IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA Case No. 50-2009CA040800XXXXMBAG JEFFREY EPSTEIN, Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant, v. SCOTT ROTHSTEIN individually, and J. , individually, Defendants/Counter-Plaintiff. Cos #### PLAINTIFF/COUNTER-DEFENDANT JEFFREY N'S OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT/COUNTER-PLAINTIFF BRADL ARDS' REQUEST FOR AN0.203 JUDICIAL NOTICE PURSUANT DA STATUTES SECTIONS 90.202k PlaintifdCounter-Defendant, Jeffrey ( lics(,\` r pstein"), objects to Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff rEdw u for Judicial Notice Pursuant to Florida Statutes section 90.202 and 90.203, and std This Court must request for judicial notice of Epstein's New York State Sex Offender reg' tt on information pursuant to the Florida Evidence Code. Although asks this C to e ercise its discretion to take judicial notice of the New York registration, it does not squ y II under matters which this Court may take judicial notice. Moreover, sections 90.401 and 90.403, Florida Statutes (2017), preclude the registration from admissibility because it is wholly irrelevant to any claim to be tried in this matter and is presented solely to unfairly prejudice or inflame the jury against Epstein. Likewise, the registration information is akin to #### INTRODUCTION evidence that is precluded by sections 90.404, 90.405, 90.609, and 90.610, Florida Statutes (2017). Therefore, this Court must deny the transparent request to prejudice the jury. #### RECORD FACTS NOT IN DISPUTE The only issues for trial are framed by the pleadings in this lawsuit: (1) Epstein's Complaint and damages against Defendant Scott Rothstein and (2) Counterclaim for malicious prosecution against Epstein. There is no issue in any Complaint or Co aim as to this issue in Epstein's Complaint, Counterclaim for malicious pro t r either party's Affirmative Defenses pled or proposed. Epstein's status as registered in the state of New York. The Court wilO i #### M EMORAND ## Sections 90.401 and 90.403 Florida Statut A\\ The New York State Sex Offender regi S irss "r oration is neither relevant nor probative to any issue raised by Epstein, nor an t...emn f proof that must be met by in his malicious prosecution Countercla prejudice the jury before it has to file his action against relation to any o d, this request is merely a transparent attempt to ate opportunity to determine if Epstein had probable cause Whether or not Epstein is a registered sex offender has zero ges sought by Epstein against Defendant Rothstein. Likewise, and significant to Counterclaim, whether Epstein is a registered sex offender does not prove any el he malicious prosecution claim that has raised. See, e.g., Alamo Rent-A-Car Inc. v. Mancusi, 632 So. 2d 1352 (Fla. 1994). Contrary to recent characterizations of the lawsuit filed by Epstein against (on which the malicious prosecution claim is based), Epstein did not allege that brought false tort claims. Rather, in December 2009, Epstein alleged that Scott Rothstein's partner, exploited the civil tort lawsuits against Epstein for the purposes of luring investors into the Pont scheme that was being carried out under the auspices of Rothstein Rosenfeldt and Adler by attempting to conduct unnecessary and irrelevant discovery, by filing duplicative actions, and by other similar actions outlined more fully in Epstein's Complaint against One clear example of litigation tactics that led Epstein to perce nnection between and Rothstein's Ponzi scheme was ' motion al Epstein was fraudulently transferring assets and seeking a Court order requiring • ost a \$15 million bond to secure a potential future judgment on the tort claims. extensively and publicly pled facts pertaining to Epstein's wealth, c 17 "billionaire" status — which Ilkil c were reasonably perceived by Epstein, once the try /S hire scheme, to be designed to entice existing inv ilsen o, more investors to Rothstein's Ponzi scheme by citing Epstein's wealth. The "evr ce" could supply the court, however, showed that Epstein merely transf i a few automobiles. There was nothing fraudulent in those transfers and the value f the a tomobiles was minor relative to Epstein's overall wealth. United States District Jud 4pneth A. Marra determined that motion seeking the \$15 million bond waQtirely devoid of evidence of [Epstein's] alleged