EFTA00175283 Case 9:09-cv-80469-KAM Document 13 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/06/2009 Page 1 of 29 # UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA CASE NO.: 09-CIV-80469 – MARRA/JOHNSON JANE DOE II, Plaintiff, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, Defendant. DEFENDANT EPSTEIN'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT, AND SUPPORTING MEMORANDUM OF LAW Defendant, Jeffrey Epstein, (hereinafter "Epstein"), by and through his undersigned attorneys, moves to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint for failure to state a cause of action, and for more definite statement. Rule 12(b)(6), (e), Fed.R.Civ.P. (2008); Local Gen. Rule 7.1 (S.D. Fla. 2008). In support of dismissal, Defendant states: At the outset, Defendant gives notice to the Court that issues pertaining to 18 U.S.C. §2255 in this motion to dismiss are also raised in the case of v. Jeffrey Epstein, Case No. 08-CV-80811-MARRA/JOHNSON, in Defendant's Motion to Dismiss directed to Plaintiff 's Amended Complaint, Plaintiff 's Response, and Defendant's reply to 's response (which has yet to be filed). In this action, Plaintiff's Complaint attempts to allege a cause of action pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §2255 - Civil Remedies for Personal Injuries. Significantly, Plaintiff previously a filed lawsuit on July 10, 2008, based on the same facts as alleged herein in the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit In and For Palm Beach County, State of Florida, Case No. EFTA00175284
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Page 3 of 29 Jane Doe II v. Epstein, et al. Page 3 federal actions reveals that they are almost identical. Based on the same allegations, in the state action, Plaintiff attempts to assert claims based on state law for Sexual Battery (Count I) and Civil Conspiracy (Count II); in this action, Plaintiff is attempting to assert a cause of action pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §2255, which applicable version provides -- PART I--CRIMES CHAPTER 110--SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND OTHER ABUSE OF CHILDREN § 2255. Civil remedy for personal injuries (a) Any minor who is a victim of violation of section 2241(1), 2242, 2243, 2251, 2251A, 2252, 2252A, 2260, 2421, 2422, or 2423 of this title and who suffers personal injury as a result of such violation may sue in any appropriate United States District Court and shall recover the actual damages such minor sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee. Any minor as described in the preceding sentence shall be deemed to have sustained damages of no less than $50,000 in value. (b) Any action commenced under this section shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within six years after the right of action first accrues or in the case of a person under a legal disability, not later than three years after the disability. CREDIT(S) (Added Pub.L. 99-500, Title I, § 101(b) [Title VII, § 703(a)], Oct. 18, 1986, 100 Stat. 1783-75, and amended Pub.L. 99-591, Title I, § 101(b) [Title VII, § 703(a)], Oct. 30, 1986, 100 Stat. 3341-75; Pub.L. 105-314, Title VI, § 605, Oct. 30, 1998, 112 Stat. 2984.) (Emphasis added). Plaintiff is likely to argue that the jurisdiction of the federal court over §2255 claims is exclusive. However, unlike other Congressional enactments, there is no language in the statute which expressly states that jurisdiction of such cause of action lies exclusively with the federal courts. Furthermore, there is a presumption of concurrent jurisdiction of state courts. See generally, Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 823, 110 S.Ct. 1566, 1568-69 (1990). "Under our ‘system of dual sovereignty, we have consistently held that state courts have inherent authority, and are thus EFTA00175285 Case 9:09-cv-80469-KAM Document 13 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/06/2009 Page 5 of 29 Jane Doe II v. Epstein, et al. Page 5 the principles articulated in Colorado River Water Conserv. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976) and Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr., 460 U.S. 1, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983)." The six factors considered are (1) whether one of the courts has assumed jurisdiction over property; (2) the inconvenience of the federal forum; (3) the potential for piecemeal litigation; (4) the order in which the forums obtained jurisdiction; (5) whether state or federal law will be applied; and (6) the adequacy of the state court to protect the parties' rights. "The test for determining when exceptional circumstances exist, therefore, involves the careful balancing of six factors. The weight to be given any one factor may vary greatly depending on the case; however, the balance is "heavily weighted" in favor of the federal court exercising jurisdiction. *Id.