotiations and if Epstein rej e offer, subsequent offers would require him to accept more jail time rather than less. enchel told OPR that the USAO was “leaving our options open” by retaining the option of a plea because he thought the defense was “trying … to get him into a federal • tiary. The letter’s deadline of August 17, 2007, for acceptance of the government’s o s intended to accommodate Villafafia’s request that the deadline provide her with eno o go to New York, pursue investigative steps involving two of Epstein’s assistants, s interviews, and take additional legal steps to obtain Epstein’s computers if Epstei I e deal. Menchel told OPR he considered August 17 to be a firm deadline: “[I]f you tell • cone they have two weeks, it should be two weeks.” Menchel signed and sent the letter on F • ay, August 3, 2007, which was his last day at the USA() before joining a private law firm.92¶

The following Monday, August 6, 2007, Villafatia contacted Menchel by email at his new firm to inquire whether the letter to Epstein’s counsel had gone out on Friday. Villafafia explained¶

{sup}92Menchel told OPR that the timing of the letter to with his impending departure from the USAO. was a “total coincidence,” and had nothing to do¶

to OPR that she “wanted to know whether this letter went out. Because … if the letter didn’t go out we can make this all go away and restart.” Menchel confirmed to her that he had sent the letter out by email.¶

Later that day, the West Palm Beach FBI squad supervisor told Sloman that he understood Epstein had rejected the USAO’s proposal, and he asked when Epstein would be charged. Villafafia told OPR that the squad supervisor “yelled at” Sloman about the USAO’s decision not to prosecute Epstein federally. Sloman similarly told OPR that the squad supervisor “like [Villafafia] [a]nd the agents felt very strongly about the case.s93¶

C. August — September 2007: Epstein Hires Additional Attorn with Acosta o Meet¶

1. Acosta Agrees to Meet with Epstein’s New Atto¶

Villafafia told OPR that Epstein’s team was “incensed” that them and that the USAO had set such a short deadline to respond to Epstein added to his team Kenneth Starr and Jay Lefkowitz, firm Kirkland & Ellis, whom Acosta knew from his empl at the firm.90 On the evening of August 6, 2007, Slom didn’t know Kirkland made a call into you. You w interviews, neither Acosta nor Sloman rememb provide no additional information about the c indicates that the Kirkland & Ellis attorne objections to the USAO’s involvement are likely to go to DC. We should stra be made clear.” would not meet with er. Around this time, inent attorneys from the law evade earlier as an associate Acosta: “Just saw Menchel. I nbelievable.” During their OPR from Kirkland & Ellis and could A reply email from Acosta to Sloman idering elevating to the Department their in matter. In that email, Acosta stated, “They b’ : We are not changing positions, and that should¶

The next day, Acosta¶

[Epstein’s attorneys want to go to DC on the case, on the grounds of a proces Le., that I have not met with them. I’m concerned thatfttis wil elay matters.¶

g of heading this off, by (i) agreeing to meet to discuss I legal policy only (the only matter in which DC has arguable¶

{sup}931c II to Louric reporting the conversation, Sloman reported that he told the squad supervisor that “it’s a tad more c heated” and commented, “The guy is killing me.” The squad supervisor told OPR that he did not remember this exchange with Sloman, but he recalled the agents being “upset” with the proposed resolution of the cast and he likely would have told Sloman, “When do we indict? Why don’t we just move forward?”¶

{sup}94Acosta told OPR that as a junior associate with Kirkland & Ellis from September 1995 to March 1997, he had worked on at least one matter each with Starr and Lefkowitz, and since that time, he had professional acquaintanceships with both.¶

{sup}9S Mcnchcl told OPR that he did not remember the timing of the call, but he did remember an occasion on which he entered Acosta’s office as Acosta was finishing a phone conversation, and Acosta stated, “[T]hat was Ken Starr,” and told Menchcl the call related to the Epstein case.¶

jurisdiction), while making clear that we are not talking about the details of the case, and (ii) asking [CEOS Chief] Oosterba[an] to participate by teleconference, thereby intercepting the DC meeting.¶

Thoughts?¶

Acosta told OPR that he had no concern about Departmental “scrutiny of the NPA scheme” and that “[i]f anything,” he was concerned whether the Department might direct the USAO to “drop this case.""¶

2. Leading to the Meeting with Defense Counsel, Investig Steps Are Postponed, and the Defense Continues to Oppose Vill orts to Obtain the Computer Evidence¶

On August 8, 2007, Villafafia informed Acosta that she had spoke it osterbaan, who was willing to join a meeting with the defense; although he could noft do sp in person until after August 21, he was willing to participate by phone in order “to stay time on our August 17th deadline.” Villafafta also reiterated that she wanted to conta pstetn’s assistants in New York and to interview some of Epstein’s colleagues and former e ees there. Noting that “there was some concern about [taking the proposed investigative bile we are trying to negotiate a plea,” Villafafta asked Acosta for guidance. Lourie Acosta and Sloman, asking that the USAO “stick to our deadline if possible.” ted out that CEOS “has no approval authority” and opined it was “a bit extreme to o e defense to keep arguing this [case] to different agencies.” Acosta replied, “This [at the Department] anyhow, if we don’t meet with them. I’d rather keep it here. B e Chief of CEOS] in visibly does so. If our deadline has to slip a bit … it’s worth i¶

As a result, the investigate Jre postponed. On August 10, 2007, Villafafta emailed Lourie inquiring whether she c o ahead” with the New York trip and whether she could oppose Black’s request to s th litigation concerning the government’s efforts to obtain Epstein’s computer equi ent un t after Acosta’s meeting with the defense team. Villafafia was reluctant to delay the litig nd reported to Lourie that agents recently had interviewed a girl who began seeing E in a ge 14 and who was photographed in the nude by an Epstein assistant. On August 13, 2(40 Villa aria advised Black that the USAO was not willing to agree to a stay of the litigation reached out to Lourie on August 22, 2007, and obtained his agreement * request for a stay until the week after Acosta’s meeting with defense counsel, which was ed for September 7, 2007.¶

Vi Ma told OPR that, in her opinion, the defense efforts to put off the litigation concerning the computers was “further evidence of the importance of [this] evidence."" Villafana suspected the computers contained evidence that “would have put this case completely to bed.”¶

{sup}96 In context, Acosta appeared to mean that although he was not concerned about the Department reviewing the NPA or its terms, he did have concerns that the Department would decide the USAO should not have accepted the case because of a lack of federal interest and might direct the USAO to end its involvement in the matter.¶

{sup}97 Menchel told OPR, on the other hand, “there could be a lot of reasons why” defense counsel would resist “turn[ing) over an entire computer.”¶

She believed that access to the computer evidence would strengthen the government’s negotiating position, but that her supervisors “did not seem to recognize that.” Villafafia said she did not understand why her supervisors were uninterested in determining what the computers contained. Instead, they instructed Villafafia to “keep calling the judge” to ask for a delay in the litigation proceedings.¶

Sloman told OPR that he recalled an issue about the computers, but did not recall “what the thinking was at the time” about pursuing that evidence or why Villafafia was “ordered to stand down.” Acosta, Menchel, and Lourie all told OPR that they did not recall Villafafia’s effort to obtain the computer evidence or that there had been litigation relating to it. Lourie, wever, told OPR that the computers might have contained “very powerful evidence” that poss uld have changed our advice to [Acosta], or his decision making.” In his OPR int M chel was uncertain whether the computer evidence would have been useful, but also edged to OPR, “You always want more as a prosecutor.”¶

On August 31, 2007, in preparation for the upcoming Sept ber , 2007 meeting with defense counsel that he planned to attend, CEOS Chief Oosterb, d to West Palm Beach to meet with Villafafia and the case agents and to examine the e. He explained to OPR that he wanted to see the file before meeting with the defens e could best `represent[] the interests of the prosecution team,” and that he was • going forward with the case. According to Villafafia, during his review of the file, told her that the case was “really good” and offered to assist Villafafia at trial.¶

On September 6, 2007, the day bef the ting with defense counsel, Sloman sent Villafafia an email asking, “Please re ollection. What is the `deal’ on the table?” Sloman told OPR that his question e fact that in his capacity as FAUSA, he was involved in “a hundred other thin 4t tune.” Villafafia sent Sloman the term sheet and explained to him, “You and Ma and I had also discussed a possible federal plea to an Information charging a 371 co ith a Rule 11 plea with a two-year cap, but I think Matt must have asked Alex about it as nixed.” Villafafia continued:¶

There are t ncems that I hope we can address tomorrow. First, that re is absolute drop-dead date for accepting or rejecting it is strategically important that we indict before the end of mFer, which means . .. September 25th. Second, the agents have not reached out to the victims to get their approval, which rew [Oosterbaan] politely reminded me, is required under the aw. And third, I do not want to make any promises about allowing Epstein to self-surrender because I still believe that we have a good chance of getting him detained.”

¶

{sup}98Sloman noted that with the attention given to the Epstein investigation, “it seems like … this was the only case [in the office), but there were other cases.”¶

{sup}99 As Villafafia explained in her OPR interview, when a violent crime defendant self-surrenders, the government may have difficulty winning an argument for pretrial detention or bond. Contrary to Villafafia’s assertion in the email, the CVRA, even when applicable, required only victim consultation, not victim approval, and as is explained in¶

Villafatia added that the PBPD Chief had alerted the FBI that an upcoming news article would report that Epstein was “going to plead to a state charge” and the PBPD Chief “wanted to know if the victims had been consulted about the deal.” Sloman forwarded Villafatla’s email to Acosta with a note that read simply, “fyi.”¶

Later that evening, Villafafia circulated to Sloman, Lourie, and Oosterbaan two alternative documents: a draft federal plea agreement and a draft NPA. um The draft federal plea agreement, following the USAO’s standard format, called for Epstein to plead guilty to a five-year conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371 to entice minors to engage in prostitution, an offense requiring registration as a sexual offender, with a Rule 11(c) binding sentence of two years’ imprisonme The draft NPA contained the terms presented to the defense team on July 31, 2007, and call Epstein to enter a state plea by September 28, 2007. Villafafia told OPR that because s ne er seen a non-prosecution agreement before, she relied on a template she found eit USAO or the Department’s internal online resources, but she did not do any additiona res regarding the use of non-prosecution agreements.’°‘¶

3. September 7, 2007: Acosta, Other SAS/Attorneys, and FBI Supervisors Meet with Epstein s Starr, Lefkowitz, and¶

On Friday, September 7, 2007, Acosta, illafafia, Villafafia’s co-counsel, Oosterbaan, and one orservisory FBI agenN e USAO’s West Palm Beach office with defense attorneys and, for the ft e, and Letkowitz.102 This was Acosta’s first meeting with Epstein’s defense team. of derstood the purpose of this meeting was to afford Epstein’s counsel an opportune o ke a pitch” as to why the case should not be prosecuted federally. Villafafia recall a “pre-meet” before defense counsel arrived, Acosta did not express concern abo~,ille r ity of the prosecution or the strength of the case.¶

Acosta told OPR that t meets was not “a negotiation,” but a chance for the defense to present their arguments, which e made by Starr and focused primarily on federalism. Villafafta similarly recalled that th eeting mainly consisted of the defense argument that the Epstein case should remain a state which the USAO should not interfere. Both Villafafia and her co-counsel recalle at S addressed himself directly to Acosta, and that Starr, who had held Senate-confirm p Roils in the government, commented to Acosta that he and Acosta were “the only people i r who have run the [gantlet] of confirmation by the Senate.” Acosta did not recall th corn ent, but he told OPR, “[B]ack in July, we had decided that we were going¶

Chapter Three, the Department’s position at the time was that victim consultation was not required in matters in which the government did not pursuc a federal charge. The USAO’s actions with respect to victim consultation and the Department’s interpretation of the CVRA are discussed in detail in Chapter Three of this Report.¶

{sup}100The initial draft NPA is attached as Exhibit 2 to this Report.¶

{sup}101 OPR was unable to identify a template upon which she might have relied.¶

{sup}1°2 Lourie was not present. During September 2007, he was traveling between Florida and Washington, D.C., as he transitioncd to his new detail post as Principal Deputy Assistant Attomcy General and Chief of Staff to the head of the Department’s Criminal Division, Assistant Attorney General Alice Fisher. He served in that detail until he left the Department in February 2008.¶

forward, that either there is this pre-indictment resolution, or we go forward with an indictment. The September meeting did not alter or shift our position.”{sup}103¶

Villafaña told OPR that after hearing the defense argument, Acosta reiterated that the federal interest in the case could be vindicated only by a state plea to an offense that required sexual offender registration, resulted in a two-year term of incarceration, and was subject to the 18 U.S.C. § 2255 process for providing compensation to the victims. When defense counsel objected to the registration requirement, Acosta held firm, and he also rejected the defense proposal for a sentence of home confinement. In a subsequent email exchange with Criminal Division Deputy Assistant Attorney General Sigal Mandelker, who supervised CEOS, Oosterbaan reported that the meeting was “non-eventful,” noting that defense counsel argued “federalism” and might approach Criminal Division Assistant Attorney General Alice Fisher to present that argument directly to her.¶

VI. SEPTEMBER 2007: THE PLEA NEGOTIATIONS INTENSIFY, AND IN THE PROCESS, THE REQUIRED TERM OF IMPRISONMENT IS REDUCED¶

Acosta had dispensed with the August 17, 2007 plea deadline specified in Menchel’s August 3, 2007 letter, in order to allow the defense to meet with him. After that meeting, and although Villafaña continued to plan to file charges on September 25, no new plea deadline was established, and the negotiations continued through most of September.¶

The defense used that time to push the USAO to make concessions. Because Acosta was not willing to compromise on the issue of sexual offender registration or providing a means through which the victims could seek monetary damages, the negotiations focused on the term of imprisonment. As the contemporaneous emails show, the USAO did not hold to its position that a two-year term of imprisonment was “the minimum” that the USAO would accept. To reach an agreement with the defense on Epstein’s sentence, the USAO explored possible pleas in either federal or state court, or both, and Villafaña spent considerable time and effort working with defense counsel on developing alternative pleas with various outcomes. In the course of that process, the agreement was revised to require that Epstein accept a sentence of 18 months, with the understanding that under the state’s sentencing procedures, he would likely serve just 15 months.¶

A. The Incarceration Term Is Reduced from 24 Months to 20 Months¶

Shortly after the September 7, 2007 meeting, Epstein attorney Gerald Lefcourt, who had not been present at the meeting, spoke with both Acosta and Lourie, and made a new counteroffer, proposing that Epstein serve 15 months in jail followed by 15 months in home confinement. On the afternoon of Monday, September 10, 2007, Villafaña emailed Sloman, identifying issues she wanted to discuss with him, including her concern that defense counsel was pushing for a resolution that would allow Epstein to avoid incarceration and possibly sexual offender registration. Villafaña stated that Lefcourt’s counteroffer was “a reasonable counteroffer in light of our starting position of 24 months,” but added that it was “a really low sentence.” Villafaña¶

{sup}103 Sloman echoed this point, telling OPR that Starr’s presentation focused on the issue of federalism, but the USAO had already decided to defer prosecution to the state and after the meeting, the USAO continued on that path.¶

noted that the revised charges involved 19 victims, so the defense proposal for a 15-month sentence amounted to less than one month per victim. Villafafia requested that “whatever the U.S. Attorney decides to do:’ the agreement with Epstein should “follow … a version of my written nonprosecution agreement” in order to “avoid any state shenanigans and … keep the defense on a strict timeline.”¶

Later that day, Villafafia circulated to Acosta and Sloman a revised NPA that called for a 20-month jail sentence to be followed by 10 months of home confinement. This redrafted NPA contained a provision that specified, “With credit for gain time, Epstein shall serve at least 17 months in a state correctional institution.i100 Acosta reviewed the revised NPA d amended it to include a statement clarifying that it was Epstein’s obligation “to undertake ions with the State of Florida to ensure compliance with these procedures.” Villafafta se ye on of the revised NPA to Lefcourt that afternoon and forwarded Acosta’s proposes e to him the following day, after she learned of it.¶

On September 11, 2007, the court contacted Villafafta to inqu ther the USAO would be prepared to proceed with the litigation concerning the cot’ ut e following day. At Sloman’s direction, Villafafia asked the court to delay the h d the court rescheduled it for the following week. At the same time, anticipating that a rations would fail, Villafafia circulated a revised indictment to her co-counsel and , seeking their feedback before sending it “through the chain of command.” Villafapa Oosterbaan the revised NPA and told him she was “still shooting for 9/25” to bri charg , assuming the defense declined the USAO’s offer. Oosterbaan responded, “The ter-9ffering is unfortunate, but I suppose it’s understandable.”1°5¶