fraudulent transfers." (See Order, D.E. t0, c o. 08-CIV-80119, Exhibit A.) ame out about the Rothstein Ponzi ore, even if this Court considers that the evidence might be relevant in some remote way to the claims for trial, the registration information should still be excluded under section 90.403 which provides, "[r]elevant evidence is inadmissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Florida courts have excluded evidence of prior convictions in analogous situations, finding that any probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Horton v. State, 943 So. 2d 1016, 1017-18 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). Likewise, here, any remotely probative value is far outweighed by the prejudicial nature of the evidence, as well as the likelihood that it would confuse the true issues in this lawsuit and mislead the jury as to the subject of the claims that are being tried. #### Sections 90.404 and 90.405, Florida Statutes Additionally, the registration information is inadmissible uncle t 0 90.404 and 90.405, Florida Statutes, because its only purpose is to disparage Eps m s 0 cter. Florida law is clear that "[e]vidence of a person's character or a trait of chara 's in'llefmissible to prove action in conformity with it on a particular occasion" except in limited circumstances not present here. § 90.404(1), Fla. Stat. (2017); see g SS?, gi .405(2), Fla. Stat. (2017) ("When character or a trait of character of a person is n 1 element of a charge, claim, or defense proof may be made of specific instances ton's re conduct.") (emphasis added). Request for hid' 1 t E is nothing more than a backdoor attempt to inject irrelevant and prejudicial ch See, e.g., Pandtda v. Fond nor particular ph Bence into the trial, contrary to well-settled Florida law. So. 358, 360 (Fla. 1940) ("neither [a witness's] general character ter can be gone into'"). ## Secti 609 and 90.610. Florida Statutes 4 'stration information is also inadmissible under sections 90.609 and 90.610, Florida Statutes, because it is irrelevant to Epstein's truthfulness and goes far beyond the bare fact he entered a plea agreement. See § 90.609, Fla. Stat. (2017) (character evidence used to impeach a witness "may refer only to character relating to truthfulness"). While section 90.610 permits a party to impeach a witness by evidence if the witness was convicted of a felony or a crime involving dishonesty, Epstein's registration information falls outside this narrow category of impeachment evidence by addressing the nature of his crime (a sexual offense). Impeachment under section 90.610 is strictly limited to the fact the witness was convicted of a felony or crime involving dishonesty, and the number of convictio s. Further details, including the nature of the crime, are off limits. See Rogers v. State, 964 21, 222- 23 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) ("[I]mpeachment by prior convictions is 'restricte nnining if the witness has previously been convicted of a crime, and if so, how many Int otte v. Pomeroy, 497 So. 2d 1275, 1280 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986) ("[Q]uestioning is ed hether the witness has ever been convicted of a felony or a crime involving dis t I Ite witness may be required to give the number of convictions, but if he answers t no further questions may be asked. In particular, the nature of the crimes may ngP ji ed.") (emphasis added); Reeser v. Boats Unlimited, Inc., 432 So. 2d 1346, 13 elicitation of the nature of the crit4 compensate for the possible p DCA 1983) ("Neither statute permits the e any additional light on his credibility would not I effect on the minds of the jurors.") (emphasis added). ### Sections 90.202 aid c 9 4203. Florida Statutes Finally, a matter of 90.20 cl em that the New York State Sex Offender registration information is is Court may take judicial notice pursuant to the procedure set out in section Statutes. However, the substantive part of the Florida Evidence Code that addresses matters as to which this Court "may" take judicial notice does not refer to or authorize judicial notice of out-of-state sex offender registration information under the circumstances of this case. Rather, items that are typical for judicial notice pertain to acts of Congress, constitutional or statutory law, the Federal Register, laws of foreign