* at 16, 103 S.Ct. at 937." American Bankers Ins. Co. of Florida v. First State Ins. Co., 891 F.2d 882, 884 (11th Cir. 1990). The list of factors is neither exhaustive, nor is it a mechanical checklist. See AM.JUR. FED. COURTS, § 1114. In the instant case, the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth factors are implicated. Clearly, more than a "potential" for piecemeal litigation exists if Plaintiff were allowed to proceed in two separate forums alleging the identical facts against the identical parties. Discovery and rulings thereon would involve the same set of facts, yet could result in inconsistent and varying rulings thereon. Should the cases proceed separately to trial, factual findings and judgments rendered in one could be inconsistent with the other. Appeals would proceed separately and in a piecemeal fashion. The piecemeal effect would be both excessive and deleterious if these cases were to proceed in parallel EFTA00175286 Case 9:09-cv-80469-KAM Document 13 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/06/2009 Page 7 of 29 Jane Doe II v. Epstein, et al. Page 7 (quoted above). See endnote 1 hereto, Complaint ¶11, 13.$^1$ It is an axiom of law that “retroactivity is not favored in the law.” Bowen, 488 U.S., at 208, 109 S.Ct., at 471 (1988). As eloquently stated in Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 1497, 511 U.S. 244, 265-66 (1994): ... the presumption against retroactive legislation is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence, and embodies a legal doctrine centuries older than our Republic. Elementary considerations of fairness dictate that individuals should have an opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly; settled expectations should not be lightly disrupted. $ ^{FN18} $ For that reason, the “principle that the legal effect of conduct should ordinarily be assessed under the law that existed when the conduct took place has timeless and universal appeal." Kaiser, 494 U.S., at 855, 110 S.Ct., at 1586 (SCALIA, J., concurring). In a free, dynamic society, creativity in both commercial and artistic endeavors is fostered by a rule of law that gives people confidence about the legal consequences of their actions. FN18. See General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 191, 112 S.Ct. 1105, 1112, 117 L.Ed.2d 328 (1992) ("Retroactive legislation presents problems of unfairness that are more serious than those posed by prospective legislation, because it can deprive citizens of legitimate expectations and upset settled transactions"); [Further citations omitted]. It is therefore not surprising that the antiretroactivity principle finds expression in several provisions of our Constitution. The Ex Post Facto Clause flatly prohibits retroactive application of penal legislation. FN19 Article I, § 10, cl. 1, prohibits States from passing another type of retroactive legislation, laws "impairing the Obligation of Contracts." The Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause prevents the Legislature (and other government actors) from depriving private persons of vested property rights except for a "public use" and upon payment of "just compensation." The prohibitions on "Bills of Attainder" in Art. I, §§ 9-10, prohibit legislatures from singling out disfavored persons and meting out summary punishment for past conduct. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 456-462, 85 S.Ct. 1707, 1719-1722, 14 L.Ed.2d 484 (1965). The Due Process Clause also protects the interests in fair notice and repose that may be compromised by retroactive legislation; a justification sufficient to validate a statute's prospective application under the Clause "may not suffice" to warrant its retroactive application. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 17, 96 S.Ct. 2882, 2893, 49 L.Ed.2d 752 (1976). FN19. Article I contains two Ex Post Facto Clauses, one directed to Congress (§ 9, cl. 3), the other to the States (§ 10, cl. 1). We have construed the Clauses as applicable only to penal legislation. See Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 390-391, 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.). EFTA00175287 Case 9:09-cv-80469-KAM Document 13 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/06/2009 Page 9 of 29 Jane Doe II v. Epstein, et al. Page 9 1998) ; and generally, Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390, 1 L.Ed. 648, 1798 WL 587 (Calder) (1798). (Calder) (1798). The United States Constitution provides that "[n]o Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed" by Congress. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. A law violates the Ex Post Facto Clause if it "‘appli[es] to events occurring before its enactment ... [and] disadvantage[s] the offender affected by it' by altering the definition of criminal conduct or increasing the punishment for the crime." Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 117 S.Ct. 891, 137 L.Ed.2d 63 (1997) (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981)). U. S. v. Siegel, 153 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir. 1998). In improperly attempting to multiply the presumptive minimum actual damages amount, Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges a time period "from about June, 2003 until on or about February, 2005." See endnote 1. In paragraph 14 of her Complaint, Plaintiff references the 2006 amended version of §2255 which raised the presumptive actual damages amount from $50,000 to $150,000; Plaintiff also improperly claims that she is entitled to "$150,000 for each violation, for a total range of damages between $1.5 million dollars to $4.5 million dollars, jointly and severally, ... ." ¶14. §2255 is contained in Title 18 of the United States Codes - "Crimes and Criminal Procedure, Part I. Crimes, Chap. 110. Sexual Exploitation and Other Abuse of Children." 18 U.S.C. §2255 (2005), is entitled *Civil remedy for personal injuries*, and imposes a presumptive minimum of damages in the amount of $50,000, should Plaintiff prove any violation of the specified criminal statutes and that she suffered personal injury with actual damages sustained. Thus, the effect of the 2006 amendments, effective July 27, 2006, would be to triple the amount of the statutory minimum previously in effect during the time of the alleged acts. If one were to take Plaintiff's EFTA00175288 Case 9:09-cv-80469-KAM Document 13 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/06/2009 Page 11 of 29 Jane Doe II v. Epstein, et al. Page 11 penalty or punishment, “Title II – Punishing Sexual Predators,” Sec. 206, from House Report No. 105-557, 5-6, specifically includes reference to the remedy created under §2255 as an additional means of punishing sexual predators, along with other penalties and punishments. Senatorial Comments in amending §2255 in 2006 confirm that the creation of the presumptive minimum damage amount is meant as an additional penalty against those who sexually exploit or abuse children. 2006 WL 2034118, 152 Cong. Rec. S8012-02. Senator Kerry refers to the statutorily imposed damage amount as “penalties.” Id. The cases of U.S. v. Siegel, supra (11th Cir. 1998), and U.S. v. Edwards, supra (3d Cir. 1998), also support Defendant's position that application of the current version of 18 U.S.C. §2255 would be in clear violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. In Siegel, the Eleventh Circuit found that the Ex Post Facto Clause barred application of the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act of 1996 (MVRA) to the defendant whose criminal conduct occurred before the effective date of the statute, 18 U.S.C. §3664(f)(1)(A), even though the guilty plea and sentencing proceeding occurred after the effective date of the statute. On July 19, 1996, the defendant Siegel pleaded guilty to various charges under 18 U.S.C. §371 and §1956(a)(1)(A), (conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, bank fraud, and laundering of money instruments; and money laundering). He was sentenced on March 7, 1997. As part of his sentence, Siegel was ordered to pay $1,207,000.00 in restitution under the MVRA which became effective on April 24, 1996. Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, 1229-1236. The 1996 amendments to MVRA required that the district court must order restitution in the full amount of the victim's loss EFTA00175289 Case 9:09-cv-80469-KAM Document 13 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/06/2009 Page 13 of 29 Jane Doe II v. Epstein, et al. Page 13 Clause.” \underline{Id}, at 1259. In determining that the application of the 1996 MVRA would indeed run afoul of the Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause, the Court agreed with the majority of the Circuits that restitution under the 1996 MVRA was an increased penalty.$^2$ “The effect of the MVRA can be detrimental to a defendant. Previously, after considering the defendant's financial condition, the court had the discretion to order restitution in an amount less than the loss sustained by the victim. Under the MVRA, however, the court must order restitution to each victim in the full amount.” \underline{Id}, at 1260. See also \underline{U.S. v. Edwards}, 162 F.2d 87 (3rd Circuit 1998). In the instant case, in answering the first question, it is clear that that imposition of a minimum amount of damages, regardless of the amount of actual damages suffered by a minor victim, is meant to be a penalty or punishment. See statutory text and House Bill Reports, cited above herein, consistently referring to the presumptive minimum damages amount under §2255 as “punishment” or “penalties.” According to the Ex Post Facto doctrine, although §2255 is labeled a “civil remedy,” such label is not dispositive; “if the effect of the statute is to