That afternoon, Lourie asked V “What is our latest offer?” Villafafta responded, “Plead to the three specified [sta a 30-month sentence, split 20 in jail and 10 in ‘community control,’ and agree !k gjkls are victims for purposes of damages. We also put in deadlines for a plea and senten¶

B. Septemb 2 2007: The USAO and Defense Counsel Meet with the State Attorney¶

Although USAO and defense counsel had been discussing resolving the federal investigation p to state charges, there is no evidence that the USAO involved the State Attorney’s I ice those discussions until September 12, 2007. On that day, Lourie, Villafafta, and another • supervisor who would be replacing Lourie as manager of the USAO’s West Palm ice, and Epstein attorneys Lefkowitz, Lefcourt, and Goldberger met with State Attorney Barry Krischer and Assistant State Attorney Lanna Belohlavek. Other than Villafafta, few of the participants had any memory of the meeting or the results of it. The available evidence indicates that the USAO made additional concessions during the meeting.¶

is Through “gain time,” Florida inmates can earn a reduction in their sentence for good behavior.¶

{sup}103 Oosterbaan told OPR that he did not recall having read the NM at this juncture and “had no involvement with it.”¶

Villafaña told OPR that during the meeting, the group discussed the draft NPA, but she did not think they gave a copy to Krischer and Belohlavek. Neither Krischer nor Belohlavek expressed concern about proceeding as the USAO was proposing. According to Villafaña, Belohlavek explained that a plea to the three state counts identified in the draft NPA would affect the state’s sentencing guidelines, and that it would be better for the guidelines calculation if Epstein pled guilty to just one of the three counts. Villafaña recalled that when Belohlavek confirmed that Epstein would be required to register as a sexual offender if he pled to any one of the three charges, Lourie, speaking for the USAO, agreed to allow Epstein to enter his plea to just one state charge in addition to the pending state indictment, and the defense attorneys selected the charge of procurement of minors to engage in prostitution.{sup}106 Lourie, however, disputed Villafaña’s recollection that he made the final decision, stating that it was “illogical” to conclude that he had the authority to change the terms of agreement unilaterally.{sup}107¶

During the meeting, defense counsel raised concerns about Epstein serving time in state prison. Villafaña also told OPR that Lourie, the other supervisor, and she made clear during the meeting that they expected Epstein to be incarcerated 24 hours a day, seven days a week, during the entirety of his sentence, and they did not “particularly care” whether it was in a state or local facility. Belohlavek explained to OPR that in order for Epstein to serve his time in a county facility, rather than state prison, his sentence on each charge could be no more than 12 months, so that, for example, consecutive terms of 12 months and 6 months—totaling 18 months—could be served in the county jail. Villafaña told OPR:¶

Our thing was incarceration 24 hours a day. So during this meeting, I remember [the defense] talking about … a one year count followed by a six-month count … that [Epstein] could serve them back to back but at the county jail, rather than having to go to a state facility. But then I said, “But if you do that, it’s still going to have to be round the clock incarceration.” And Barry Krischer said yes. And [he] said that to avoid [Epstein being extorted while incarcerated], he would be kept in solitary confinement.¶

Villafaña did not recall whether she and Lourie agreed to an 18-month sentence during that meeting, but she told OPR that in her view, allowing Epstein to serve his sentence in the county jail was not a “concession” because he would be incarcerated regardless.¶

Neither Lourie nor the other USAO supervisor present could recall any substantive details of the September 12, 2007 meeting, and Krischer and Belohlavek told OPR they did not remember the meeting at all. Krischer did, however, recall that he was “not offended at all” when he learned of the proposed federal resolution, requiring Epstein to plead to both the pending state indictment and an additional charge requiring sexual offender registration, explaining to OPR that Epstein “was going to plead guilty to my indictment, we were going to add an additional charge, he was¶

{sup}106 Later, the defense would claim that they had mistakenly understood that the selected charge would not involve sexual offender registration.¶

{sup}107 As noted below, a contemporaneous email indicates that shortly after the meeting, Lourie and Villafaña spoke with Acosta and Sloman, who concurred with the agreement.¶

going to become a registered sex offender, and he was going to go actually do time—which he hadn’t done up to this point.” Krischer asked, “Why would I turn that down?” Krischer also noted that at that time, sexual offender registration “was not the noun” in Florida, and he recognized that “it was clearly something that was important to the U.S. Attorney’s Office.” l08¶

Acosta told OPR that he did not recall if he learned what transpired at the September 12 meeting, nor did he recall why the USAO team agreed to permit Epstein to plead guilty to only one charge. Acosta told OPR, however, that he recognized that Villafafia and Lourie needed “some degree of discretion to negotiate”; that “in the give and take” of negotiations, they might propose a concession; and he was comfortable with the concession as long as the charge to ch Epstein ultimately pled “captured the conduct” in an “appropriate” way.¶

Although Epstein’s attorneys expressed interest in Epstein servin in a county facility (rather than state prison), one of Epstein’s attorneys alternative , —.ed interest in Epstein serving his time in a federal facility, and along with discussi he possible state resolution, the USAO and Epstein’s counsel also discussed a possibl ede I plea with a sentence running concurrently to the sentence Epstein would receive on a indicted state charge. Later that day, Villafafia sent Leflcowitz an email advising t s a and Lourie had talked with Acosta and Sloman, and they were “all satisfied in principl greement”109 The next day, September 13, 2007, Villafafia sent an email to Acosta, I urie, and two other supervisors, identifying potential federal offenses that would yiel sentence. Villafafia also emailed defense counsel, stating that she had been “spend’ a uality time with Title 18”—referring to the code of federal criminal statutes—to u ere would be a “factual basis” for any federal plea, and identifying the federal sta she considering.¶

C. The Evidence Does No C r y Show Why the Term of Incarceration Was Reduced from 24 n h 20 Months to 18 Months¶

OPR reviewed the con mpora ous records and asked Acosta, Villafafia, and Lourie to explain how the jail term Epste would have to accept came to be reduced from two years to 18 months. Lourie had no ollection of the process through which the term of incarceration was reduced. Villafafia and A ffered significantly different explanations.¶

Villafafia OPR:¶

ad this flip flop between is it going to be a state charge, is it ֥g to be a federal charge, is it going to be [a] state charge, is it oing to be a federal charge? And to get to a federal charge, there was no way to do 24 months that made any sense. So somehow it ended up being 20 months and then it got to be 18 months. And these were calls that if I remember correctly, Jay Lefkowitz was¶

{sup}108Belohlavek, however, told OPR that sexual offender registration “was a common occurrence” for enumerated state crimes, but the state crime charged in the state indictment against Epstein was not one of them.¶

{sup}109The email does not indicate what the panics meant by “the agreement”¶

having directly with Alex Acosta, and Alex Acosta agreed to 18 months.¶

Villafaña further explained to OPR:¶

Regarding going from 24 months to 20 months, I recall a discussion that 24 months of federal time was really 20 months after gain time, so Epstein should be allowed to plead to 20 months’ in the state. Epstein’s counsel represented that he wouldn’t get gain time like that in the [s]tate, and someone above me agreed. Later, of course, as shown in the agreements, Epstein’s counsel (Jay Lefkowitz) got Alex to agree that Epstein should be allowed to earn gain time in the [s]tate, so the 20 months in the state became at least 17 months.¶

Regarding going from 20 months’ to 18 months, … this came from a negotiation between Epstein’s counsel and Andy or Alex where the federal statutory max could only be 24 or 18, so 18 was agreed to. I also recall that, after Epstein’s counsel decided that they wanted to proceed with an NPA and only a state guilty plea, I asked Alex why we didn’t return to 20 months because the reason why we went to 18 months was because that was the only way to end up with a federal statutory maximum.{sup}110¶

However, a subsequent account of the history of negotiations with Epstein’s attorneys, drafted by Villafaña for Acosta several weeks after the September 12, 2007 meeting with the State Attorney’s Office, stated that “a significant compromise” reached at the meeting “was a reduction in the amount of jail time – from [the originally proposed] twenty-four months down to eighteen months, which would be served at the Palm Beach County Jail rather than a state prison facility.” Acosta also noted to OPR that Villafaña was engaged in a “tough negotiation,” and he was willing to allow her the discretion to reduce the amount of incarceration time without him “second-guessing” her. Acosta acknowledged that he “clearly approved it at some point.”¶

Based on this record, OPR could not definitively determine when, how, or by whom the decision was made to reduce the required term of imprisonment from 24 months to 18 months. It is possible that the reduction was connected to Epstein’s effort to achieve a result that would allow him to serve his time in a county facility, but it may also have resulted from the parties’ attempts to reach agreement on federal charges that would not result in a sentence of incarceration greater than what had been discussed with respect to state charges. In the end, the evidence shows that Acosta approved of a reduced term of incarceration from 24 months to 18 months, and the USAO understood at the time that the state gain time requirement would further reduce the actual amount of time Epstein would spend incarcerated.¶

{sup}110 By “federal statutory maximum,” Villafaña referred to 12-month and 6-month misdemeanors.¶

D. The Parties Continue to Negotiate but Primarily Focus on a Potential Plea to Federal Charges¶

During the remainder of September, Villafaña conducted plea negotiations and drafted the final NPA, mainly with Epstein attorney Jay Lefkowitz. In a September 13, 2007 email to CEOS Chief Oosterbaan, Villafaña reported that the plea negotiations were “getting fast and furious.” She said that the defense wanted to establish a “victim’s fund” through which Epstein could make payments to the victims, rather than having the victims file individual § 2255 court actions for damages, which she speculated was “to keep this stuff out of the public [c]ourt files.”¶

According to the email documentation, by Friday, September 14, 2007, the parties had moved toward a “hybrid” federal plea agreement, incorporating a plea to state charges, which would allow Epstein to serve his sentence for all the charges concurrently in a federal prison. Villafaña informed Acosta, Sloman, Lourie, and other colleagues that negotiations with Lefkowitz had resulted in a tentative agreement for Epstein to plead to two federal charges: harassment to prevent a witness from reporting a crime (18 U.S.C. § 1512(d)(2), which was then a one-year misdemeanor), and simple assault on an airplane (18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(5), a six-month misdemeanor). Villafaña reported that Lefkowitz “put in a pitch for only 12 months, I put in a pitch that [Epstein] plead to 24 with a 20-month recommendation, and we decided that we would be stuck with the 18 months.”¶

Later that day, Villafaña sent to Lefkowitz a draft “hybrid” plea agreement and information mirroring the agreement in principle she had described to her supervisors, but which she noted had “not yet been blessed” by them. The agreement provided that Epstein would plead guilty to the two federal charges for which the parties would jointly recommend that he be sentenced to the statutory maximum penalty of 18 months’ imprisonment followed by 2 years of supervised release, and that he would also plead guilty to the state registrable offense of procurement of minors to engage in prostitution, for which Epstein and the State Attorney’s Office would make a joint, binding recommendation that he be sentenced to serve at least 20 months in prison followed by 10 months of community control (home confinement). Although not specified in the draft agreement, the negotiations evidently expected the federal and state terms would run concurrently. In addition to payment of restitution, Epstein would not oppose jurisdiction or victim status for any of the victims identified in the federal investigation—at that point specified as numbering 40—who elected to file suit for damages under 18 U.S.C. § 2255. A guardian ad litem would be appointed to communicate with the defense on the victims’ behalf.¶

Lourie, however, quickly made clear that he was not in favor of the proposal. In response to Villafaña’s email about the potential federal charges, but after Villafaña sent the proposal to Lefkowitz, Lourie told her, “The assault [charge] sounds like a stretch and factually [is] sort of silly.”{sup}111 Lourie also told Sloman, Acosta, and another supervisor that he did not “like the assault charge” and believed that it would not “go smooth with every judge.” Acosta responded, “If we need[,] let’s find a different charge.” On Saturday, September 15, 2007, Villafaña emailed Lefkowitz, using her personal email address, reporting that she had “gotten some negative reaction¶

{sup}111 The charge was to be based on “an incident in which Epstein ‘put great pressure’ … on [one of his female assistants] to call the girls to set up appointments.”¶

to the assault charge” and suggesting a different factual scenario to support a federal charge. ” 2 At this point, Sloman left on vacation, and he informed Acosta and Villafafia that in his absence Lourie had agreed “to help finalize this.” Lourie spent the following work week at his new post at the Department in Washington, D.C., but communicated with his USAO colleagues by phone and email.¶

In a Sunday, September 16, 2007 email, Villafafia informed Lefkowitz that she had drafted a factual proffer to accompany a revised “hybrid” federal plea proposal. In that email, Villafafia also noted that she was considering filing charges in the federal district court in Miami, “which will hopefully cut the press coverage significantly.” This email received considerabl ttention 12 years later when it was made public during the CVRA litigation and was view dence of the USAO’s efforts to conceal the NPA from the victims. Villafafta, howev lain to OPR that she was concerned that news media coverage would violate the victi vacy. She told OPR, “[1]f [the victims] wanted to attend [the plea hearing], I wanted the ble to go into the courthouse without their faces being splashed all over the newspa at such publicity was less likely to happen in Miami, where the press “in general does t ca e about what happens in Palm Beach.”¶

Lefkowitz responded to Villafafia with a revised er latest proposed “hybrid” plea agreement, in a document entitled “Agreemen cantly, this defense proposal introduced two new provisions. The first related ale assistants who had allegedly facilitated Epstein in his criminal scheme. The se ought a government promise not to prosecute them, as well as certain other unna ‘n employees, and a promise to forego immigration proceedings against two of the ale stants:¶

Epstein’s fulfilling the precludes the initiati otherwise in the assistants] or an entity] for any c investigat’ … . Further, no immigration proceeding will be instituted a [two named female assist iczatir ants] as a result of the on pcnv g i tigation. nditions of the Agreement also and all criminal charges which might rought against [four named female ee of [a specific Epstein-owned corporate charge that arises out of the ongoing federal

¶

e provision related to the USAO’s efforts to obtain Epstein’s computers:¶

in’s fulfilling the terms and conditions of the Agreement olves any and all outstanding [legal process] that have requested witness testimony and/or the production of documents and/or computers in relation to the investigation that is the subject of the Agreement. Each [legal process] will be withdrawn upon the execution of the Agreement and will not be re-issued absent reliable¶

{sup}112Villafafia told OPR that she sometimes used her home email account because “[n]egotiations were occurring at nights, on wcekend[s], and while I was [away from the office for personal reasons], … and this occurred during a time when out of office access to email was very limited.” Records show her supervisors were aware that at times she used her personal email account in communicating with defense counsel in this case.¶

evidence of a violation of the agreement. Epstein and his counsel agree that the computers that are currently under [legal process] will be safeguarded in their current condition by Epstein’s counsel or their agents until the terms and conditions of the Agreement are fulfilled.¶

Later that day, Villafaña sent Lefkowitz a lengthy email to convey two options Lourie had suggested: “the original proposal” for a state plea but with an agreement for an 18-month sentence, or pleas to state charges and two federal obstruction-of-justice charges. Villafaña also told Lefkowitz she was willing to ask Acosta again to approve a federal plea to a five-year conspiracy with a Rule 11(c) binding recommendation for a 20-month sentence. Villafaña explained:¶

As to timing, it is my understanding that Mr. Epstein needs to be sentenced in the state after he is sentenced in the federal case, but not that he needs to plead guilty and be sentenced after serving his federal time. And recommended that some of the timing issues be addressed only in the state agreement, so that it isn’t obvious to the judge that we are trying to create federal jurisdiction for prison purposes.¶

With regard to prosecution of individuals other than Epstein, Villafaña suggested standard federal plea agreement language regarding the resolution of all criminal liability, “and I will mention ‘co-conspirators,’ but I would prefer not to highlight for the judge all of the other crimes and all of the other persons that we could charge.” Villafaña told OPR that she was willing to include a non-prosecution provision for Epstein’s co-conspirators, who at the time she understood to be the four women named in the proposed agreement, because the USAO was not interested in prosecuting those individuals if Epstein entered a plea. Villafaña told OPR, “[W]e considered Epstein to be the top of the food chain, and we wouldn’t have been interested in prosecuting anyone else.” She did not consider the possibility that Epstein might be trying to protect other, unnamed individuals, and no one, including the FBI case agents, raised that concern. Villafaña also told OPR that her reference to “all of the other crimes and all of the other persons that we could charge” related to her concern that if the plea agreement contained information about uncharged conduct, the court might ask for more information about that conduct and inquire why it had not been charged, and if the government provided such information, Epstein’s attorneys might claim the agreement was breached.{sup}113¶