nations, official acts of one of the three Judicial Notice. WHEREFORE, Epstein respectfully ?'itc" t this Court deny Request for branches of government, court records, rules of court, county charters, the Florida Administrative Code, ordinances, or facts not subject to dispute because generally known within the court's territorial jurisdiction, or official seals of governmental agencies or United States departments. There is no listing for out-of-state sex offender registration information. #### CONCLUSION As supported by the pleadings and the record in this lawsuit, whether or Lein is a registered sex offender in the state of New York is not probative of any mat • i for this trial. Rather, this consistent attempt by to re-litigate his closed c i o ions and interject mini-trials in this matter must be rejected. The purpose is i ncoV • n the Florida Evidence Code, specifically sections 90.401, 90.403, 90.404, 90.40 by attempting to take advantage of the jury's negati . and 90.610, Florida Statutes, to such information. #### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that the foregoing document has been furnished to the attorneys listed on the Service List below on November 17, 2017, through the Court's e-filing portal pursuant to Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.516(bXI). > LINK & ROCKENBACH, PA 1555 Palm Beach Lakes Boulevard, Suite 301 West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 (561) 727-3600; (561) 727-3601 [fiu] By. /s/ Scott .1 Link Scott J. Link (FBN 60299 Kara Berard Rockenbac 44903) Angela M. Many (Fr2 Primary: Scott®Iin ockliw.com Primary: Ka inkrocklaw.com Primary: Second Seco S nkrocklaw.com m Eservice(alinkrocklaw.com (S'/Si e Counsel fo r Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant Epstein # CSERVICE LIST Jack Scarola Seamy, Denny, Sc a, m art & Shipley, P.A. 2139 Palm Bea oulevard West Palm 33409 law .c m Co-Cou endant/Counter-Plaintiff Nichole J. Segal Burlington & Rockenbach, P.A. Courthouse Commons, Suite 350 444 West Railroad Avenue West Palm Beach, FL 33401 njse.FLAppellateLaw.com kbt®FLAppellateLaw.com Co-CounseloiSiendant/Counter-Plaintiff J. |

J. [REDACTED]
Pottinger LLC
425 N. Andrews Avenue, Suite 2
Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301-3268
brad@epllc.com
staff.efile@pathtojustice.com
Co-Counsel for Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff
J. [REDACTED]

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Marc S. Nurik
Law Offices of Marc S. Nurik
One E. Broward Boulevard, Suite 700
Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
marc@nuriklaw.com
Counsel for Defendant Scott Rothstein

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Jack A. Goldberger
Atterbury, Goldberger & Weiss, P.A.
250 Australian Avenue S., Suite 1400
West Palm Beach, FL 33401
jgoldberger@agwpa.com
smahoney@agwpa.com
Co-Counsel for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant
Jeffrey Epstein

| | NOT A CERTIFIED COPY # EXHIBIT A NOT A CERTIFIED COPY #### UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA CASE NO.: 08-CIV-80119-MARRa✓ JANE DOE NO. 2, Plaintiff, vs. JEFFREY EPSTEIN, Defendant. I Related cases: 08-80232, 08-80380, 08-80381, 08-80994, 08-80993, 08-80811, 08-80893, 09-80469, 09-80591, 09-80656, 09-80802, 09-81092 C This cause is before the Court u t • ffJane Doe's Motion for Injunction Restraining Fraudulent Transfer a ppointment of a Receiver to Take Charge of Property of Epstein, and to Post Million Bond to Secure Potential Judgment (DE 165). Defendant Jeffrey stein IP a response in opposition to the motion (DE 198), and Plaintiff filed a reply (D 1 e motion is now fully briefed and ripe for review. P1 otion argues that Defendant is fraudulently transferring his assets with the specific in t to defeat any judgment that might be entered against him in this and other similar cases. Plaintiff therefore seeks an order enjoining Defendant from fraudulent transfers of his assets, appointing a receiver to take charge of Defendant's property, and requiring Defendant to post a \$15 million dollar bond against any potential judgment in this case. The relief sought by Plaintiff is injunctive and, essentially, amounts to a prejudgment writ of attachment. v. Cascade Intern., Inc. 21 F.3d 1520, 1530 (11th Cir. 1994) (vacating district court's preliminary injunction freezing defendant's assets). "No relief of this character has been thought justified in the long history of equity jurisprudence." De Beers Consol. Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 222-23 (1945). "Preliminary injunctive relief freezing a defendant's assets in order to es with which to satisfy a potential judgment for money damages is simply n ate exercise of a federal district court's authority." =, 21 F.3d at 153 "[i]t is entirely settled by a long and unbroken line of Florida cases that in an at law for money damages, there is simply no judicial authority for an order requirin controversy into the registry of the court ... or ind defendant's unrestricted assets prior to the Realty Assoc., Ltd. v. Mladen, 511 So it of the amount in straint upon the use of a ent." Id. at 1531, gtAtgt Konover (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). In Florida, an injunction his assets prior to the conclusto So.2d 614, 616 (Fla. 3d tered to prevent a party from using or disposing of egal action. Briceno v. Bryden Investments, Ltd., 973 8). See also SME Racks, Inc. v. Sistemas Mecanicos Para, Electroni S. ed.Appx. 502 (111° Cir. 2007) (affirming district's court's denial of prelimin on to freeze defendant's assets); Proctor v. Eason,651 So.2d 1301, 1301-02 (Fla. 2d D 1995) (Defendant not required to deposit funds in court registry prior to final judgment where Plaintiff failed to show unavailability of an adequate remedy at law and the likelihood of irreparable harm, two elements essential to entry of an injunction); Lawhon v. Mason, 611 So.2d 1367 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (quashing trial court order requiring defendant to give plaintiffs ten days notice prior to the transfer of any assets in excess of \$500). Additionally, as the Eleventh Circuit explained in In actions at law, plaintiffs in Florida possess an adequate, exclusive prejudgment remedy for the sequestration of assets under the attachment statute, Fla.Stat.Ann. § 76.04-.05 (West 1987), provided that they can satisfy the enumerated statutory grounds for relief. Accordingly, the use of injunctive relief as a substitute for the remedy of prejudgment attachment, with its attendant safeguards, is improper. 21 F.3d at 1531 (emphasis added). Here, Plaintiff did not move to amend hemp laint to allege a claim under the Florida Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act ("FUFTA" t. § 726.101, et m' Rather, she filed the present motion for injunctive relief. Even d moved to amend her complaint, it is certainly not clear that she could meet t statutory elements. Plaintiff's motion is premised on the contention that s fraudulently transferring his assets. However, Plaintiff's motion is entirely i evidence of Defendant's alleged fraudulent transfers. The Court declines n e that Defendant is fraudulently transferring assets based upon the adverse inf r d upon by Plaintiff. Plaintiff's supplemental filing regarding the titles of approxi of Defendant's vehicles is clearly de minimis particularly in light of P1 s repeated characterization of Defendant as a "billionaire." Based upo a fo oing, it is hereby ### ORD D ADJUDGED that &#x27;Fraudulent transfer claims under Florida law arise under the Florida Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act ("FUFTA"), Fla. Stat. § 726.101, et seq.. FUFTA, as set forth in Florida Statute § 726.105, provides the substantive requirements that must be pled to state a valid fraudulent transfer claim. Nationsbank. N.A. v. Coastal Utilities. Inc., 814 So.2d 1227, 1229 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 2002). The plaintiff must show that "(1) there was a creditor to be defrauded; (2) a debtor intending fraud; and (3) a conveyance of property which could have been applicable to the payment of the debt due." Id. (1) Plaintiff Jane Doe's Motion for leave to Provide Recently-obtained Deposition Testimony and Affidavit (DE 386 in 08-80119) is **GRANTED**. (2) Plaintiff Jane Doe's Motion for Injunction Restraining Fraudulent Transfer of Assets, Appointment of a Receiver to Take Charge of Property of Epstein, and to Post a \$15 Million Bond to Secure Potential Judgment (DE 165 in 08-80119) is **DENIED**. **DONE AND ORDERED** in [REDACTED] at West Palm Beach, Palm Beach County, Florida, this 5th day of November, 2009. ![](<>)Copies to:\ all counsel of record