impose punishment that is criminal in nature, the ex post facto clause is implicated.” *See generally*, Roman Catholic Bishop of Oakland v. Superior Court, 28 Cal.Rptr.3d 355, at 360, citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 360-61 (1997). The effect of applying the 2006 version of §2255 would be to triple the amount of the presumptive minimum damages to a minor who proves the 2 The Eleventh Circuit, in holding that "the MVRA cannot be applied to a person whose criminal conduct occurred prior to April 24, 1996," was "persuaded by the majority of districts on this issue." "Restitution is a criminal penalty carrying with it characteristics of criminal punishment." Siegel, supra at 1260. The Eleventh Circuit is in agreement with the Second, Third, Eighth, Ninth, and Circuits. See U.S. v. Futrell, 209 F.3d 1286, 1289-90 (11th Cir. 2000). EFTA00175290
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Page 15 of 29 Jane Doe II v. Epstein, et al. Page 15 application. As noted, 18 U.S.C. §2255 is entitled “Civil remedy for personal injuries.” Notwithstanding this label, the statute was enacted as part of the criminal statutory scheme to punish those who sexually exploit and abuse minors. Regardless of the actual damages suffered or proven by a minor, as long as a minor proves violation of a specified statutory criminal act under §2255 and personal injury, the defendant is held liable for the statutory imposed minimum. As explained by the Landgraf court, supra at 280, and at 1505, $ ^{3} $ When a case implicates a federal statute enacted after the events in suit, the court's first task is to determine whether Congress has expressly prescribed the statute's proper reach. If Congress has done so, of course, there is no need to resort to judicial default rules. When, however, the statute contains no such express command, the court must determine whether the new statute would have retroactive effect, i.e., whether it would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party's liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed. If the statute would operate retroactively, our traditional presumption teaches that it does not govern absent clear congressional intent favoring such a result. Here, there is no clear expression of intent regarding the 2006 Act's application to conduct occurring well before its enactment. Clearly, however, as discussed in part B herein, the presumptive minimum amount of damages of $150,000 was enacted as an punishment or penalty upon those who sexually exploit and abuse minors. See discussion of House Bill Reports and Congressional background above herein. The amount triples the previous amount for which a defendant might be found liable, regardless of the amount of actual damages a plaintiff has suffered and proven. The new 3 In Landgraf, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and refused to apply new provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to conduct occurring before the effective date of the Act. The Court determined that statutory text in question, §102, was subject to the presumption against statutory retroactivity. EFTA00175291
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Page 17 of 29 Jane Doe II v. Epstein, et al. Page 17 allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level ... on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Id. On a motion to dismiss, the well pleaded allegations of plaintiff's complaint are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. M.T.V. v. DeKalb County Sch. Dist., 446 F.3d 1153, 1156 (11th Cir.2006). In discussing Twombly, the Eleventh Circuit in Watts v. Fla. International Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2007), noted - "The Supreme Court's most recent formulation of the pleading specificity standard is that 'stating such a claim requires a complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest' the required element." In order to sufficiently allege the claim, the complaint is required to identify "facts that are suggestive enough to render [the element] plausible." Watts, 495 F.3d at 1296 (quoting Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1965). Pursuant to Rule 12(e), a party may move for more definite statement of a pleading to which a responsive pleading is allowed where the pleading “is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably frame a response.” The motion is required to point out the defects and the desired details. ld. As to the general rules and form of pleading, Rules 8 and 10, a claim for relief must contain “a short plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief;” Rule 8(a)(3); and may contain alternative claims within a count or as many separate claims. Rule 10(d)(2) and (3). ## A. 18 U.S.C. §2255(a) does not allow the Plaintiff to multiple the presumptive minimum damages amount on a per incident or per violation basis. In attempting to allege a §2255 claim, Plaintiff alleges that she is entitled to a multiplication of the presumptive minimum damages amount based on the number of EFTA00175292 Case 9:09-cv-80469-KAM Document 13 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/06/2009 Page 19 of 29 Jane Doe II v. Epstein, et al. Page 19 Martinez v. White, 492 F.Supp.2d 1186, 1188 (N.D. Cal. 2007), (emphasis added). 