With regard to immigration, Villafaña told OPR that the USAO generally did not take any position in plea agreements on immigration issues, and that in this case, there was no evidence that either of the two assistants who were foreign nationals had committed fraud in connection with their immigration paperwork, “and I think that they were both in status. So there wasn’t any reason¶

{sup}113 OPR understood Villafaña’s concern to be that if the government were required to respond to a court’s inquiry into additional facts, Epstein would object that the government was trying to cast him in a negative light in order to influence the court to impose a sentence greater than the agreed-upon term.¶

for them to be deported.”1” As to whether the foreign nationals would be removable by virtue of having committed crimes, Villafafia told OPR she did not consider her role as seeking removal apart from actual prosecution.¶

Villafafia concluded her email to Leflcowitz by expressing disappointment that they were not “closer to resolving this than it appears that we are,” and offering to meet the next day to work on the agreement:¶

Can I suggest that tomorrow we either meet live or via teleconference, either with your client or having him within a quick phone call, to hash out these items? I was hoping to work only tr half day tomorrow to save my voice for Tuesday’s hearing . . necessary, but maybe we can set a time to meet. If you want “off campus” somewhere, that is fine. I will make sure th all the necessary decision makers present or “on call,”

¶

Villafafia told OPR that she offered to meet Lefkowitz away from the O because conducting negotiations via email was inefficient, and Villafafia wanted “t meeting where we sat down and just finalized things. And what I meant by off campus)s, es people feel better if you go to a neutral location” for a face-to-face meeting.¶

On the morning of Monday, September 17 e USAO supervisor who was taking over Lourie’s duties as manager of the West Pa office asked Villafafia for an update on the plea negotiations, and she forwarded to th ail she had sent to Lefkowitz the previous afternoon. Villafafia told the manager, “As o see … there are a number of things in their last draft that were unacceptable. All loo oles that I sewed up they tried to open.”¶

Shortly thereafter, Villaf e new manager, Acosta, and Lourie that she had just spoken with Lefkowitz, who ad sad pstein was leaning towards a plea to state charges under a non-prosecution agreement, s would be forwarding to Lefkowitz “our last version of the Non-Prosecution Agree t.” costa asked that Villafafia “make sure they know it[‘]s only a draft” and reminded her t he form and language may need polishing.” Villafafia responded, “Absolutely. The ere of of problems with their last attempt. They tried to re-open all the loopholes that I s ut.” Villafafia sent to Leflcowitz the draft NPA that she had provided to Lefcourt o e 11, 2007, noting that it was the “last version” and would “avoid [him] having to i e wheel.” She also updated the FBI case agents on the status of negotiations, noting that told her “chain of command … that we are still on for the [September] 25th [to brin ] …, no matter what.”¶

After receiving the draft NPA, Lefkowitz asked Villafafia to provide for his review a factual proffer for a federal obstruction of justice charge, and, with respect to the NPA option, asked, “[I]f¶

{sup}114According to the case agents, the West Palm Beach FBI office had an ICE agent working with them at the beginning of the federal investigation, and the ICE agent normally would have looked into the immigration status of any foreign national, but neither cast agent recalled any immigration issue regarding any of the Epstein employees.¶

{sup}115Lefkowitz was based in New York City but traveled to Miami in connection with the case.¶

we go that route, would you intend to make the deferred [sic] prosecution agreement public?” Villafaña replied that while a federal plea agreement would be part of the court file and publicly accessible, the NPA “would not be made public or filed with the Court, but it would remain part of our case file. It probably would be subject to a FOIA [Freedom of Information Act] request, but it is not something that we would distribute without compulsory process.”{sup}116 Villafaña told OPR that she believed Epstein did not want the NPA to be made public because he “did not want people to believe him to have committed a variety of crimes.” As she explained to OPR, Villafaña believed the NPA did not need to be disclosed in its entirety, but she anticipated notifying the victims about the NPA provisions relating to their ability to recover damages.¶

E. The Parties Appear to Reach Agreement on a Plea to Federal Charges¶

Negotiations continued the next day, Tuesday, September 18, 2007. Responding to Villafaña’s revised draft of the NPA, Lefkowitz suggested that Epstein plead to one federal charge with a 12-month sentence, followed by one year of supervised release with a requirement for home detention and two years of state probation, with the first six months of the state sentence to be served under community control. Villafaña replied, “I know that the U.S. Attorney will not go below 18 months of prison/jail time (and I would strongly oppose the suggestion).” Shortly thereafter, Villafaña emailed Acosta, Lourie, and the incoming West Palm Beach manager:¶

Hi all – I think that we may be near the end of our negotiations with Mr. Epstein, and not because we have reached a resolution. As I mentioned yesterday, I spent about 12 hours over the weekend drafting Informations, changing plea agreements, and writing factual proffers. I was supposed to receive a draft agreement from them yesterday, which never arrived. At that time, they were leaning towards pleading only to state charges and doing all of the time in state custody.¶

Late last night I talked to Jay Lefkowitz who asked about Epstein pleading to two twelve-month federal charges with half of his jail time being spent in home confinement pursuant to the guidelines. I told him that I had no objection to that approach but, in the interest of full disclosure, I did not believe that Mr. Epstein would be eligible because he will not be in Zone A or B.{sup}117 This morning Jay Lefkowitz called and said that I was correct but, if we could get Mr. Epstein down to 14 months, then he thought he would be eligible.¶

My response: have him plead to two separate Informations. On the first one he gets 12 months’ imprisonment and on the second he gets¶

{sup}116 FOIA requires disclosure of government records upon request unless an exemption applies permitting the government to withhold the requested records. See 5 U.S.C. § 552.¶

{sup}117 Sentences falling within Zones A or B of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines permit probation or confinement alternatives to imprisonment.¶

twelve months, with six served in home confinement, to run consecutively.¶

I just received an e-mail asking if Mr. Epstein could just do 12 months imprisonment instead.¶

As you can see, Mr. Epstein is having second thoughts about doing jail time. I would like to send Jay Lefkowitz an e-mail stating that if we do not have a signed agreement by tomorrow at 5:00, negotiations will end. I have selected tomorrow at 5:00 because it gives them enough time to really negotiate an agreement if they serious about it, and if not, it gives me one day before the Je holiday to get [prepared] for Tuesday . [September 25] , plan to [file charges], and it gives the office sufficient time the indictment package.¶

Do you concur?¶

A few minutes later, the incoming West Palm Beach iled Lourie, suggesting that Londe “talk to Epstein and close the deal.”118¶

Within moments, Lourie replied to the man had just spoken with Lefkowitz and agreed “to with nonbinding recommendation for 18 mo offenses, including against minor, registra confinement.” By reply email, Villaftul they spoke. copy to Villafafta, reporting that he obstruction[] charges (24 month cap) [Epstein] gets out, he has to plead to state en take one year house arrest/community rie to call her, but there is no record of whether¶

F. Defense Couns the Federal Ple ew Proposals Substantially Changing the Terms of ement, which the USAO Rejects¶

Approximately arl Lefkowitz, Leflcowi sent believed he and in a 16-mont home dete USA° fro after Lourie’s email reporting the deal he had reached with illafafta a revised draft plea agreement. Despite the agreement Lourie owitz ad reached that morning, Leflcowitz’s proposal would have resulted ence followed by 8 months of supervised release served in the form of flcowitz also inserted a statement in his proposal explicitly prohibiting the ing, initiating, or encouraging immigration authorities to institute immigration inst two of Epstein’s female assistants. t¶

Villafafta circulated the defense’s proposed plea agreement to Lourie and two other supervisors, and expressed frustration that the new defense version incorporated terms that were “completely different from what Jay just told Andy they would agree to.” Villafafta also pointed out that the defense “wants us to recommend an improper calculation” of the sentencing guidelines¶

{sup}&quot; 8 The manager told OPR that he probably meant this as a joke because in his view the continued back-andforth communications with defense counsel “was ridiculous,” and the only way to “get this deal done” might be to have a direct conversation with Epstein.¶

and had added language waiving the preparation of a presentence investigation (PSI) “so he can keep all of his information confidential. I have already told Jay that the PSI language … was unacceptable to our office.” Of even greater significance, in a follow-up email, Villafaña noted that the defense had removed both the requirement that Epstein plead to a registrable offense and the entire provision relating to monetary damages under 18 U.S.C. § 2255.¶

In the afternoon, Villafaña circulated her own proposed “hybrid” plea agreement, first internally to the management team with a note stating that it “contains the 18/12 split that Jay and Andy agreed to,” and then to Lefkowitz. Regarding the prosecution of other individuals, she included the following provision: “This agreement resolves the federal criminal liability of the defendant and any co-conspirators in the Southern District of Florida growing out of any criminal conduct by those persons known to the [USAO] as of the date of this plea agreement,” including but not limited to the conspiracy to solicit minors to engage in prostitution.¶

In her email to Lefkowitz, transmitting the plea agreement, Villafaña wrote:¶

Could you share the attached draft with your colleagues. It is in keeping with what Andy communicated to me was the operative “deal.” The U.S. Attorney hasn’t had a chance to review all of the language, but he agrees with it in principle.¶

… .¶

[The West Palm Beach manager] and I will both be available at 2:00… . One of my suggestions is going to be (again) that we all sit down together in the same room, including Barry [Krischer] and/or Lanna [Belohlavek], so we can hash out the still existing issues and get a signed document.¶

Villafaña also emailed Acosta directly, telling him she planned to meet with Epstein’s attorneys to work on the plea agreement, and asking if Acosta would be available to provide final approval. Acosta replied, “I don’t think I should be part of negotiations. I’d rather leave it to you if that’s ok.” Acosta told OPR that “absent truly exceptional circumstances,” he believed it was important for him “to not get involved” in negotiations, and added, “You can meet, like I did in September, [to] reaffirm the position of the office, [and] back your AUSA, but ultimately, I think your trial lawyer needs discretion to do their job.” Villafaña told OPR, however, that she did not understand Acosta to be giving her discretion to conduct the negotiations as she saw fit; rather, she believed Acosta did not want to engage in face-to-face negotiations because “he wanted to have an appearance of having sort of an arm’s length from the deal.”{sup}119 Villafaña replied to Acosta’s¶

{sup}119 As noted throughout the Report, Villafaña’s interpretation of her supervisors’ motivations for their actions often differed from the supervisors’ explanations for their actions. Because it involved subjective interpretations of individuals’ motivations, OPR does not reach conclusions regarding the subjects’ differing views but includes them as an indication of the communication issues that hindered the prosecution team. See Chapter Two, Part Three, Section V.E.¶

message, “That is fine. [The West Palm Beach manager] and I will nail everything down, we just want to get a final blessing.”¶

Negotiations continued throughout the day on Wednesday, September 19, 2007, with Villafaña and Lefkowitz exchanging emails regarding the factual proffer for a plea and the scheduling of a meeting to finalize the plea agreement’s terms. During that exchange, Villafaña made clear to Lefkowitz that the time for negotiating was reaching an end:¶

I hate to have to be firm about this, but we need to wrap this up by Monday. I will not miss my [September 25 charging] date when this has dragged on for several weeks already and then, if things fall apart, be left in a less advantageous position than before the negotiations. I have had an 82-page pros memo and 53-page indictment sitting on the shelf since May to engage in these negotiations. There has to be an ending date, and that date is Monday.¶

Early that afternoon, Lourie—who was participating in the week’s negotiations from his new post at the Department in Washington, D.C.—asked Villafaña to furnish him with the last draft of the plea agreement she had sent to defense counsel, and she provided him with the “18/12 split” draft she had sent to Lefkowitz the prior afternoon. After reviewing that draft, Lourie told Villafaña it was a “[g]ood job” but he questioned certain provisions, including whether the USAO’s agreement to suspend the investigation and hold all legal process in abeyance should be in the plea agreement. Villafaña told Lourie that she had added that paragraph at the “insistence” of the defense, and opined, “I don’t think it hurts us.” Villafaña explained to OPR that she held this view because “Alex and people above me had already made the decision that if the case was resolved we weren’t going to get the computer equipment.”¶

At 3:44 p.m. that afternoon, Lefkowitz emailed a “redline” version of the federal plea agreement showing his new revisions, and noted that he was “also working on a deferred [sic] prosecution agreement because it may well be that we cannot reach agreement here.” The defense redline version required Epstein to plead guilty to a federal information charging two misdemeanor counts of attempt to intentionally harass a person to prevent testimony, the pending state indictment charging solicitation of prostitution, and a state information charging one count of coercing a person to become a prostitute, in violation of Florida Statute § 796.04 (without regard to age). Neither of the proposed state offenses required sexual offender registration. Epstein would serve an 18-month sentence and a concurrent 60 months on probation on the state charges. The redline version again deleted the provisions relating to damages under 18 U.S.C. § 2255 and replaced it with the provision requiring creation of a trust administered by the state court. It retained language proposed by Villafaña, providing that the plea agreement “resolves the federal criminal liability of the defendant and any co-conspirators in the Southern District of Florida growing out of any criminal conduct by those persons known to the [USAO] as of the date of this plea agreement,” but also re-inserted the provision promising not to prosecute Epstein’s assistants and the statement prohibiting the USAO from requesting, initiating, or encouraging immigration proceedings. It also included a provision stating the government’s agreement to forgo a presentence investigation and a promise by the government to suspend the investigation and withdraw all pending legal process.¶

G. Villafafia and Lourie Recommend Ending Negotiations, but Acosta Urges That They “Try to Work It Out”¶

In the late afternoon of Wednesday, September 19, 2007, Villafafia expressed her increasing frustration to her supervisors. She emailed the defense redline version of the plea agreement to Lourie and the incoming West Palm Beach manager, identifying all of the provisions she had “specifically discussed with [the defense team] and rejected, that they have re-inserted into the agreement.” (Emphasis in original). Villafafia opined, “This is NOT good faith negotiations.” Lourie responded that he would “reach out to Alex to discuss.”¶

Lourie immediately emailed Acosta the following:¶

I looked at the latest draft from Jay [Lefkowitz] and I mus with M. Based on my own conversations with him, hi out of left field. He claims to orally agree to our sends us a document that is the opposite. I suggest sim ly tell him that his counter offer is rejected and that whin move forward with our case.¶

Acosta replied:¶

Why don’t we just call him. Tell hi¶

• I. You agree, and then c I
• 2. That’s not accep , and3is in bad faith. Stop it or we’ll indict.
• 3. Try tow

It seems that we ose, and it[‘]s worth trying to overcome what has to be p … annoying negotiating tactics.¶

Acosta explained OPR tittRt he recognized,¶

n gotiation was a pain, but if it was the right position, the fact ou’ve got annoying counsel on the other side doesn’t it make it ess of a right position. You tell them stop being annoying, you try to work it out, and if not, then you indict.¶

In response to Acosta’s instruction, Lourie responded, “Ok will do.” He also forwarded to Acosta the latest version of the USAO draft “hybrid” plea agreement that Villafafia had sent to Lefkowitz the previous day, which Lourie had requested and obtained from Villafafia earlier that afternoon.¶

Meanwhile, Villafafia sent to Lourie and his successor West Palm Beach manager a draft message she proposed to send to Letkowitz with her objections to the defense revisions, explaining, “I know that you keep saying he is going to plead, and he will plead if we cave on¶

everything, but I really do not think that Mr. Epstein is going to engage in serious negotiations until he sees the Indictment and shows up in mag [federal magistrate judge] court.” She suggested charging Epstein on a federal conspiracy charge, and if he refused to plead to that offense, superseding with additional charges and going to trial. She complained that after seven weeks of negotiations, “we are just spinning our wheels.” Her proposed email to Lefkowitz detailed all of the objectionable provisions in his draft, and concluded, “If you or your client insists on these, there can be no plea agreement.”¶

H. Acosta Edits the Federal Plea Agreement, and Villafaña Sends a Final Version to the Defense¶

The next day, Thursday, September 20, 2007, Villafaña emailed Assistant State Attorney Belohlavek and informed her:¶

Our deadline is Monday evening for a signed agreement and arraignment in the federal system. At this time, things don’t look promising anyway, but I will keep you posted. In their latest draft, they changed what they agreed to plead to in the state from solicitation of minors for prostitution (a registrable offense) to forcing adults into prostitution (a non-registrable offense). We will not budge on this issue, so it is looking unlikely that we will reach a mutually acceptable agreement. If that changes, I will let you know.¶

Acosta sent Lourie “[s]ome thoughts” about the USAO version of the proposed “hybrid” federal plea agreement he had received from Lourie the evening before, commenting that “it seems very straightforward” and “we are not changing our standard charging language” for the defense.{sup}120 Noting that the draft was prepared for his signature, Acosta told Lourie that he did not typically sign plea agreements and “this should not be the first,” adding that the USAO “should only go forward if the trial team supports and signs this agreement.”{sup}121 Lourie forwarded the email to Villafaña with a transmittal message simply reading, “I think Alex’s changes are all good ones. Please try to incorporate his suggestions, change the signature block to your name and send as final to Jay.” Lourie also noted to Acosta and Villafaña that he believed the defense would want to go back to the initial offer of a state plea with a non-prosecution agreement. When Villafaña sent the revised plea agreement to Lefkowitz later that afternoon, she advised him that if the defense wanted to return to the original offer of a state plea only, the draft NPA she had sent to him on September 17, 2007, would control.¶

{sup}120 The USAO had standard federal plea agreement language, from which this “hybrid” plea agreement had substantially diverged.¶

{sup}121 The standard procedure was for documents such as plea agreements to be signed by an AUSA under the name of the U.S. Attorney. In his OPR interview, Acosta further explained that wanted to give “the trial team” an opportunity to voice any objections because “if it’s something they don’t feel comfortable with we … shouldn’t go forward with it.”¶

I. The Defense Rejects the Federal Plea Agreement, Returns to the NPA “State-Only” Resolution, and Begins Opposing the Sexual Offender Registration Requirement¶

After having spent days negotiating the federal charges to be included in a plea agreement, by the afternoon of September 20, 2007, the defense rejected the federal plea option, and the parties resumed negotiations over the details of an NPA calling for Epstein to plead to only state charges. Through multiple emails and attempts (some successful) to speak directly with Acosta and other supervisors, defense attorneys vigorously fought the USAO’s insistence that Epstein plead to a state charge requiring sexual offender registration.¶

After receiving the federal plea agreement, Lefkowitz spoke with Villafaña. She reported to Acosta and Lourie that Lefkowitz told her the defense was “back to doing the state-charges-only agreement” and wanted until the middle of the following week to work out the details, but that she had told defense counsel that “we need a signed agreement by tomorrow [Friday] or we are [filing charges] on Tuesday.”¶

Lefkowitz emailed Villafaña about the draft NPA that she had sent to him, pointing out that it called for a 20-month jail sentence followed by 10 months of community control, rather than 18 months in jail and 12 under community control, and to ask if the USAO had “any flexibility” on the § 2255 procedure. Villafaña responded:¶

The 18 and 12 has already been agreed to by our office, so that is not a problem. On the issue about 18 [U.S.C. §] 2255, we seem to be miles apart. Your most recent version not only had me binding the girls to a trust fund administered by the state court, but also promising that they will give up their [§] 2255 rights.¶

I reviewed the e-mail that I sent you on Sunday with the comments on some of your other changes. In the context of a non-prosecution agreement, the office may be more willing to be specific about not pursuing charges against others. However, as I stated on Sunday, the Office cannot and will not bind Immigration.¶

Also, your timetable will need to move up significantly. As [State Attorney] Barry [Krischer] said in our meeting last week, his office can put together a plea agreement, [and an] information, and get you all before the [state] judge on a change of plea within a day.¶

Villafaña alerted Krischer that evening that negotiations were “not going very well” and that defense counsel “changed their minds again, and they only want to plead to state charges, not concurrent state and federal.” She added, “If we cannot reach … an agreement, then I need to [charge] the case on Tuesday [September 25] and I will not budge from that date.”¶

In response to Villafaña’s report of her conversation with Lefkowitz about the defense preference for a “state-charges-only agreement,” Lourie alerted her that, “He wants to get out of [sexual offender] registration which we should not agree to.” Lourie emailed Acosta:¶

I think Jay [Lefkowitz] will try to talk you out of a registrable offense. Regardless of the merits of his argument, in order to get us down in time they made us an offer that included pleading to an offense against a minor (encouraging a minor into prostitution) and touted that we should be happy because it was registrable. For that reason alone, I don’t think we should consider allowing them to come down from their own offer, either on this issue or on time of incarceration.¶

Lefkowitz attempted to reach Acosta that night, but Acosta directed Villafafia return the call, and told Lourie that he did not want to open “a backchannel” with defense I. Lourie instructed Villafafia, “U can tell Play that [A]lex will not agree to a nonregistr ft o¶

On the morning of Friday, September 21, 2007, Villafafia email nforming him that “it looks like we will be [filing charges against] Mr. Epstein on rting that the charging package was being reviewed by the West Palm Beach man d asking if anyone in the Miami office needed to review it. Villafafia also alerted un she had spoken that morning to Lefkowitz, who “was waffling” about Epstein p a state charge that required sexual offender registration, and she noted that she woul th Krischer and Belohlavek “to make sure the defense doesn’t try to do an end run.”¶

That same morning, Epstein attorney Sanc hajhad not been involved in negotiations for several weeks, emailed Sloman, advising, ” finalize the plea deal and there is only one issue outstanding and [I] do not believe has read all the defense submissions that would assist in his determination on this pon resolution, we will be prepared to sign as soon as today.” From his out-of-to n, Sloman forwarded the email to Acost who replied, “Enjo[y] vacation. Wor arie on this.” Sloman also forwarded email to Lourie and asked, “Do what she’s talking about?” Lourie dr nded that “has not been in any Don’t even engage with yet another ao¶

J. The USA grees ot to Criminally Charge “Potential Co-Conspirators”¶

Lefkowitz, he $antime, sent Villafafia a revised draft NPA that proposed an 18-month sentence in the jail, followed by 12 months of community control, and restored the provision for t nd for disbursement to an agreed-upon list of individuals `who seek reimburse by ling suit pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2255.” This defense draft retained the provisir g not to criminally charge Epstein’s four female assistants and unnamed employ e specific Epstein-owned corporate entity, but also extended the provision to “any potential c onspirators” for any criminal charge arising from the ongoing federal investigation. This language had evolved from similar language that Villafafia had included in the USAO’s earlier proposed draft federal plea agreement.’ Lefkowitz also again included the sentence¶

The language in the USAO’s draft federal plea agreement stated, “This agrccmcnt resolves the federal criminal liability of the defendant and any co-conspirators in the Southern District of Florida growing out of any criminal conduct by those persons known to the [USAO] …”¶

precluding the government from requesting, initiating, or recommending immigration proceedings against the two assistants who were foreign nationals.¶

At this point, Leflcowitz again sought to speak to Acosta, who replied by email: “I am happy to talk. My caveat is that in the middle of negotiations, u try to avoid[] undermining my staff by allowing ‘interlocutor[]y’ appeals so to speak so I’d want [Marie on the call[.] I’ll have her set something up.”¶

Villafafta sent to Leflcowitz her own revised NPA, telling him it was her “attempt at combining our thoughts,” but it had not “been approved by the office yet.” She insert solicitation of minors to engage in prostitution, a registrable offense, as the charge to whic em would plead guilty; proposed a joint recommendation for a 30-month sentence, divi to months in the county jail and 12 months of community control; and amended t 5 provision.123 Villafafta’s revision retained the provision suspending the investigatio an ding all legal process in abeyance, and she incorporated the non-prosecution provisioft while lightly altering it to apply to “any potential co-conspirator of Epstein, including” the four named assistants, and deleting mention of the corporate entity employees. Finall Vill a deleted mention of immigration proceedings, but advised in her transmittal emai e have not and don’t plan to ask immigration” proceedings to be initiated.124¶

Later that day, Villafafta alerted Lourie (who m Florida from Washington, D.C. early that afternoon) and the new West Palm Beac g copying her first-line supervisor and co-counsel) that she had included language e counsel had requested “regarding promises not to prosecute other people,” an ed, “I don’t think it hurts us.” There is no documentation that Lourie, the West Pal ac nager, or anyone else expressed disagreement with Villafafia’s assessment. Rather, ew minutes, Villafaila re-sent her email, adding that defense counsel was persisting c g an immigration waiver in the agreement, to which Lourie responded, “No way. We u at sort of thing in a plea agreement.” Villafarla replied to Lourie, indicating she wo d p at along to defense counsel and adding, “Any other thoughts?” When Lourie gave er response, Villafaha informed defense counsel that Lourie had rejected the propos migration language.¶

OPR quest ubjects about the USAO’s agreement not to prosecute “any potential co-conspirators.” tie did not recall why the USAO agreed to it, but he speculated that he left that provisio A because he believed at the time that it benefited the government in some way. In Lourie conjectured that the promise not to prosecute “any potential co-co t protected victims who had recruited others and thus potentially were co-consp tors in Epstein’s scheme. Lourie also told OPR, “I bet the answer was that we weren’t going to ch rge” Epstein’s accomplices, because Acosta “didn’t really want to charge Epstein” in¶

{sup}123Villafana noted that she had consulted with a USAO employee who was a “former corporate counsel from a hospital” about the § 2255 language, and thought that the revised language “addresses the concern about having an unlimited number of claimed victims, without me trying to bind girls who I do not represent.”¶

{sup}124 Villafana gave OPR an explanation similar to that given by the case agents—that an ICE Special Agent had been involved in the early stages of the federal investigation of Epstein, and Villafana believed the agent knew two of Epstein’s female assistants were foreign nationals and would have acted appropriately on that information. Villafana also said that the USAO generally did not get involved in immigration issues.¶

federal court. Sloman similarly said that he had the impression that the non-prosecution provision was meant to protect named co-conspirators who were also victims, “in a sense,” of Epstein’s conduct. Although later press coverage of the Epstein case focused on Epstein’s connection to prominent figures and suggested that the non-prosecution provision protected these individuals, Sloman told OPR that it never occurred to him that the reference to potential co-conspirators was directed toward any of the high-profile individuals who were at the time or subsequently linked with Epstein.’ Acosta did not recall the provision or any discussions about it. He speculated that if he read the non-prosecution provision, he likely assumed that Villafafia and Lourie had “thought this through” and “addressed it for a reason.” The West Palm Beach manager, who had only limited involvement at this stage, told OPR that the provision was “highly un 1,” and he had “no clue why the USAO agreed to it.¶

Villafafia told OPR that, apart from the women named in the NP Ac vestigation , had not developed evidence of “any other potential co-conspirators. So, . . wouldn’t be prosecuting anybody else, so why not include it? … I just didn’t think that ere was anybody that it would cover.” She conceded, however, that she “did not catchijle fact that it could be read as broadly as people have since read it.”¶

/Ths K. The USAO Rejects Defense Efforts jo Eliminate the Sexual Offender Registration Requirement¶

On the afternoon of Friday, September , State Attorney Krischer informed Villafafia that Epstein’s counsel had contact Epstein was ready to agree “to all the terms” of the NPA—except for sexual off er stration. According to Krischer, defense counsel had proposed that registration be nd that Epstein register only if state or federal law enforcement felt, at any point d ervice of the sentence, that he needed to do so. Krischer noted that he had “reach costa about this proposal but had not heard back from him. Villafafia responded, x is calling you now.” Villafafia told OPR that, to her knowledge, Acosta called Kri er to t • him that registration was not a negotiable term. t26¶

Later that afters Villa afia emailed Krischer for information about the amount of “gain time” Epstein would earn p te prison. Villafaiia explained in her email that she wanted to include a provisio the A specifying that Epstein “will actually be in jail at least a certain number of days o ake sure he doesn’t try to ‘convince’ someone with the Florida prison authorities to m t early.” Krischer responded that under the proposal as it then stood, Epstein w 1 15 months. He also told Villafafia that a plea to a registrable offense would not pre n from serving his time “at the stockade”—the local minimum security detention facility.¶

{sup}125 Sloman also pointed out that the NPA was not a “global resolution” and other co-conspirators could have been prosecuted “by any other [U.S. Attorney’s] office in the country.”¶

{sup}126Krischer told OPR that he did not recall meeting or having interactions with Acosta regarding the Epstein case or any other matter.¶

{sup}12/ The State Attorney concluded his email: “Glad we could get this worked out for reasons I won’t put in writing. After this is resolved I would love to buy you a cup at Starbucks and have a conversation.” Villafarla responded, “Sounds great.” When asked about this exchange during her OPR interview, Villafafla said: “Everybody¶

At some point that day, Acosta spoke with Lefkowitz by phone regarding the need for Epstein to plead to a registrable offense. Throughout the weekend, with Villafafia’s Monday deadline looming, defense counsel ressed hard to eliminate the sexual offender requirement. On Saturday, September 22, 2007, sent a series of emails to Lourie. In the first, she provided details from a press report about a Florida public official who the previous day had pled guilty to child sex abuse charges and was sentenced to a term of probation. She noted that she “spoke to Matt [Menchel]” and asked Lourie to call her. Two hours later she sent Lourie a second, lengthy email, strongly objecting to the registration requirement, and outlining “all arguments against registration [as a sexual offender] in this case.” In this email, claimed that there had been a “miscommunication” during the September 12, 2007 meeting, and that “we only to the solicitation with minors because we believed and [Krischer] and [Belohlavek] c ed it was NOT registrable.” complained that lifetime sexual offender registration was a “life sentence” that was “uncalled for:’ “does not make sense,” and was “in ro e” to impose “simply [because] the FBI wants it, in return for all there [sic] efforts.% Sh 1 sted numerous reasons why Epstein should not have to register, including his lack o a pnor cord or history of sexual offenses; the lack of any danger of recidivism; the ease with ich to could be “tracked” without registering; and that it would be “virtuallbssible t. p with four separate state registration requirements. A few minutes later, sen rt’s phone number to Lourie “in case you want to speak to him directly.”¶

In another email sent less than two hours lat because “you are a very fair person. This resolu • result of a misunderstanding at a meeting.” S emphasized their goal of 18 months in a f offense precluded” a camp designation. inconsistent with that primary goal o meeting.” concluded, ”[ eventually be proud of. Please S ch told Lourie she was writing again ?the Epstein case is not reasonable. [1]t is a at Epstein’s attorneys had “consistently and “[e]veryone knew that a registemble dded, “Therefore it would have been wholly ‘s] safety to lightly concede to registration at that life sentence on him is not something anyone will nd help me get a fair result.”¶

Lourie responded to non emails, but he did reach out to Acosta for a phone conversation. By email l t night, at 10:26 p.m., Lefkowitz asked Lourie to phone him.¶

The next to “follow up on Epstein plea at the Sep itz emailed Acosta—with copies to Sloman, Lourie, and Villafafia versation Friday,” asking Acosta again to reconsider the requirement that g ble offense. Lefkowitz wrote that there had been a “misunderstanding” , 2007 meeting:¶

efore the meeting, Mr. Krischer and Ms. Belohlavek, a sex prosecutor for 13 years, told us that solicitation of a minor … is not a registerable offense. However, as it turned out, [it] is a registerable offense and our discussion at the meeting was based on a mistaken assumption. We suggest that Mr. Epstein enter two pleas—one to the Indictment and a second to a non-registerable charge.

¶

has offered to buy me a cup of coffee. i have had coffee with no one.” Krischer told OPR that the “reasons” to which he referred related to the pressure he had been getting from Chief Reiter about the Epstein case.¶

Lefkowitz set forth arguments similar to those had presented to Lourie, as to why registration “based on the facts alleged in this case … simply does not make sense.” In the event that Acosta did not agree to their proposed charges, Lefkowitz offered as an alternative “to stipulate that the state offense” would “constitute a prior sexual offense for purposes of enhanced recidivist sentencing” should Epstein ever again commit a federal sex offense against minors. As Lefkowitz further argued, “By accepting this option, you would be substituting the certainty of recidivist sentencing for the humiliation of registration.” Emails reflect that, early that afternoon, Acosta, Lourie, and Villafafia discussed the matter in a conference call.¶

Lefkowitz also sent a revised version of the NPA to Villafafta that omitted id ification of the charge to which Epstein would plead guilty. Later that day, Lefkowitz email sta:¶

I got a call from [M]arie who said you had rejected our propo Does that mean you are not even prepared to have [Epstein omiiii now to plead to the registerable offense near the end of J 1 math sentence and then be sentenced to 12 month[s] corn for that charge? I thought that was exactly w t [F]riday (although you wanted, but were not kind of federal charge).