18 U.S.C.A. §2255 “merely provides a cause of action for damages in ‘any appropriate United States District Court.’” ld, at 1189. In Tilton v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 554 F.3d 1371 (11th Cir. Jan. 15, 2009), the District Court granted plaintiff “the minimum ‘actual damages’ prescribed by §2255(a),” wherein plaintiff alleged that defendants had violated three of the statutory predicate acts; there was no multiplying of the award. It is well settled that in interpreting a statute, the court's inquiry begins with the plain and unambiguous language of the statutory text. CBS, Inc. v. Prime Time 24 Venture, 245 F.3d 1217 (11th Cir. 2001); U.S. v. Castroneves, 2009 WL 528251, *3 (S.D. Fla. 2009), citing Reeves v. Astrue, 526 F.3d 732, 734 (11th Cir. 2008); and Smith v. Husband, 376 F.Supp.2d at 610 ("When interpreting a statute, [a court's] inquiry begins with the text."). "The Court must first look to the plain meaning of the words, and scrutinize the statute's 'language, structure, and purpose.'" Id. In addition, in construing a statute, a court is to presume that the legislature said what it means and means what it said, and not add language or give some absurd or strained interpretation. As stated in CBS, Inc., supra at 1228 – "Those who ask courts to give effect to perceived legislative intent by interpreting statutory language contrary to its plain and unambiguous meaning are in effect asking courts to alter that language, and '[c]ourts have no authority to alter statutory language... We cannot add to the terms of [the] provision what Congress left out.' Merritt, 120 F.3d at 1187." See also Dodd v. U.S., 125 S.Ct. 2478 (2005); 73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes §124. EFTA00175293 Case 9:09-cv-80469-KAM Document 13 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/06/2009 Page 21 of 29 Jane Doe II v. Epstein, et al. Page 21 had intended to abrogate the forum non conveniens doctrine in a §2255 action; the District Court noted that the statute does not contain a mandatory venue provision. Had Congress wanted to get rid of the forum non-conveniens doctrine, it would have said so in the statute. Also, in Smith v. Husband, 428 F.Supp. 432; and 376 F.Supp.2d 603, the plaintiff invoked “the accompanying civil remedy for these criminal violations, stating that she has sustained and continues to sustain physical and mental damages, humiliation, and embarrassment as a result of Defendant's criminal acts.” In other words, she brought a single cause of action, based on allegations of multiple violations of the §2255 predicate acts. Furthermore, the court refused to add a venue interpretation that simply was not written into the statutory text. See other §2255 cases cited herein. For an example of a statute wherein the legislature included the language “for each violation” in assessing a “civil penalty,” see 18 U.S.C. §216, entitled “Penalties and injunctions,” of Chapter 11 – “Bribery, Graft, and Conflict of Interests,” also contained in Title 18 – “Crimes and Criminal Procedure.” Subsection (b) of §216 gives the United States Attorney General the power to bring a “civil action … against any person who engages in conduct constituting an offense under” specified sections of the bribery, graft, and conflicts of interest statutes. The statute further provides in relevant part that “upon proof of such conduct by a preponderance of the evidence, such person shall be subject to a civil penalty of not more than $50,000 for each violation or the amount of compensation which the person received or offered for the prohibited conduct, which ever amount is greater.” As noted, 18 U.S.C. §2255 does not include such language. EFTA00175294 Case 9:09-cv-80469-KAM Document 13 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/06/2009 Page 23 of 29 Jane Doe II v. Epstein, et al. Page 23 commerce, or within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any individual who has not attained the age of 18 years, to engage in prostitution or any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, or attempts to do so, ... ." Plaintiff appears to be relying solely on an “agreement with the United States Attorney's Office to not contest liability for claims brought exclusively pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §2255, in exchange for avoiding federal prosecution under 18 U.S.C. §2422(b).” Complaint, ¶15. As noted above herein, Plaintiff already has additional claims against EPSTEIN pending in state court. See