¶

But that still gives you a registerable and 18 in jail. 30 months total,

¶

How can that not satisfy you not unduly endangered in jai ensuring that [E]pstein is

¶

Acosta responded, “I do not mean AUSAs assigned to the case.” they had “discretion to procee and she emailed Acosta to than t, but our negotiations must take place with the that he had spoken with Lourie and Villafafta, and lieve just and appropriate.” Acosta copied Villafafta, for the support.”¶

L. The Defends a Confidentiality Clause¶

Through Villafafia, an and Villaf first time, unday evening, Lefkowitz had numerous email exchanges with a conference call with Lourie (who was returning to Washington, D.C.) that evening, Lefkowitz sent Villafafia a new version of the NPA that, for the a confidentiality term:¶

It is the intention of the parties to this Agreement that it not be disseminated or disclosed except pursuant to court order. In the event the Government must disclose this Agreement in response to a request pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, the Government agrees to provide Epstein notice before the disclosure of this Agreement.

¶

After making additional revisions, Villafafia sent this NPA to Acosta and Lourie as the “final” version, asking Acosta to let her know what he thought of it. Among her revisions, she changed the confidentiality provision to the following:¶

The parties anticipate that this agreement will not be made part of any public record. If the United States receives a Freedom of Information Act request or any compulsory process commanding the disclosure of the agreement, it will provide notice to Epstein before making that disclosurein¶

VII. SEPTEMBER 24, 2007: ACOSTA MAKES FINAL EDITS, AND THE NPA IS SIGNED¶

The contemporaneous emails show that Villafafia continued to update Acosta the parties negotiated the final language and that Acosta reviewed and edited the NPA. Shortl midnight on Monday, September 24, 2007, Acosta sent Villafafia “[s]mall edits” to the ” she had sent to him. Among his changes was language modifying provisions that to require the State Attorney’s Office or the state court to take specific actions, such g that Epstein enter his guilty plea by a certain date. Acosta explained in his emai comfortable with requiring the State Attorney to enter into a [joint sentencing] reco en tion” or “requiring a State court to stick with our timeline” for entry of the guilty p tenting. Accordingly, Acosta substituted language that required Epstein alo to ake a binding sentencing recommendation to the state court, and required Epstein to t efforts” to enter his guilty plea and be sentenced by the specified dates. Acosta als t Villafalia to restore a reference to Epstein’s wish “to reach a global resolution of his t eral criminal liabilities.” Lourie, who had returned to the Department in Was .C., had a phone conversation with Lefkowitz and sent additional comments on th to Acosta and Villafafia. Villafafia sent a new revision, incorporating edits from Ac an urie, to Lefkowitz later that morning.¶

On the afternoon of Septem the NPA to Acosta, Sloman, Louri signed agreement. After Lefko signed by Epstein, she emailed and emailed the signed agreeme Villafafia circulated the new “final” version of er supervisors, and asked Lefkowitz to send her the nically transmitted to Villafafia a copy of the NPA late supervisor and her co-counsel: “They have scanned is done.”¶

In his transmittal i?*a , Lefkowitz asked Villafafia to “[p]lease do whatever you can to keep this from bec g p lic.” Villafafia responded:¶

ha ye rwarded your message only to Alex, Andy, and [the West Beach manager]. I don’t anticipate it going any further than . When I receive the originals, I will sign and return one copy o you. The other will be placed in the case file, which will be kept confidential since it also contains identifying information about the girls.

¶

When we reach an agreement about the attorney representative for the girls, we can discuss what I can tell him and the girls about the

¶

In In commenting on OPR’s draft report, Laurie observed that because the NPA contained names of uncharged co-conspirators and other protected information, the USAO would have a duty to redact the information before disclosing the NPA.¶

agreement. I know that Andy promised Chief Reiter an update when a resolution was achieved… . [The West Palm Beach manager] is calling, but [he] knows not to tell Chief Reiter about the money issue, just about what crimes Mr. Epstein is pleading guilty to and the amount of time that has been agreed to. [He] also is telling Chief Reiter not to disclose the outcome to anyone.¶

OPR questioned Villafaña about this email. She explained that she generally kept confidential the terms of the resolution of any case. She understood that “the way that the [Epstein] case was resolved” needed to remain confidential, but the victims could be informed about what happened because by the NPA’s terms, they needed to know what the agreement was about.¶

Villafaña emailed the West Palm Beach manager, asking him to tell PBPD Chief Reiter “the good news” but “leave out the part about damages,” and explained that she wanted to meet with the victims herself to explain how the damages provision would work. Villafaña also told him that Lourie had asked that Reiter share information about the NPA only with the PBPD Detective who had led the state investigation of Epstein.{sup}129 Villafaña forwarded to Acosta, Lourie, and the West Palm Beach manager Lefkowitz’s email asking that the USAO try to keep the NPA from becoming public. Acosta responded that the agreement “already binds us not to make public except as required by law under [the Freedom of Information Act],” and asked, “[W]hat more does he want?” Villafaña replied, “My guess is that if we tell anyone else (like the police chief or FBI or the girls), that we ask them not to disclose.” Soon thereafter, Acosta emailed Lourie, Villafaña, and the West Palm Beach manager to set up a call to discuss “who we tell and how much,” adding, “Nice job with a difficult negotiation.”¶

The final NPA, as signed by Epstein, his attorneys Lefcourt and [REDACTED], and Villafaña, contained the following pertinent provisions:¶

Charges: Epstein would plead guilty to the pending Palm Beach County indictment, plus one count of solicitation of minors to engage in prostitution, a registrable offense.¶

Sentence: The parties would make a joint, binding recommendation for a 30-month sentence divided as follows: consecutive terms of 12 months and 6 months in the county jail, without opportunity for withholding adjudication or sentencing and without community control or probation, followed by 12 months of community control, consecutive.{sup}130¶

Damages: As long as the identified victims proceeded exclusively under 18 U.S.C. § 2255, Epstein would not contest federal court jurisdiction or the victims’ status as victims. The USAO would provide to Epstein a list of individuals¶

{sup}129 The West Palm Beach manager told OPR that he called Chief Reiter, who was “fine” with the outcome.¶

{sup}130 Withholding adjudication or sentencing referred to a special sentence in which the judge orders probation but does not formally convict the defendant of a criminal offense. See Fla. Stat. § 948.01 (2007).¶

it had identified as victims.13t The USAO, with the good faith approval of Epstein’s counsel, would select an attorney representative for the victims, whom Epstein would pay.¶

Timing: Epstein would make his best efforts to enter his guilty plea and be sentenced by October 26, 2007. The USAO had no objection to Epstein self-reporting to begin serving his sentence by January 4, 2008.¶

Immunity: co-conspirator of Epstein,” including four named personal ass’ ants. The USAO would not initiate criminal charges against “any potential¶

Other: Epstein was obligated to undertake discussions with ate orney’s Office to ensure compliance with this agreement.¶

Epstein waived his right to appeal.¶

Epstein agreed that he would not be afforded gain time or other rights, opportunities other inmate. nefits with respect to nefits not available to any¶

The federal investigation would s ed and all pending legal process held in abeyance unless pstein violated any term of the agreement. Evidence ’ es y r directly related to” the pending legal process, “including ce ter equipment,” would be kept inviolate until all the NPA t b satisfied.¶

Breach: The USAO wo ired to notify Epstein of any alleged breach of the agreement days of the expiration of the term of home confine ould be required to initiate prosecution within 60 days thereaft¶

Disclosure: Th ies “anticipate[d]” that the agreement would not be made part of any b lc record, and if the USAO received a Freedom of Information Act requ t or compulsory process commanding disclosure of the agreement, it uld provide notice to Epstein before making any disclosure.”2¶

g, Lefkowitz emailed Lourie to express concern about the notification he unde Id be given to Chief Reiter, stating, “I am very concerned about leaks unduly prejudicin effrey [Epstein] in the media.""3 He added, “I have enjoyed working with you on¶

{sup}&quot; I The USAO had not informed the defense of the victims’ identities at this point. The parties anticipated that the USAO would send Epstein’s attorneys a list of victims when Epstein fulfilled his obligation under the NPA to enter his state guilty pleas.¶

{sup}132The final NPA is attached as Exhibit 3 to this Report.¶

{sup}133On October 3, 2007, the Miami FBI media officer notified the USAO that the New York Post had reported that federal authorities were not going to pursue federal charges against Epstein. According to the Post’, Epstein would plead guilty to soliciting underage prostitutes, “in a deal that will send him to prison for about 18 months,” followed by “a shorter period of house confinement,” and, according to “sources,” federal authorities had “agreed to drop their¶

this matter.” Lourie responded with an assurance that the Reiter notification was only “so he does not find out about it in the paper,” and he concluded: “I enjoyed it as well. Mr. Epstein was fortunate to have such excellent representation.”¶

VIII. POST-NPA NEGOTIATIONS¶

Almost immediately after the NPA was signed, conflicts arose about its terms, and the difficult negotiation process began anew. The USAO quickly realized that there were numerous issues concerning the monetary damages provision that were not resolved in the NPA, and the parties differed in their interpretations of the § 2255 provision, in particular the role and duties of the attorney representative for the victims. As negotiations regarding the damages provision continued, the defense was able to delay having Epstein enter his guilty plea in state court.¶

A. September – October 2007: Sloman’s Concerns about Selection of an Attorney Representative Lead to a Proposed NPA Addendum¶

The first controversy centered on the appointment of an attorney representative for the victims. Initially, Villafaña reached out to a private attorney who was one of several suggested to her for that role. Villafaña notified Lefkowitz that she was recommending the attorney to serve as the victims’ representative and suggested a phone conference to discuss what information the USAO could disclose to the attorney about the case. Villafaña told Lefkowitz that she had never met the attorney, but he had been recommended by “a good friend in our appellate section” and by one of the district judges in Miami.{sup}134 Over the next few days, Villafaña exchanged messages with the attorney about the possibility of his serving as the attorney representative. She also exchanged emails with Lefkowitz, passing along procedural questions raised by the attorney.¶

By this time, Lourie had fully transitioned to his detail at the Department’s Criminal Division. Sloman, who had been on vacation during the week the NPA was finalized, returned to the office, reviewed the final agreement, and immediately expressed his disapproval of the provision authorizing the USAO to select an attorney representative for the victims, which he believed might raise the appearance of a conflict of interest. Instead, he proposed that a special [REDACTED] make the selection. Although evidently frustrated by Sloman’s belated proposal, Villafaña conveyed to Lefkowitz the suggestion that a special [REDACTED] be appointed to select the attorney representative, rather than having the USAO make the selection.{sup}135 She provided Lefkowitz with¶

probe into possible federal criminal violations in exchange for the guilty plea to the new state charge, with the understanding that he will do prison time.” Dan Mangan, “Unhappy Ending’ Plea Deal—Moneyman to Get Jail For Teen Sex [REDACTED]sages,” New York Post, Oct. 1, 2007. ABC News later reported that federal charges “could carry more substantial prison time. Now, Epstein’s high-powered lawyers, including Kenneth Starr, … may try to get him out of registering as a sex offender …” Scott Michels, “Money Manager Said to Plan to Plead Guilty to Prostitution Charges: Jeffrey Epstein may serve about 18 months in prison for soliciting prostitutes,” ABC News, Oct. 11, 2007.¶

{sup}134 The “good friend” was an AUSA whom Villafaña was dating. The defense subsequently raised this as a misconduct issue, alleging that Villafaña was “closely associated” with the individual nominated for the victims’ representative position.¶

{sup}135 In a separate email to the proposed attorney representative, Villafaña commented, “[O]f course they tell me this now.”¶

a proposal regarding the special [REDACTED] responsibilities, along with a draft letter to send to the special [REDACTED] explaining the procedure for selecting an attorney representative.¶

Lefkowitz objected to this proposal in a letter to Villafaña, pointing out that the NPA did not provide for the appointment of a special [REDACTED]. More importantly, Lefkowitz used the discussion of the special [REDACTED] as an opening to press for other alterations to the language of the NPA or, at least, to its interpretation. Focusing on the attorney representative, Lefkowitz argued that the attorney’s role should be viewed as limited to negotiating settlements and that the attorney was precluded from filing lawsuits on behalf of victims who could not reach a negotiated settlement with Epstein. Lefkowitz proposed:¶

[T]he selected attorney should evaluate the claims of each identified individual, negotiate a total fund amount with Mr. Epstein, then distribute the monies based on the strength of each case. For those identified individuals who elect not to settle with Mr. Epstein, they may proceed on their own, but by doing so, they would not be suing under § 2255 as contemplated by [the NPA] and therefore may not continue to be represented by the selected attorney.¶

Lefkowitz also objected to Villafaña’s draft letter to the special [REDACTED], asserting that it was essential for the defense to participate in crafting a “mutually acceptable communication” to the victims. Going further, Lefkowitz claimed that any contact between the USAO and the victims about the § 2255 provision would violate the agreement’s confidentiality provision. Lefkowitz admonished the government not to contact the victims “to inform them of the resolution of the case, including [the] appointment of the selected attorney and the settlement process.”¶

Villafaña forwarded Lefkowitz’s letter to Sloman, complaining that the defense interpretation of the § 2255 procedure violated the clear language of the NPA and asking, “Can I please just indict him [Epstein]?” Days later, [REDACTED] emailed Sloman, and then sent a follow-up letter, asking that Sloman “help resolve” the issue regarding the attorney representative’s role, and arguing that Epstein had never intended by signing the NPA to promise to pay fees for the victims’ civil lawsuits in the event a settlement could not be reached. When Villafaña explained to Sloman her views on Sanchez’s arguments, Sloman responded, “I suggest that you communicate your proposal back to [Sanchez]. The more ‘voices’ they hear the more wedges they try to drive between us.” Villafaña agreed, noting that “[t]here are so many of them over there, I am afraid we are getting triple-teamed.”{sup}136¶

Villafaña sent [REDACTED] a letter regarding the roles of the special [REDACTED] and attorney representative. The next day, October 10, 2007, Lefkowitz sent a six-page letter to Acosta, as a “follow up to our conversation yesterday,” expressing “serious disagreements” with Villafaña’s view of the process for victims to claim § 2255 damages under the NPA. Lefkowitz reiterated the defense position that the attorney representative’s role was meant to be limited to negotiating settlements for the victims, rather than pursuing litigation. Lefkowitz claimed that a requirement¶

{sup}136 Villafaña also alerted Sloman that a newspaper was reporting that defense counsel was writing a letter to Acosta asking for reconsideration of the requirement that Epstein register as a sexual offender. Villafaña commented, “It appears they don’t understand that a signed contract is binding.”¶

that Epstein pay the victims’ legal fees incurred from contested litigation would “trigger profound ethical problems,” in that the attorney representative would have an incentive to reject settlement offers in order to incur more fees. In addition, Lefkowitz rejected Villafaña’s view that Epstein had waived the right to challenge § 2255 liability as to victims who did not want to settle their claims, and contended that any such victims “will have to prove, among other things, that they are victims under the enumerated statutes.” Finally, Lefkowitz again argued that the USAO should not discuss the settlement process with the victims who were to be identified as eligible for settlement under § 2255:¶

Ms. Villafaña proposes that either she or federal agents will speak with the [victims] regarding the settlement process. We do not think it is the government’s place to be co-counsel to the [victims], nor should the FBI be their personal investigators. Neither federal agents nor anyone from your Office should contact the [victims] to inform them of the resolution of the case, including appointment of the attorney representative and the settlement process. Not only would that violate the confidentiality of the Agreement, but Mr. Epstein also will have no control over what is communicated to the [victims] at this most critical stage. We believe it is essential that we participate in crafting a mutually acceptable communication to the [victims]. We further believe that communications between your Office or your case agents and the [victims] might well violate Rule 6(e)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The powers of the federal grand jury should not, even in appearance, be utilized to advance the interests of a party to a civil lawsuit.{sup}137¶

Lefkowitz concluded, “I look forward to resolving these open issues with you during our 4:30 call today.”{sup}138¶

Villafaña was at that time on sick leave, and Sloman and Acosta exchanged emails about crafting an addendum to the NPA to address the method of appointing an attorney representative and to articulate the representative’s duties. The next day, October 11, 2007, Sloman exchanged emails with Lefkowitz about the text of a proposed addendum.¶

B. October 12, 2007: Acosta and Defense Attorney Lefkowitz Meet for Breakfast¶

On the morning after his scheduled afternoon phone call with Lefkowitz, Acosta exchanged emails with Lefkowitz, arranging to meet for breakfast the following day, on October 12, 2007, at a Marriott hotel in West Palm Beach. Contemporaneous records show that Acosta was previously scheduled to be in West Palm Beach for a press event on October 11 and to speak at the Palm Beach County Bench Bar conference the following midday, and that he stayed overnight at the Marriott.¶

{sup}137 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(2)(B) relates to secrecy of federal grand jury matters.¶

{sup}138 OPR did not locate any emails indicating what happened on the call.¶

However, as with Villafafia’s publicly released emails to Lefkowitz, this meeting between Acosta and Lefkowitz drew criticism when the media learned of it during the CVRA litigation. It was seen either as further evidence of the USAO’s willingness to meet with Epstein’s attorneys while simultaneously ignoring the victims, or as a meeting at which Acosta made secret agreements with the defense.¶

Two letters written later in 2007 refer to the breakfast meeting. In a December 2007 letter to M, Acosta stated that he had “ma sponte proposed the Addendum to Mr. Lefkowitz at an October meeting in Palm Beach … . in an attempt to avoid what I foresaw would likely be a litigious selection process.”139 In an October 23, 2007 letter from Lefkowitz to Ac less than two weeks after the breakfast meeting, Lefkowitz represented that during the m costa¶

assured me that [the USAO] would not intervene with th Attorney’s Office regarding this matter, or contact an identified individuals, potential witnesses, or po claimants and their respective counsel in this matter, a [the USAO] nor the [FBI] would intervene reg Mr. Epstein receives pursuant to a plea with th sentence does not violate state law. 14° either g entence so long as the

¶

However, two days after receiving this letter sf wised a response letter drafted by Sloman, adding the term “inaccurate” to describe ‘s claims that Acosta had promised not to intervene with the State Attorney’s Offica”,c ct individual witnesses or claimants, or intervene regarding Epstein’s sentence. 141 Tjue draft response stated, “[S]uch a promise equates to the imposition of a gag order. Our Office inotgfr4 nd will not agree to this.s142¶

Acosta told OPR that he diet tuber the breakfast meeting, but he speculated that the meeting may have been prom ense complaints that Villafafia had recommended “her boyfriend’s partner” to serve representative. 103 Acosta said that “the way this was reported [in the press] was th otiated [the NPA] over breakfast,” which was inaccurate because the NPA had be sign’ weeks before the breakfast meeting.144 When asked about¶

{sup}139 In fact, Slo meeting with Lefico when writing di witz had been working on language for the Addendum before Acosta’s breakfast is possible that Acosta was not aware of Sloman’s efforts or had forgotten about them , 2007 letter.¶

{sup}140 This le scussed further in the following section of this Report.¶

{sup}141OP12 did’not find evidence establishing that the response was ever sent.¶

{sup}143 Sloman’s initial draft response referred to a conversation the previous day in which Acosta had “clarified” Legkowitz’s claims about what Acosta had purportedly said in the October 12, 2007 breakfast mccting.¶

{sup}143 As noted previously, the attorney whom Villafafia recommended was a friend of another AUSA whom Villafafia was then dating, but had no professional relationship with either Villafafta or the other AUSA.¶

{sup}144For example, the Miami Herald’s November 2018 investigative report stated that “on the morning of the breakfast meeting, a deal was struck—an extraordinary plea agreement that would conceal the full extent of Epstein’s crimes and the number of people involvedalhc deal—called a non-prosecution agreement—essentially shut down an ongoing FBI probe …” Julie K. “Perversion of Justice: How a future Trump cabinet member gave a serial sex abuser the deal of a lifetime,” Miami Herald, Nov. 28, 2018. The NPA, however, was finalized and signed¶

Lefkowitz’s description of their breakfast meeting discussion, Acosta told OPR that there were “several instances” in which Leflcowitz and other defense counsel mischaracterized something he or an AUSA said, in a way that was misleading.¶

Emails show that, immediately after the breakfast, Acosta phoned Sloman, who then emailed to Leflcowitz a revision to the Addendum language they had been negotiating and who also later reported to Villafaila that Lefkowitz’s “suggested revision has been rejected.” Other emails show that the parties continued to be at odds about the proposed language for the NPA addendum for several days after the breakfast meeting.¶

C. Acosta Agrees to the Defense Request to Postpone Epstein’s Gird Plea; the Parties Continue to Negotiate Issues concerning the Attorngflep entative and Finally Reach Agreement on the NPA Addendum¶

A week after his breakfast meeting with Acosta, Leflcowitz—ci uling conflict sent Acosta an email seeking his agreement to postpone Epstein’s e of is guilty plea in state court from October 26, 2007, the date agreed to in the NPA, to Nove 0, 2007. In his email, Lefkowitz reported that the State Attorney’s Office had a postponement, and he noted that Acosta had said during the breakfast meeting that he to dictate a schedule to the state.s145 Acosta solicited input from Sloman, who lat emailed Lefkowitz and agreed to the postponement.¶

With Lourie having departed from t O, Sloman became more involved in negotiating the NPA addendum than he had en i negotiations leading to the NPA, and he quickly came up against the problem Vil f nd Lourie had faced: the defense attorneys continued to negotiate provisions to w ad seemingly already agreed. Between October 12 and 19, 2007, in a series of e anges and phone conversations, Acosta, Sloman, Villafarla, and Lefkowitz continu g on language for the NPA addendum addressing the process for selection of the att mey tative and describing which of the representative’s activities Epstein would be req reimburse. Although it appeared that progress was being made towards reaching a ment on the terms of an addendum, on October 19, 2007, Lefkowitz emailed Sloman identifyi as of concern” with a proposal the USAO had made days before. Sloman forwarded s e to Acosta, noting that it “re-ploughs some of what we accomplished this week,” and s “unneensary” issues. Sloman reported to Acosta that a victim in New York had filed a c. su against Epstein, and Villafafta was concerned that “this may be the real reason for in the … plea. She thinks that [Epstein] … want[s] to knock that lawsuit out before plea to deter others.” Sloman also alerted Acosta that newspaper reports indica at pstein had planted false stories in the press in an attempt to discredit the victims.¶

almost three weeks before the breakfast meeting occurred. OPR discusses the breakfast meeting further in its analysis at Chapter Two, Part Three, Section IV.E.2.¶

{sup}14\$ Assuming Acosta made the remark Leflcowitz attributed to him, it was consistent with the position Acosta had taken before the NPA was signed. As noted previously, during the NPA negotiations, Acosta had instructed Villafafia to omit language requiring the State Attorney’s Office to take action by a certain date, because he was “not comfortable with requiring the State” to comply with a specific deadline. During his interview, Acosta told OPR that “we as federal prosecutors arc not going to walk in and dictate to the state attorney.”¶

On October 22, 2007, Sloman responded to the issues Leflcowitz had raised, rejecting some defense proposals but agreeing to modify certain language in the proposed addendu atisfy your concern.”146 Noting that the addendum and a revised letter to the special were attached, Sloman ended by stating, “[T]his needs to be concluded. Alex and I believe that this is as far as we can go. Therefore, please advise me whether we have a deal no later than COB tomorrow …”¶

Nonetheless, the next day, Lefkowitz sent Acosta a three-page letter reiterating the Epstein team’s disagreements with the USAO’s interpretation of the NPA. Lefkowitz noted, however, that Epstein had “every intention of honoring the terms of [the NPA] in good faith,” and th the defense letter was not intended to be “a rescission or withdrawal from the terms of the [NP fkowitz added:¶

I also want to thank you for the commitment you made to our October 12 meeting in which you promised genuine regard to this matter, and assured me that your Offi intervene with the State Attorney’s Office regard* th contact any of the identified individuals, p potential civil claimants and their respectiv, and that neither your Office nor the [FB the sentence Mr. Epstein receives pu so long as that sentence does not v) as Mr. Epstein’s sentence does Agreement, he is entitled to including but not limited t ain th Id not tter; or witnesses, or n this matter; rvene regarding lea with the State, law. Indeed, so long tly violate the terms of the sentence available to him, and work release.

¶

Sloman forwarded the lett aft, commenting, “Wait [until] you see this one.” Villafaila replied:¶

Welcome to my r . this agree . I love the way that they want to interpret

¶

lcs like they are planning to ask for and receive a sentence wer than the one we agreed to. Has anyone talked to Barry scher] about this? Maybe this is the real reason for the delay in entering the guilty plea? We also have to contact the victims to tell [them] about the outcome of the case and to advise them than an attorney will be contacting them regarding possible claims against Mr. Epstein. If we don’t do that, it may be a violation of the Florida Bar Rules for the selected attorney to “cold call” the girls.

¶

{sup}146The defense raised issues concerning the attorney representative, the statutory limit on damages, and inclusion of certain victims.¶

Why don’t we agree to mutual recission [sic] and indict him?¶

Acosta also weighed in, sending both Villafafia and Sloman an email with a subject line that read “This has to stop,” in which he stated:¶

Just read the letter.¶

• I. We specifically refused to include the provision saying that we would not communicate. If I recall the conference call, we tolcj him we could not agree to a gag order using those words.
• 2. The purpose of the agreement was not an out settlement. Seems that they can’t take no. Let’s to ieeed. ro I’m not sure we will ever agree on a letter [ about how to select an attorney representative]

Notwithstanding Acosta’s assessment and prediction draft addendum and they spoke by phone, the parties terms.”’ man sent to Lefkowitz a new ment on the addendum’s¶

On October 25 2007, Sloman sent a lett serve as special M, outlining the special 2007, Epstein and his attorneys Lefcourt an name was printed as the USAO repre tive, addendum for her on behalf of the U n whom the USAO had selected to uties. A few days later, on October 29, signed the NPA addendum.148 Villafafia’s ut at Villafafia’s request, Sloman signed the¶

Villafafia later emailed apparently related to the deli selection of the private attorney anking him for “the advice and the pep talk,” which meys’ allegation of impropriety concerning her initial ist the victims. Villafafa explained to Sloman:¶

The Is that I had never met (and still haven’t met) or to [t e private attorney] before I asked him if he would be take on this case… . But as soon as you mentioned the ce problem, I saw where the problem would arise and d that the Special would be a safer route. I just worry at the defense’s attacks on me could harm the victims.

¶

Sloman nded that defense counsel had “put an … insidious spin” on Villafafia’s role in proposing the private attorney, but Sloman added, “I hope that you understand that these ad hominem attacks against you do not diminish in our eyes what you and the agents have accomplished.”¶

{sup}147Acosta and Villafatia wcrc copied on this email.¶

{sup}148The Addendum is attached as Exhibit 4 to this Report.¶

D. Epstein Further Delays His Guilty Plea¶

The addendum did not bring the case to conclusion. Instead, the matter entered a new, protracted phase, which involved the upper echelons of the Department of Justice. Despite the fact that Epstein and his attorneys had signed the NPA, they pursued a new strategy of appealing to senior Department managers with the goal of setting aside the NPA entirely. Although ultimately unsuccessful, the strategy delayed the entry of Epstein’s guilty plea by months.¶

On October 29, 2007, Villafafta emailed Sloman, raising several issues that she wanted Sloman to address with Lefkowitz. Among other things, Villafafta pointed out t t the NPA required Epstein to use his “best efforts” to comply with the agreement, but he had to comply with the timeline established by the NPA when he sought and obtain ple hearing postponement from October 26 to November 20. Responding to Lefkowitz’ t pts to limit the USAO’s communications with various entities and individuals, Villafaft at the USAO needed to be able to communicate with the State Attorney’s Office a ’ attorney “to [e]nsure that Epstein is abiding by the terms of the agreement.”¶

That same day, Assistant State Attorney Belohlavek i Sloman that the state judge assigned to the case had scheduled Epstein’s plea and sent y January 2008. Belohlavek assured Sloman that the “plea and sentence will defin* fore the January 4th date that was agreed on by all for the sentencing”149 Nonethe over the course of the next month show that the USAO, the State Attorney’s Office, f e counsel continued to communicate regarding the date of the guilty plea, with the serting that a proposed January 7, 2008 date for the entry of Epstein’s guilty plea w table,” while the defense contended that Epstein had not agreed to any date. Fin multiple communications referring to various potential dates, on December 7, 200 attorney Jack Goldberger issued a Notice of Hearing, setting the case for Jan¶

E. Epstein Seeks Depart ntal Review of the NPA’s § 2255 Provision Relating to Monetary Damages for the Victims¶

With Epstein’s pie ng delayed, he launched a new effort to undermine the validity of the NPA, this time in t Department. On November 16, 2007, Epstein attorney Kenneth Starr called the office sistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division Alice Fisher and left a message that as ailing regarding Epstein.15’ At Fisher’s request, Lourie, who in late Septem 2 • begun serving his detail as Fisher’s Principal Deputy and Chief of Staff, return isher told OPR that she had no recollection of this call, and Lourie also could¶

{sup}149 The NPA had required Epstein’s plea and sentencing to occur by October 26, 2007, but provided that Epstein could report to begin serving his sentence on January 4, 2008.¶

ISO State v. Epstein, No. 2006-CF-9454, Notice of Hearing (Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Dec. 7, 2007).¶

{sup}151In a meeting with Acosta and Sloman on November 21, 2007, Lefkowitz informed them that Starr had placed a call to Fisher.¶

not recall for OPR the substance of his conversation with Starr, other than that it was likely about Epstein’s wish to have the Department review the case.{sup}152¶

On November 28, 2007, Starr requested, by letter, a meeting with Fisher. In his letter, Starr argued that the USAO improperly had compelled Epstein to agree to pay civil damages under 18 U.S.C. § 2255 as part of a state-based resolution of a criminal case. On the same day, Lefkowitz emailed Sloman, complaining about the USAO’s plan to notify victims about the § 2255 provision and alerting Sloman that Epstein’s counsel were seeking a meeting with the Assistant Attorney General “to address what we believe is the unprecedented nature of the section 2255 component” of the NPA. After Lourie sent to Sloman a copy of the Starr letter, Sloman forwarded it to Villafaña, asking her to prepare a chronology of the plea negotiations and how the § 2255 provision evolved. Villafaña responded that she was “going through all of the ways in which they have tried to breach the agreement to convince you guys to let me indict.”¶

In Washington, D.C., Lourie consulted with CEOS Chief Oosterbaan, asking for his thoughts on defense counsel’s arguments. At the same time, at Lourie’s request, Villafaña sent the NPA and its addendum to Lourie and Oosterbaan. Oosterbaan responded to Lourie that he was “not thrilled” about the NPA; described Epstein’s conduct as unusually “egregious,” particularly because of its serial nature; and observed that the NPA was “pretty advantageous for the defendant and not all that helpful to the victims.” He opined, however, that the Assistant Attorney General would not and should not consider or address the NPA “other than to say that she agrees with it.” During her OPR interview, Fisher did not recall reading Starr’s letter or discussing it with Oosterbaan, but believed the comment about her “agree[ing] with it” referred to a federal prosecution of Epstein, which she believed was appropriate. She told OPR, however, that she “played no role in” the NPA and did not review or approve the agreement either before or after it was signed.¶

As set forth in more detail in Chapter Three of this Report, Villafaña planned to notify the victims about the NPA and its § 2255 provision, as well as about the state plea hearing, and she provided a draft of the notification letter to Lefkowitz for comments. On November 29, 2007, Lefkowitz sent Acosta a letter complaining about the draft notification to the victims. Lefkowitz asked the USAO to refrain from notifying the victims until after defense counsel met with Assistant Attorney General Fisher, which he anticipated would take place the following week. Internal emails indicate that Lourie contacted Oosterbaan about his availability for a meeting with Starr, but both Fisher and Lourie told OPR that such a meeting never took place, and OPR found no evidence that it did.¶

Acosta promptly responded to Lefkowitz by letter, directing him to raise his concerns about victim notification with Villafaña or Sloman. Acosta also addressed Epstein’s evident efforts to stop the NPA from being enforced:¶

{sup}152 In a short email to Fisher, the next day, Lourie reported simply: “He was very nice. Kept me on the phone for [a] half hour talking about [P]epperdine,” referring to the law school where Starr served as [REDACTED].¶

[S]ince the signing of the September 24th agreement, more than two months[] ago, it has become clear that several attorneys on your legal team are dissatisfied with that result.¶

[You], Professor Dershowitz, former Solicitor General] Starr, former United States Attorney and Messrs. Black, Goldberger and Lefcourt previously had the opportunity to review and raise objections to the terms of the Agreement. The defense team, however, after extensive negotiation, chose to adopti the Agreement. Since then counsel have objected to several s taken by the U.S. Attorney’s Office to effectuate the terms Agreement, in essence presenting collateral challenges to of the Agreement.¶

It is not the intention of this Office ever to require a dant to enter a plea against his wishes. Your client h it 1 t to proceed to trial. If your client is dissatisfied with his t, or believes that it is unlawful or unfair, we st dy to unwind the Agreement.¶

In a separate, seven-page letter to Sta responded to the substance of Starr’s Nove Fisher told OPR that she did not recall wh but she conjectured that “probably I w Criminal Division wasn’t] going to Villafafia’s and Sloman’s input, Acosta ter to Assistant Attorney General Fisher. rather than her office, responded to the letter, make sure that somebody responded since [the¶

In his seven-page letter on December 4, 2007, Acosta wrote:¶

The Non- rosecu Agreement entered into between this Office and Mr. E ponds to Mr. Epstein’s desire to reach a global reso]ption his state and federal criminal liability. Under this ent, this District has agreed to defer prosecution for sections of Title 18 in favor of prosecution by the State o rida, provided .. . Mr. Epstein satisfies three general federal ts: (1) that Mr. Epstein plead guilty to a “registerable” ffense; (2) that this plea include a binding recommendation for a sufficient term of imprisonment; and (3) that the Agreement not harm the interests of his victims.¶

id \ mӦ

Acosta explained in the letter that the USAO’s intent was “to place the identified victims in the same position as they would have been had Mr. Epstein been convicted at trial. No more; no less.” Acosta documented the USAO’s understanding of the operation of the NPA’s § 2255¶

{sup}133The USAO may have been asked to respond because Stares letter raised issues that had not been previously raised with the USAO, and it would normally fall to the USAO to address them in the first instance.¶

provision, recounted the history of NPA negotiations, and described the post-signing efforts by Epstein’s counsel to challenge portions of the NPA. Acosta’s letter concluded:¶

Although it happens rarely, I do not mind this Office’s decision being appealed to Washington, and have previously directed our prosecutors to delay filings in this case to provide defense counsel with the option of appealing our decisions. Indeed, although I am confident in our prosecutors’ evidence and legal analysis, I nonetheless directed them to consult with the subject matter experts in [CEOS] to confirm our interpretation of the law before approving their [charges]. I am thus surprised to read a letter addressed t Department Headquarters that raises issues that either have not been raised with this Office previously or that have been raised fact resolved, in your client’s favor.