Exhibit A hereto. Even taking Plaintiff's allegation in paragraph 15 as true, Plaintiff is not proceeding exclusively under §2255. Accordingly, under the standard of pleading as established in Twombly, supra, Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege the requisite elements of a §2255 claim, thus requiring dismissal for failure to state a cause of action. C. In the alternative, pursuant to constitutional law principles of statutory interpretation, 18 U.S.C. §2255 is required to be interpreted as creating a single “civil remedy” or cause of action on behalf of a minor plaintiff against a defendant. The “civil remedy” afforded is not on a “per violation” or “per incident” basis. As set forth above, it is Defendant’s position that the text of 18 U.S.C. §2255 does not allow a Plaintiff to pursue the damages afforded under the statute on a “per violation” or “per incident” basis. In the alternative, if one were to assume that the language of §2255 were vague or ambiguous, under the constitutional based protections of due process, judicial restraint, and the rule of lenity applied in construing a statute, Defendant’s position as to the meaning of the statute would prevail over EFTA00175295 Case 9:09-cv-80469-KAM Document 13 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/06/2009 Page 25 of 29 Jane Doe II v. Epstein, et al. Page 25 Plaintiff's position would subject Defendant EPSTEIN to a punishment that is not clearly prescribed – an unwritten multiplier of the "actual damages" or the presumptive minimum damages. The rule of lenity requires that Defendant's interpretation of the remedy afforded under §2255 be adopted. As noted above, Plaintiff's interpretation would allow Plaintiff to multiply her recovery without any regard to what the actual damages are. In addition, under the Due Process Clause's basic principle of fair warning - ... a criminal statute must give fair warning of the conduct that it makes a crime ... As was said in United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617, 74 S.Ct. 808, 812, 98 L.Ed. 989, 'The constitutional requirement of definiteness is violated by a criminal statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute. The underlying principle is that no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.' Thus we have struck down a [state] criminal statute under the Due Process Clause where it was not 'sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties.' Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 126, 127, 70 L.Ed. 322. We have recognized in such cases that 'a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law,' ibid., and that 'No one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids.' Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453, 59 S.Ct. 618, 619, 83 L.Ed. 888. Thus, applying these well-entrenched constitutional principles of statutory interpretation and application, Plaintiff's cause of action attempting to multiply the presumptive amount of damages is required to be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. EFTA00175296 Case 9:09-cv-80469-KAM Document 13 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/06/2009 Page 27 of 29 Jane Doe II v. Epstein, et al. Page 27 ## Certificate of Service I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing was electronically filed with the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF. I also certify that the foregoing document is being served this day on all counsel of record identified on the following service list in the manner specified via transmission of Notices of Electronic Filing generated by CM/ECF on this day of May, 2009: | Isidro M. Garcia, Esq. | Garcia Law Firm, P.A. | | :--- | :--- | | 224 Datura Street, Suite 900 | West Palm Beach, FL 33401 | isidrogarcia@bellsouth.net Counsel for Plaintiff Jack Alan Goldberger, Esq. Atterbury Goldberger & Weiss, P.A. 250 Australian Avenue South Suite 1400 West Palm Beach, FL 33401-5012 jagesq@bellsouth.net Co-Counsel for Defendant Jeffrey Epstein Respectful By: ROBERT D. CRITTON, JR., ESQ. Florida Bar No. 224162 rcrit@bclclaw.com MICHAEL J. PIKE, ESQ. Florida Bar #617296 BURMAN, CRITTON, LUTTIER & COLEMAN 515 N. Flagler Drive, Suite 400 West Palm Beach, FL 33401 (Co-counsel for Defendant Jeffrey Epstein) ENDNOTES: 1 In paragraph 11 of her Complaint, Jane Doe II alleges that – “From about June, 2003 until about February, 2005, Defendants, EPSTEIN and persuaded, induced, or EFTA00175297 Case 9:09-cv-80469-KAM Document 13 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/06/2009 Page 29 of 29 Jane Doe II v. Epstein, et al. Page 29 102, 112 Stat. 2975; Apr. 30, 2003, Pub.L. 108-21, Title I, § 103(a)(2)(A), (B), (b)(2)(A), 117 Stat. 652, 653.) ## Amendments 2006 Amendments. Subsec. (b). Pub.L. 109-248, § 203, struck out "not less than 5 years and not more than 30 years" and inserted "not less than 10 years or for life".