¶

I am troubled, likewise, by the apparent lack of ft this Agreement. The AUSAs who have been negoti: g defense counsel have for some time complained to me ng the tactics used by the defense team. It appears t e t as soon as resolution is reached on one issue, defen ebItio el finds ways to challenge the resolution collaterally. My response thus far has been that defense counsel is doing its job to vigorously represent the client. That said, there must be re on this matter. Some in our Office are deeply concerned t de se counsel will continue to mount collateral challen top isions of the Agreement, even after Mr. Epstein has e guilty plea and thus rendered the agreement difficult, j§t t ssible, to unwind.

¶

I would re .4 : to that it is not the intention of this Office ever to force the hand is fendant to enter into an agreement against his wises Yo client has the right to proceed to trial. Although time is e essence … I am directing our prosecutors not to issue tification letters until this Friday … to provide you with + to review these options with your client… . We expect a tten decision by [December 7, 2007] at 5 p.m., indicating whet her the defense team wishes to reaffirm, or to unwind, the Agreement.¶

Acosta explained to OPR that he did not view his letter as “inviting” Departmental review, but he believed the Department had the “right” to address Epstein’s concerns. Moreover, the USAO’s only option at that time was to declare Epstein in breach of the NPA, which would have prompted litigation as to whether Epstein was, in fact, in breach. Acosta noted that defense counsel repeatedly proclaimed Epstein’s intent to abide by the agreement, making any USAO effort to declare him in breach more difficult. In fact, the day after receiving Acosta’s letter, Starr and Lefkowitz responded to Acosta (with copies to Sloman and Assitant Attorney General Fisher) that¶

the defense “[f]irst and foremost” reaffirmed the NPA and that Epstein “has no intention of unwinding the agreement.”¶

On December 7, 2007—the deadline set by Acosta in his December 4, 2007 letter to Starr the defense transmitted to the USAO a one-sentence “Affirmation” of the NPA and its addendum, signed by Epstein. Is¶

F. Despite Affirming the NPA, Defense Counsel Intensify Their Challenges to It and Accuse Villafalla of Improper Conduct¶

1. December 7 and 11, 2007: Starr and Leflcowitz Send to to Letters and “Ethics Opinions” Complaining about the Fed In gation and Villafaiia¶

On the same day that the defense team sent Epstein’s “Affi s to a USAO, Starr and Lefkowitz sent to Acosta two “independent ethics opinions” ored by prominent criminal defense attorney and former U.S. Attorney Joe Whitley, assessed purported improprieties in the federal investigation of Epstein, and the o a prominent retired federal judge and former U.S. Attorney, arguing against the NP ’ o the civil damages recovery provision under 18 U.S.C. § 2255 “as a proxy for traditi I al restitution.”¶

Days later, on December 11, 2007, Starr s t I to Acosta transmitting two lengthy submissions authored by Lefkowitz presentin u five challenges to the NPA and to the “background and conduct of the investigation’ bmissions repeated arguments previously raised by the defense but also asserted new n one submission, 20 pages long, Lefkowitz addressed the “improper involvement” authorities in the investigation and criticized Villafafia for a number of alleged es, including having engaged in “unprecedented federal overreaching” by seekin ute Epstein federally, “insist[ing]” that the State Attorney’s Office “charge Mr. th violations of law and recommend a sentence that are significantly harsher than wha a to deemed appropriate,” and requiring that Epstein plead guilty to a registrable offq e, a’ i arsh” condition that was “unwarranted.”I55¶

Leflcowitz o ar d that the federal investigation relied upon a state investigation that was “tainted” b lead BPD Detective’s misrepresentation of key facts in affidavits and interview su eading the USAO to make its charging decision based on flawed informatio mpromised the federal investigation.” Finally, Leflcowitz criticized federal involvemen state plea process as a violation of “the tenets of the Petite Policy.” In a second, I 3-pa e ion, Lefkowitz reiterated Epstein’s complaints about the § 2255 component of the NPA, argu g, among other things, that federal prosecutors “should not be in the business of helping alleged victims of state crimes secure civil financial settlements.”¶

Ists The Affirmation read: “I, Jeffrey E. Epstein do hereby re-affirm the Non-Prosecution Agreement and Addendum to same dated October 30, 2007.”¶

ISS Villafana sent Lefkowitz a five-page letter responding to the accusations madc against her personally.¶

Notwithstanding these voluminous submissions, Lefkowitz added that Epstein “unconditionally re-asserts his intention to fulfill and not seek to withdraw from or unwind” the NPA.¶

2. As a Result of the Starr and Lefkowitz Submissions, the New USAO Criminal Chief Begins a Full Review of the Evidence, and Acosta Agrees to Meet Again with Defense Counsel¶

After reviewing Stair’s and Lefkowitz’s letters, Sloman notified Villafafta that “in light of the recent Kirkland & Ellis correspondence” he had asked Robert Senior, who li succeeded Menchel as Chief of the USAO’s Criminal Division, to review de novo the evid nderlying the proposed revised indictment, and Sloman asked Villafafta to provide Seni ‘th a he state and FBI investigative materials.¶

In the meantime, Acosta agreed to meet with Starr and other d ense attorneys to discuss the defense complaints raised in Lefkowitz’s December I 1 2007 submissions. 156 The meeting took place in Miami on December 14, 2007. The de team included Starr, Dershowitz, Lefcourt, and Boston attorney Weinbe SAO side included Acosta, Sloman, Villafafta, and another senior AUSA, with the M. peels! Agent in Charge and Assistant Special Agent in Charge also present. In addit ously raised arguments, during this meeting, Epstein’s attorneys raised a new argu t the state charge to which Epstein had agreed to plead guilty did not apply to the fac f e e.¶

3. The Defense Notifies ’ 41cos ., at It May Pursue a Department Review of the USAO’s Actions¶

Shortly after the December I raised at the meeting could not but to seek review in Washin defense team might make an ap “to in fact review this cas Starr and Lefkowitz then defense submissio a “prompt, ind letter reitera state law or a “impro claim’ u ting, Lefkowitz notified Acosta that if the issues romptly, the defense team may “have no alternative sta notified Assistant Attorney General Fisher that the her, and he asked her to grant such a request for review and an expedited manner [in order] to preserve the January 4th plea date.” o Acosta a lengthy letter, with numerous previously submitted ng issues discussed at the meeting, and advising that Epstein sought expedited review” of the evidence by “you or someone you trust.” The s position that his conduct did not amount to a registrable offense under on of federal law, and with respect to the NPA’s § 2255 provision, that it was ire Epstein to pay damages “to individuals who do nothing but simply assert a e statute.¶

{sup}&quot; 6 As Assistant Attorney General Fishcr’s Chief of Staff, Lourie had informed Starr that Fisher hoped Starr would speak to Acosta to “resolve then fairly narrow issues” raised in Starr’s correspondence with Acosta. Acosta had the Starr and Le&owitz submissions of December I I forwarded to Fisher.¶

4. Acosta Attempts to Revise the NPA § 2255 Language concerning Monetary Damages, but the Defense Does Not Accept It¶

Acosta undertook to respond to defense counsel’s continuing concern about the § 2255 provision. He sent to Deputy Assistant Attorney General Sigal Mandelker language that he proposed including in a revision to the NPA’s § 2255 implementation section. Mandelker forwarded the language to her counterpart in the Civil Division, who responded to Mandelker and Acosta that he did not have “any insight” to offer. On December 19, 2007, after Acosta and Sloman had a phone conversation with Starr and Lefkowitz, Acosta sent to [REDACTED] a letter proposing to resolve “our disagreements over interpretation[]” by replacing the existing language of the NPA relating to § 2255 with a provision that would read:¶

Any person, who while a minor, was a victim of a violation of an offense enumerated in Title 18, United States Code, Section 2255, will have the same rights to proceed under Section 2255 as she would have had, if Mr. Epstein [had] been tried federally and convicted of an enumerated offense. For purposes of implementing this paragraph, the United States shall provide Mr. Epstein’s attorneys with a list of individuals whom it was prepared to name … as victims of an enumerated offense by Mr. Epstein. Any judicial authority interpreting this provision, including any authority determining which evidentiary burdens if any a plaintiff must meet, shall consider that it is the intent of the parties to place these identified victims in the [REDACTED] position as they would have been had Mr. Epstein been convicted at trial. No more; no less.¶

Acosta also noted that he had resisted his prosecutors’ urging to declare the NPA breached by the defense delays.{sup}157¶

Lefkowitz responded by letter a few days later, suggesting that Acosta’s proposal raised “several troubling questions” and that “the problem arises from the incongruity that exists when attempting to fit a federal civil remedies statute into a criminal plea agreement.”{sup}158 In a follow-up letter to Acosta, to address the USAO’s concern that Epstein was intentionally delaying the entry of his guilty plea, Lefkowitz asserted that “any impediment to the resolution at issue is a direct cause of the disagreements between the parties,” and that defense counsel had “at all times made and will continue to make sincere efforts to resolve and finalize issues as expeditiously as possible.”¶

Acosta told OPR that despite this assurance from defense counsel, he was “increasingly frustrated” by Epstein’s desire to take an “11th hour appeal” to the Department so soon before the¶

{sup}157 As described in detail in Chapter Three, Acosta’s December 19, 2007 letter also addressed defense objections to notifying the victims about the NPA and the state plea.¶

{sup}158 After Starr and Lefkowitz had another conversation with Acosta and Sloman, Lefkowitz sent a second letter to Acosta reiterating concerns with the § 2255 provision and asserting that the provision was “inherently flawed and becoming truly unmanageable.” In the end, the defense team rejected Acosta’s December 19, 2007 NPA modification letter.¶

scheduled January 4, 2008 plea hearing. As soon became apparent, Acosta was unable to achieve an expedited review so that Epstein could plead guilty and be sentenced by January 4, 2008, and the plea and sentencing date was rescheduled. On January 2, 2008, Sloman spoke with Assistant State Attorney Belohlavek, who confirmed that the change of plea hearing had been postponed. In an email reporting this to Acosta and Villafafia, Sloman said that Epstein’s local defense attorney Goldberger had told Belohlavek the postponement was because the facts “did not fit the proposed state charge,” and that Belohlavek told Sloman she agreed with that assessment.159 The next day, Villafafia sent to Acosta and Sloman a local newspaper article reporting that Epstein’s state plea hearing was reset for March and in exchange for it the federal authorities would drop their investigation of him. Acosta also sent to Sloman and illafafia an email memorializing a statement made to him by Leflcowitz in a phone cal day: “`I [Lefkowitz] may have made a mistake 6 months ago. [Belohlavek] told us ‘tat [is] not registrable. It turns out that the actual offense charged is.”’I6°¶

5. January 7, 2008: Acosta and Sloman Meets Who Makes Additional Allegations of USAO Misconduc¶

On January 7, 2008, Acosta and Sloman met with del at her request. According to meeting notes made by Sloman, among alleged that the USAO’s media spokesperson had improperly disclose the Epstein case to a national news reporter, and “suggested that the US void any potential ugliness in DC by agreeing to a watered-down resolution for Ep er Acosta excused himself to attend another meeting and Sloman refused to speak “without a witness rig she left. Later that day, Acosta and Sloma hone with Starr, Lefkowitz, and who expressed concern about the “leak” media, reiterated their objections to the NPA, and pressed for the “watered-down r ich they specified would mean allowing Epstein to plead to a charge of coercion ins urement, avoid serving time in jail, and not register as a sexual offender. A note ’ n of Sloman’s handwritten notes of the conversation reads: “We’re back to where m September.”¶

That evening, Vi afta expressed concern that the delay in resolving the matter was affecting the USAO’s ab go forward with a prosecution should Epstein renege on his agreement, and sh tlin or Acosta and Sloman the steps she proposed to take while Epstein was pursuing D a ental review. Those steps included re-establishing contact with victims, interviewing t ew York and one victim who lived in a foreign country, making contact with “pot of information” in the Virgin Islands, and re-initiating proceedings to obtain ‘s computers.¶

In t meantime, USAO Criminal Division Chief Robert Senior performed a “soup to nuts” review of the Epstein investigation, reviewing the indictment package and all of the evidence Villafafia had compiled. He told OPR that he could not recall the reason for his review, but opined¶

{sup}159Belohlavek told OPR that she did not recall this incident, but she noted that the PBPD report did set forth facts supporting the charge of procurement of a minor.¶

{sup}160Although the meeting Lefkowitz had with Lourie, Villafana, Krischer, and Belohlavek to discuss the state resolution was only four months prior, not six, Leficowitz’s reference was likely to the September 12, 2007 meeting.¶

that it was to establish whether, if the plea fell apart, he, as Chief, would agree “that we can go forward with” the charges. He did recall being concerned, after completing the review, that “we did not have … a lot of victims …lined up and ready to testify” and that some victims might “not be favorable for us.” Nevertheless, he concluded that the proposed charges were sound, and he told Acosta that he would approve proceeding with a federal case.¶

6. Acosta Asks CEOS to Review the Evidence¶

Notwithstanding Senior’s favorable review, Acosta and Sloman told Starr and Lefkowitz that they “appreciate[d]” that the defense wanted a “fresh face” to conduct a review, noted that the Criminal Chief had not undertaken the “in-depth work associated with the iss sed by the defense.” They told the defense team that Acosta had asked CEOS to “come and that CEOS Chief Oosterbaan would designate an attorney having “a national p ve” to conduct a fresh review in light of the defense submissions. Oosterbaan assigned vial Attorney who Villafafta understood was to review the case and prepare for trial cone ‘n t t Epstein did not “consummate’ the NPA. The CEOS Trial Attorney traveled to lorid to review the case materials, and to meet with Villafafia to discuss the case and inte ‘ew e of the victims. After one such meeting, Villafafia wrote to Acosta and Sloman:¶

We just finished interviewing three of Twish you could have been there to see how much this 1 d them.

¶

One girl broke down sobbing so t had to stop the interview twice within a 20 minute span e ned her composure enough to continue a short time, but slhi e t at she was having nightmares about Epstein coming ati r an she started to break down again, so we stopped the i

¶

The second girl that she was very upset about the 18 month deal she about in the paper. She said that 18 months was noth. and at she had heard that the girls could get restitution, would rather not get any money and have Epstein spegds sign :cant time in jail.

¶

Oe girls deserve so much better than they have received so far, nd I hate feeling that there is nothing I can do to help them.I61¶

The CEOS Trial Attorney had substantial experience prosecuting child exploitation cases. She told OPR that in her view, the victim witnesses in this case presented a number of challenges for a prosecution: some of the victims did not want to admit they had sexual contact with Epstein; some had recruited other victims to provide Epstein massages, and thus could have been charged as accomplices; some had “drug histories and … things like that”; some could appear to have been “complicit”; and there was no evidence of physical violence against the victims. She did not regard¶

{sup}161Villafafta added, “We have four more girls coming in tomorrow. Can I persuade you to attend?”¶

these victim issues as insurmountable but, based on these alone, the CEOS Trial Attorney considered a potential prosecution of Epstein to be a “crap shoot.” In addition, she told OPR that there were novel legal issues in the case that also presented difficulties, although she believed these difficulties could be overcome. Shortly after the CEOS Trial Attorney met with the victims, however, “things just stopped” when Oosterbaan instructed her to cease her involvement in the case and CEOS engaged in the Criminal Division review sought by Epstein’s defense team.¶

IX. FEBRUARY – JUNE 2008: THE DEPARTMENT’S REVIEW¶

Epstein’s defense attorneys sought a broad review from the Department, one that would encompass the defense complaints about federal jurisdiction, specific terms in the NPA, and the various allegations of professional misconduct by USAO attorneys and other personnel. The Department, however, only reviewed the issue of federal jurisdiction and never reviewed the NPA or any specific provisions.{sup}162 Nonetheless, the process took several months as the defense appealed first to CEOS and the Department’s Criminal Division, and then to the Office of the Deputy Attorney General. The chart set forth on the following page shows the positions and relationships among the individuals in those offices involved in communicating with the USAO or defense beginning in November 2007 or in those offices’ reviews, which continued through June 2008.¶

The Office anticipates charges of violations of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 371, 2422, 2423, and 1591. The investigation of the case by the City of Palm Beach Police Department has resulted in press coverage because of the titillating nature of the facts, but we see this case as similar to other “child prostitution” cases charged by our office, and not a matter of “national interest” as defined by the U.S. Attorney’s Manual.¶

{sup}162 On February 28, 2008, USAO Criminal Division Chief Senior sent to the Civil Rights Division written notification of the USAO’s “ongoing investigation of a child exploitation matter” involving Epstein and others “that may result in charges of violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1591.” USAM § 8-3.120 required a U.S. Attorney to notify the Civil Rights Division, in writing, “[a]t the outset of a criminal investigation … that may implicate federal criminal civil rights statutes, … and in no event later than ten days before the commencement of the examination of witnesses before a grand jury.” The provision also required notification to CEOS in cases involving sex trafficking of minors. The written notification was to identify the targets of the investigation, the factual allegations to be investigated, the statutes which may have been violated, the U.S. Attorney’s assessment of the significance of the case, whether the case was of “national interest,” and the U.S. Attorney’s proposed staffing of the matter.¶

Villafaña became aware of this requirement in late February 2008, and she prepared a written notification that was edited by Sloman, who discussed it with Acosta. After briefly summarizing the facts, Senior advised:¶

In the notification, Senior stated that CEOS “has been involved and is currently reviewing the matter,” he anticipated the case would be staffed by USAO and Department personnel, and “[i]f we determine that the case should be [charged], a copy [of the charging document] will be forwarded to you.” OPR did not locate a response from the Civil Rights Division to the notification.¶

February — May 15, 2008: Review by CEOS and the Criminal Division¶

ary 21, 2008, soon after the CEOS Trial Attorney met with victims, Oosterbaan spoke witft9eflcowitz about CEOS’s role. In a subsequent email to Villafafla, Sloman, and Senior, Oosterbaan explained:¶

I told [Lefkowitz] that all i want to do is help the process move forward, and if they think we best help the process by taking a fresh and objective look at the case and their arguments [then] that is what I want to do. I told him that if that’s what they want — if that is what will help the process to move forward — then I don’t think it’s advisable for CEOS to partner with the USAO on the case. He wants to think about that (and probably talk to his co-counsel about

¶

whether it is better to have us partnered in the case or just serve a review function) and he said he’d get back to me later today.¶

Oosterbaan told OPR that this email reflects that he likely told Acosta that he intended to limit CEOS’s role to review only, and Acosta asked him to “make sure the defense is okay with that,” to preempt a possible defense complaint about CEOS’s involvement in the review. Oosterbaan explained to OPR that “the defense ke[pt] bringing up new arguments and new problems and [the USAO was saying] look if we’re going to do this, if you’ve got a problem with it, tell us now.”¶

By February 25, 2008, Lefkowitz told Oosterbaan, who informed Slom the CEOS role should be “review only.” Lourie had just then left the Department to ent ‘vat ractice, and Oosterbaan continued to keep his direct supervisor, Deputy Assis orney General Mandelker, informed of the defense team contacts. Sloman emailed Le’ at CEOS was “ready to proceed immediately” with a review of the matter. Slom fkowitz that “in the event CEOS decides that a federal prosecution should not be un ak against Mr. Epstein, this Office will close its investigation,” but that, “should CE• with Mr. Epstein’s position, Mr. Epstein shall have one week to abide by [the loman forwarded this email to Villafafta, who responded, “Why would we possibly let e same deal after all he has put us through? And after we have discovered 6 new g¶

The defense soon signaled that the CEOS sold not end Epstein’s requests for the Department’s involvement. On February 29, owitz requested a defense meeting with Oosterbaan on March 12, 2008.163 Starr spo to i tant Attorney General Fisher and “made it clear that [the defense team would] want with her if [CEOS] decid[ed] to support the prosecution.” On March 6, 2008, Aco loman and Oosterbaan that Starr and Lefkowitz had called him to express “conce osterbaan’s participation in the case, and indicated that “they may ask for more seni r o v ment.” Acosta “informed them that they certainly had the right to ask whomever the or whatever they thought appropriate, and that whatever process would be given them w o whomever they asked.”¶

The next day, Le followed up with Acosta in an email:¶

W reciate that you will afford us as much time as Main Justice is appropriate for it to conduct a review of this matter. u have suggested, we will initiate that review process with -47\ti w Oosterbaan, and engage in a discussion with him about all of le facts and circumstances, as well as the legal and policy issues associated with this case… . However, due to our misgivings (engendered because Drew has told us that he sees himself as a prosecutor and has already made clear he would be ready and willing to prosecute this case himself[)] we may well find it necessary to¶

{sup}163The defense team meeting with CEOS was originally to be set for late January, but never got scheduled for that time. On February 25, Sloman informed Lelkowitz that the USAO was “very concerned about additional delays” in the Departmental review process, but would agree to a short extension of the March 3 deadline “to provide CEOS time to engage in a thorough review.”¶

appeal an adverse determination by him within the DOJ. Ken [Starr] and I appreciate that you understand this and have no objection to our seeking appellate review within DOJ.¶

Starr, Lefkowitz, and Weinberg attended the March 12, 2008 meeting, as well as the former Principal Deputy Chief of CEOS, who had joined the Epstein defense team. Oosterbaan, Mandelker, and a current CEOS Deputy Chief represented the Department. The current CEOS Deputy Chief told OPR that it was primarily a “listening session” with Starr doing most of the presentation. Oosterbaan told OPR that he recalled “some back and forth” because the defense team was saying “some outrageous things.” Both Oosterbaan and his Deput Chief were disturbed that the former CEOS Principal Deputy Chief, who had been an aggress’ vocate for child exploitation prosecutions, was supporting the defense position, althou g to the CEOS Deputy Chief, the former Principal Deputy Chief gave only a “w ” that was not effective.¶

After the meeting, Starr and Leflcowitz made multiple written ions to the Criminal Division. One submission provided a lengthy list of USAO actgs t ave caused us serious concern,” including the following:¶

“Federal involvement in a state crimin on without any communication with state authorities”¶

the issuance of legal process an t requests for items that “had no connection to the co¶

the nomination “of an • ual closely associated with one of the Assistant United Sta involved in this case” to serve as the victims’ attom tative;¶

the “insistence” im notification letter inviting the victims to make swoLrt state ts at Epstein’s sentencing; and¶

existence of a “relationship?” between Sloman and a la resenting several of the alleged victims in civil suits pstein. I65¶

{sup}164This complaint appeared to be at odds with Villafaha’s understanding that the defense objected to USAO communications with the state authorities. In November 2007, Sloman noted to Leficowitz, “Your recent correspondence attempting to restrict our Office from communicating with the State Attorney’s Office … raises concern.” In a March 2008 email reporting to CEOS about the state case, Villafaha noted that she did not know whether a state “misdemeanor deal [was] back on the table because the defense demanded that we have no contact with the State Attorney’s Office, so I haven’t spoken with the [Assistant State Attorney] in over 6 months.” Villafaha later reported to Acosta and Sloman that when Krischer complained to her that the USAO had not been communicating with him, she explained to Krischcr that “it was the defense who were blocking the channels of communication.”¶

{sup}165In approximately 2001, Sloman briefly left the USAO and for a few months was in private practice with a Miami attorney, whose practice specialized in plaintiffs’ sexual abuse claims. During 2007-2008, the attorney¶

In another letter, Starr renewed the defense accusation that the USAO improperly disclosed information about the case to the media, and accused Sloman and Villafafia of “encouraging civil litigation” against Epstein. Finally, in a letter to Assistant Attorney General Fisher on May 14, 2008, Starr thanked her for having spoken with him the previous day, reiterated the defense team’s various complaints, and asked her to meet with him, Lefkowitz, and Whitley.¶

Meanwhile, Oosterbaan’s Deputy Chief drafted a decision letter to be sent from Oosterbaan to Lefkowitz, and over the course of several weeks, it was reviewed by and received input from Deputy Assistant Attorney General Mandelker and Assistant Attorney General Fisher, as well as the Criminal Division’s Appellate Section (regarding certain legal issues) an Office of Enforcement Operations (regarding the Petite policy). Oosterbaan told OPR that, hstanding the defense submissions on a wide variety of issues and complaints, CEOS’sflw limited to determining whether there was a basis for a federal prosecution of Epste’¶

Oosterbaan’s letter, sent to Lefkowitz on May 15, 2008, no efense team that CEOS had completed its independent evaluation of whether prose tion f Epstein for federal criminal violations “would contradict criminal enforcement poli int .” The letter specified that CEOS’s review addressed the “narrow question” of wh egitimate basis existed for a federal prosecution, and that CEOS did not conduct a de of the facts, analyze issues relating to federal statutes that did not pertain to child e , or review the terms of the NPA or the prosecutorial misconduct allegations. The let at based on its examination of the material relevant to its limited review of the matt d concluded that “federal prosecution in this case would not be improper or inapp nd that Acosta “could properly use his discretion to authorize prosecution in this c¶

On May 19, 2008, Lefkowitz asked that Acosta “not shunt me off of the request for a meeting: (1) would involve a “novel appli tion” federal prosecution would not case; I67 (3) CEOS did no new evidence,” in the fo to Acosta to request a meeting and specifically our staff” Lefkowitz made several points in support ter acknowledged that federal prosecution of Epstein o relevant federal statutes; I66 (2) CEOS’s conclusion that abuse of discretion” was “hardly an endorsement” of the dress Epstein’s prosecutorial misconduct allegations; and (4) “critical recent defense counsel depositions of victims confirmed “that¶

represented attorney ms. The Epstein defense team alleged in the letter that Sloman’s past association with the an to take actions to favor victims’ potential civil lawsuits against Epstein.¶

{sup}166Oo n’s letter stated, “Mr. Acosta can soundly exercise his authority to decide to pursue a prosecution even though it might involve a novel application of a federal statute.” This statement referred to a defense argument based on a prior Departmental expression of concern about a Congressional proposal to expand federal law to “adult prostitution where no force, fraud or coercion was used.” Oosterbaan stated that “the Department’s efforts are properly focused on the commercial sexual exploitation of children”—even if wholly local—and “the exploitation of adults through force, fraud, or cocrcion.” He then observed that the fact “that a prosecution of Mr. Epstein might not look precisely like the cases that came before it is not dispositive.”¶

{sup}167 Oosterbaan began his letter, however, by making it clear that CEOS had considered “the narrow question as to whether there is a legitimate basis for the U.S. Attorney’s Office to proceed with a federal prosecution of Mr. Epstein.”¶

federal prosecution is not appropriate in this case.”{sup}168 Lefkowitz alluded to the possibility of seeking further review of the matter by the Deputy Attorney General or Attorney General, should the defense be unable to “resolve this matter directly with” Acosta.¶

Acosta declined the request to respond personally and directed Lefkowitz to communicate with the “trial team.” That same day, Sloman sent Lefkowitz a letter asking that all further communication about the case be made to Villafaña or her immediate supervisor, and reiterating that Acosta would not respond personally to counsel’s email or calls. Sloman noted that the USAO had “bent over backwards to exhaustively consider and re-consider” Epstein’s objections, but “these objections have finally been exhausted.” Sloman advised that the USAO would terminate the NPA unless Epstein complied with all of its terms by the close of business on June 2, 2008.¶

B. May – June 23, 2008: Review by the Office of the Deputy Attorney General¶

Also on May 19, 2008, Starr and Whitley co-authored a letter to Deputy Attorney General Mark Filip asking for review “of the federal involvement in a quintessentially state matter.”{sup}169 In the letter, they acknowledged that CEOS had recently completed “a very limited review” of the Epstein case, but contended that “full review of all the facts is urgently needed at senior levels of the Justice Department.” They argued that federal prosecution of Epstein was “unwarranted,” and that “the irregularity of conduct by prosecutors and the unorthodox terms of the [NPA] are beyond any reasonable interpretation of the scope of a prosecutor’s responsibilities.” They followed up with a second letter on May 27, 2008, in which they asserted “the bedrock need for integrity in the enforcement of federal criminal laws” and “the profound questions raised by the unprecedented extension of federal laws … to a prominent public figure who has close ties to President Clinton” required Departmental review. On this latter point, they argued that Epstein “entered the public arena only by virtue of his close personal association with former President Bill Clinton,” and that there was “little doubt” that the USAO “never would have contemplated a prosecution in this case if Mr. Epstein were just another ‘John.’” This was the first defense submission mentioning Epstein’s connection to President Clinton and raising the insinuation that the federal involvement in the investigation was due to politics.¶

In the May 27, 2008 letter to the Deputy Attorney General, Starr and Whitley used the existing June 2, 2008 deadline for the entry of Epstein’s guilty plea to argue that it made the need for review of the case “all the more exigent.” John Roth, a Senior Associate Deputy Attorney General who was handling the matter, instructed the USAO to rescind the deadline, and on May 28, 2008, Sloman notified Lefkowitz that the USAO had postponed the deadline pending completion of the review by the Deputy Attorney General’s office.{sup}170 Meanwhile, the Criminal¶

{sup}168 Under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220, defendants are permitted to depose victims, and Epstein’s counsel utilized that procedure aggressively and expansively to conduct sworn interviews of multiple victims, including victims who were not part of the state prosecution, to learn information about the federal investigation.¶

{sup}169 In addition to having served as U.S. Attorney in two different districts, Whitley had served as Acting Associate Attorney General, the Department’s third-highest position.¶

{sup}170 On May 28, 2008, Attorney General Mukasey was in Miami for unrelated events and had lunch at the USAO with Acosta and other senior managers. OPR found no indication that the Epstein matter was discussed.¶

Division forwarded to Roth the prior defense submissions, describing them as “an enormous amount of material” regarding the Epstein matter. On June 3, 2008, Sloman sent to Roth a lengthy letter from Sloman to the Deputy Attorney General, recounting in detail the history of negotiations with Epstein’s counsel culminating in the NPA, and addressing Epstein’s claims of professional misconduct. Among the documents submitted with the letter were the prosecution memorandum, one of the proposed char ‘n documents, and the NPA with its addendum and Acosta’s December 19, 2007 letter to¶

As the review was ongoing in the Office of the Deputy Attorney General, State Attorney Krischer mentioned to the USAO’s West Palm Beach manager that Krischer and E tern’s local defense attorney Jack Goldberger had arrived at a resolution of Epstein’s case tha Id involve a 90-day jail term, but Krischer provided no further information. Upon learning this illafafla wrote to her immediate supervisor: “Please tell me that you are joking. Maybe e should throw him [Epstein] a party and tell him we are sorry to have bothered him.” Vill ana er immediate supervisor later had phone and email exchanges with Krischer and wi s local counsel to insist that die state plea comply with the terms of the NPA, or “we w tder it a breach of the agreement and proceed accordiogiy.”171¶

Deputy Attorney General Filip told OPR he had r of Epstein before receiving Starr’s letter. Following the office’s standard protocol er was handled by John Roth, an experienced senior feder¶

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